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Archive for the month “January, 2019”

What is marriage?

Every now and again I come across a fantastic article the warrants posting here.  I came across one a while back that was a fantastic secular approach to defining marriage from Harvard.  I thought it was pretty insightful. Be edified.

You can find this article here in .pdf format.  It may be easier to read than the below as the formatting below is a little wonky.






  1. ……………………………………………………………………..248
  2. Equality, Justice, and the Heart

of the Debate……………………………………………………. 248

  1. Real Marriage Is—And Is Only—The

Union of Husband and Wife…………………….. 252

  1. Comprehensive Union………………………….. 253
  2. Special Link to Children……………………….. 255
  3. Marital Norms………………………………………….. 259
  4. How Would Gay Civil Marriage

Affect You or Your Marriage?…………………… 260

  1. Weakening Marriage……………………………… 260
  2. Obscuring the Value of Opposite‐Sex

Parenting As an Ideal……………………………. 262

  1. Threatening Moral and Religious

Freedom……………………………………………………… 263

  1. If Not Same‐Sex Couples,

Why Infertile Ones?………………………………………. 265

  1. Still Real Marriages…………………………………. 266
  2. Still in the Public Interest……………………… 268
  3. Challenges for Revisionists………………………….. 269
  4. The State Has an Interest in

Regulating Some Relationships?………… 269

  1. Only if They Are Romantic?……………….. 271
  2. Only if They Are Monogamous?……….. 272
  3. Isn’t Marriage Just Whatever

We Say It Is?…………………………………………………….. 274

II   …………………………………………………………………………………….. 275


  • D. Candidate in Philosophy, Princeton University.
  • McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
  • D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Notre Dame.
  1. Why Not Spread Traditional Norms

to the Gay Community?………………………………. 275

  1. What About Partners’

Concrete Needs?…………………………………………….. 280

  1. Doesn’t the Conjugal Conception

of Marriage Sacrifice Some

People’s Fulfillment for Others’?………………. 281

  1. Isn’t It Only Natural?…………………………………….. 284
  2. Doesn’t Traditional Marriage

Law Impose Controversial

Moral and Religious Views

on Everyone?…………………………………………………… 285

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………… 286


What is marriage?

Consider two competing views:

Conjugal View: Marriage is the union of a man and a woman who make a permanent and exclusive commitment to each other of the type that is naturally (inherently) fulfilled by bearing and rearing children together. The spouses seal (consummate) and renew their union by conjugal acts—acts that constitute the be‐ havioral part of the process of reproduction, thus uniting them as a reproductive unit. Marriage is valuable in itself, but its in‐ herent orientation to the bearing and rearing of children con‐ tributes to its distinctive structure, including norms of monogamy and fidelity. This link to the welfare of children also helps explain why marriage is important to the common good and why the state should recognize and regulate it.1


Revisionist View: Marriage is the union of two people (whether of the same sex or of opposite sexes) who commit to romantically loving and caring for each other and to sharing the burdens and benefits of domestic life. It is essentially a un‐ ion of hearts and minds, enhanced by whatever forms of sexual intimacy both partners find agreeable. The state should recog‐ nize and regulate marriage because it has an interest in stable romantic partnerships and in the concrete needs of spouses and any children they may choose to rear.2


  1. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,69 NOTRE DAME REV. 1049, 1066 (1994); John Finnis, “Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good,” THE MONIST, July–Oct. 2008, 388–406. See also PATRICK LEE & ROBERT P. GEORGE, BODY‐SELF DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND POLITICS 176–97 (2008).


It has sometimes been suggested that the conjugal under‐ standing of marriage is based only on religious beliefs. This is false. Although the world’s major religious traditions have his‐ torically understood marriage as a union of man and woman that is by nature apt for procreation and childrearing,3 this sug‐ gests merely that no one religion invented marriage. Instead, the demands of our common human nature have shaped (however imperfectly) all of our religious traditions to recognize this natu‐ ral institution. As such, marriage is the type of social practice whose basic contours can be discerned by our common human reason, whatever our religious background. We argue in this Article for legally enshrining the conjugal view of marriage, us‐ ing arguments that require no appeal to religious authority.4

Part I begins by defending the idea—which many revision‐ ists implicitly share but most shrink from confronting—that the nature of marriage (that is, its essential features, what it fun‐ damentally is) should settle this debate. If a central claim made by revisionists against the conjugal view, that equality requires recognizing loving consensual relationships,5 were true, it would also refute the revisionist view; being false, it in fact re‐ futes neither view.

Revisionists, moreover, have said what they think marriage is not (for example, inherently opposite‐sex), but have only rarely (and vaguely) explained what they think marriage is. Consequently, because it is easier to criticize a received view than to construct a complete alternative, revisionist arguments have had an appealing simplicity. But these arguments are also vulnerable to powerful criticisms that revisionists do not have the resources to answer. This Article, by contrast, makes a posi‐ tive case, based on three widely held principles, for what makes a marriage.


  1. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261,

279 (1995).

  1. Even in traditions that permit or have permitted polygamy, each marriage is between a man and a woman.


  1. See infra Part II.E.
  2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same‐Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1993).

Part I also shows how the common good of our society cru‐ cially depends on legally enshrining the conjugal view of mar‐ riage and would be damaