Court Dismisses Suit Over Disclosure of Clergy-Penitent Conversation

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In Stephens v. Metropolitan New York Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, (Dutchess Cty. NY Sup. Ct., April 29, 2024), a New York state trial court dismissed a suit for breach of fiduciary duty, infliction of emotional distress, hostile work environment and defamation brought by an Episcopal clergyman, who was also on the Roster of Ministers of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Plaintiff had sought out pastor Christopher Mietlowski for a confidential confessional conversation about an extramarital affair. Despite the assurance of confidentiality, Mietlowski disclosed the information to the bishop of the New York Synod of the ELCA who in turn disclosed the information to plaintiff’s wife who was also a pastor. The bishop also disclosed the information to the Episcopal Church which suspended plaintiff’s license to officiate. Subsequently, ELCA removed plaintiff from its roster of clergy.

The court held that even though New York has codified the clergy-penitent privilege, that provision does not give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when a conversation between a congregant and a member of the clergy is disclosed. The court also rejected plaintiff’s claims growing out of his removal from the roster of ministers of the ELCA saying that this was an ecclesiastical decision about a minister’s qualifications to serve which is beyond the power of civil courts to review.

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New HIPPA Rules Protect Against Disclosure to Law Enforcement of Out-of-State Abortions

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On April 22, the Department of Health and Human Services issued new rules under HIPPA to protect the privacy of reproductive health care.  The rules were adopted in a 291-page Release (full text) (press release). The rules are designed to protect women (and those who assist them) who travel out of state for an abortion that is not legal in their state of residence. A Fact Sheet issued by the Department of Health and Human Services summarizes the new rules, saying in part:

The Final Rule strengthens privacy protections by prohibiting the use or disclosure of protected health information (PHI) by a covered health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse—or their business associate—for either of the following activities:

To conduct a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into or impose criminal, civil, or administrative liability on any person for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care, where such health care is lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided.

The identification of any person for the purpose of conducting such investigation or imposing such liability.

… [T]he prohibition applies where…:

The reproductive health care is lawful under the law of the state in which such health care is provided under the circumstances in which it is provided….

The reproductive health care is protected, required, or authorized by Federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the state in which such health care is provided….

19th News reports on the new rules. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

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Supreme Court Clarifies Harm Requirement in Title VII Job Transfer Claims

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 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, (Sup. Ct., April 17, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, clarified the extent to which harm must be shown in a Title VII employment discrimination case in which plaintiff alleges a discriminatory job transfer. The court said in part:

The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage.  Other courts have used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers. 

Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.  Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar….

To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” … Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.

Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh each filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but differing to some extent with the majority’s reasoning. 

Although this case involved sex discrimination, the test would apply equally to religiously discriminatory job transfers. Wisconsin Public Radio reports on the decision.

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Alabama Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

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In Sails v. Weeks, (AL Sup. Ct., April 5, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 8-1, without an opinion for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of a suit challenging the use and disposal of church property. Defendants contended that plaintiffs are not members of the church and thus could not bring suit on its behalf. Justice Mendheim filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

[I]t is inaccurate to attribute the genesis of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine to the First Amendment. The delicacy with which courts approach church-dispute cases arose more organically from America’s history of seeking to disentangle church denominations from state governance…

I believe that our invocation of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence….

The Sails plaintiffs argued that the heart of this dispute concerns the alleged mismanagement or misuse of church property. However, I believe that the Sails plaintiffs’ property allegations are a proxy for asking the courts to decide who controls the church — an issue our courts lack the means and expertise to decide….

… “[T]he nature of the underlying dispute” is whether the Sails plaintiffs, who stopped attending the church several years ago, are still members of the spiritual church, who are the ones that ultimately control the incorporated church and the property it holds. In short, there is no way around the fact that, in this case, a decision concerning the use of the church property implicates the spiritual church because church membership is a spiritual concern. 

Justice Sellers filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Defendants … moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of Union Baptist because, they claimed, Union Baptist was no longer a recognized legal entity under Alabama law because of the official name change that occurred in 2017….

… [C]hanging the name of a corporation, amending an organizational document, or reforming a deed involves the use of our civil legal system that by its very nature is not ecclesiastical.  The issue in this case then is who has the authority to act on behalf of the organization?  And, after identifying that issue, the question then becomes whether secular courts can decide that issue or whether that decision should be left to some ecclesiastical authority?  Because we have no ecclesiastical courts with enforcement authority, I am uncertain how the issue can be decided without court intervention. 

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Suit For Misappropriating Church Funds Not Precluded by Church Autonomy Doctrine

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In Buck v. Peace Apostolic Church, Inc., (CA Super. Ct., March 8, 2024), a California trial court rejected the contention that the church autonomy or ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes the court from adjudicating a claim that two church officers and directors improperly spent church funds.  The court said in part:

The First Amendment does not immunize the Church or the individual defendants from illegal acts that apply equally to everyone, religious or not. The Plaintiffs alleged and proved that Defendants committed fraud and engaged in false advertising. Defendants solicited donations from the public promising that “no part of the income or assets of this corporation shall ever inure to the benefit of any director, officer, or member thereof or to the benefit of any private person.”… Prince used her position in the church and the representations made by her and by the church to enrich herself. While Brown did not enrich herself, she facilitated the enrichment of her son, Howard Woods. The defendants cannot take money based on a representation that it would be used for charitable purposes and church mission and use it for personal benefit. That’s not internal church governance. That’s fraud. The activities that occurred in that case are not protected by the First Amendment…. 

On December 19, 2023, the Court ordered injunctive relief. In part, PAC was ordered to post warnings that read “WARNING: A Jury has found that Tamara Swancy-Prince, Priscilla Woods Brown and Peace Apostolic Church have improperly misappropriated donations.” PAC objects to the injunction arguing that the Court misapplied the law…. The Court is simply not convinced that similar abuses won’t recur.

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Religious Marriage Without Marriage License and Later Annulled by Religious Court Is Still Recognized By New York

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In T.I. v. R.I., (NY Sup Ct Kings Cty, March 20, 2024), a New York state trial court held that the state would recognize a couple’s marriage that was performed in a Jewish religious ceremony even though the couple did not obtain a civil marriage license and the marriage was annulled eight years later by a religious tribunal.  In a long-running dispute between the parties, there had been a prior divorce action which the parties discontinued and there had been protection orders in favor of the wife against the husband issued by the Family Court and Criminal Court. Now the husband, claiming that no marriage between them existed any longer, sought to have the wife’s divorce action dismissed so that the court could not issue orders for him to pay child support, spousal maintenance or equitable distribution of property. According to the court:

The husband contends that the rabbinical court invalidated the parties’ religious marriage on two Jewish religious concepts: 1) based upon “concealment” because the wife did not disclose her alleged mental health history to him prior to the religious solemnization ceremony; and 2) because the person who conducted the solemnization ceremony was not, although unknown to the parties, authorized to do so by at least some portion of the religious community….

Nothing related to the wife’s request for a civil divorce requires this Court to address or assess the religious issues that the husband brought before the rabbinical court or that may have been part of the rabbinical court’s determination and, as such, the husband’s theory that the issue of whether the wife can seek a divorce of any marriage recognized by the State of New York is not prohibited by the First Amendment. Here, the determination of whether a marriage recognized by the State of New York exists between the parties separate and apart from any religious marriage rests not upon religious doctrine but upon neutral principles of law.

Any religious determinations and any ramification of religious doctrine made by the rabbinical court as to the parties’ religious marriage are separate and apart from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over whether, based on neutral principles of law, there exists here a marriage recognized by the State between the parties….

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Custody Order Barring Father from Taking Child to His Church Upheld

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In Bardonner v. Bardonner, (IN App., March 12, 2024), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a father’s free exercise rights were not infringed in any way by a provision in a custody order that gives his former wife custody of their child and the sole right to determine the child’s religious training.  At issue is a trial court order that provides in part:

Father shall NOT permit the child to attend any All Saints Orthodox Church service, Sunday school, social event, any event located at the church, any event sponsored in whole or in part by All Saints Orthodox Church; nor any private events hosted by a member of All Saints Orthodox Church….

The court said in part:

The bottom line is that Mother has the exclusive authority to dictate Child’s religious training, and she has decided that Child shall not participate in Father’s church. Mother does not need to explain her reasons or justify her decision in any way.

Finally, we note that it was Father’s own violations of previous court orders, which were less restrictive on this issue, that led the trial court to impose the current prohibition against taking Child to even private functions hosted by members of Father’s church. Given the trial court’s broad discretion in family matters, we decline Father’s invitation to find an abuse of that discretion here. 

In sum, the trial court’s order does not violate Father’s First Amendment rights; nor is it erroneous for other reasons.

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Custody Order Barring Father from Taking Child to His Church Upheld

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In Bardonner v. Bardonner, (IN App., March 12, 2024), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a father’s free exercise rights were not infringed in any way by a provision in a custody order that gives his former wife custody of their child and the sole right to determine the child’s religious training.  At issue is a trial court order that provides in part:

Father shall NOT permit the child to attend any All Saints Orthodox Church service, Sunday school, social event, any event located at the church, any event sponsored in whole or in part by All Saints Orthodox Church; nor any private events hosted by a member of All Saints Orthodox Church….

The court said in part:

The bottom line is that Mother has the exclusive authority to dictate Child’s religious training, and she has decided that Child shall not participate in Father’s church. Mother does not need to explain her reasons or justify her decision in any way.

Finally, we note that it was Father’s own violations of previous court orders, which were less restrictive on this issue, that led the trial court to impose the current prohibition against taking Child to even private functions hosted by members of Father’s church. Given the trial court’s broad discretion in family matters, we decline Father’s invitation to find an abuse of that discretion here. 

In sum, the trial court’s order does not violate Father’s First Amendment rights; nor is it erroneous for other reasons.

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RLUIPA Safe harbor Does Not Extend to Claims for Monetary Damages

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In Bair Brucha Inc. v. Township of Toms River, New Jersey, (D NJ, Feb. 29, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court granted plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings on their RLUIPA and Free Exercise challenges to discriminatory land use regulations that prevented their construction of a synagogue.  Plaintiffs claimed that Toms River had engaged in an orchestrated effort to prevent the growth of the Orthodox Jewish population in the town. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the township amended its zoning regulations in a settlement of a RLUIPA suit brought by the Justice Department. Plaintiffs did not deny that their original regulations violated the Equal Terms and the Exclusion and Limits provisions of RLUIPA. However, they contended that since the zoning ordinances have subsequently been amended, the township is covered by the safe harbor provision in RLUIPA that shields a local government from the preemptive force of RLUIPA if it subsequently amends its land use regulations to remove the burdensome or discriminatory provisions. The court held that the safe harbor provision does not extend to claims for monetary damages incurred before the township took corrective action.

Also finding a violation of the Free Exercise clause, the court concluded that the land use regulations were neither neutral nor generally applicable and that antisemitic animus was a motivating factor behind the land use regulations.

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Civil Conspiracy Claims Against Religious Organization Survive 1st Amendment Defenses

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In re Gothard, (TX App., Feb. 22, 2024), is a mandamus action that is essentially an appeal of a trial court’s refusal to dismiss civil conspiracy claims against Institute in Basic Life Principles and its founder, William Gothard. Plaintiffs claimed that ILBP is a cult that “teachers distorted and heretical Christian doctrines” that led to their sexual abuse by their father and brother. The Texas state appellate court rejected Relators’, i.e. defendants’, First Amendment defenses, saying in part:

Gothard maintains that religious teachings and the publication thereof are constitutionally protected.  IBLP contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars RPIs’ cause of action. It argues that the “alleged religiously motivated conduct of IBLP is the advocacy and publication of religious beliefs.”  According to Relators, if RPIs’ claim is considered valid, any religious leader who speaks on religious topics and publishes his beliefs could be subject to a civil cause of action if a listener or reader improperly applies those beliefs in sexually abusing another person or committing some other unlawful act. …

But the First Amendment does not bar all claims against religious bodies.,,,  A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government….

The relevant question is whether it appears certain that resolution of [plaintiffs’]’ claims will require the trial court to address purely ecclesiastical questions…. IBLP represents that its teachings and materials are based on scriptures from the Bible, none of which “advocate sexual abuse or any other form of sexual immorality.”  Accordingly, by its own admission, IBLP’s teachings and materials do not advocate sexual abuse and consequently, the intentional tort of sexual assault that underlies the civil conspiracy claim is not rooted in religious belief.  ….

Because sexual assault is not part of Relators’ belief system, we cannot definitively say, based on the record before us, that this is a situation in which religious beliefs are so intertwined with a tort claim so as to unconstitutionally burden Relators’ rights and embroil the court in an assessment of those religious beliefs.

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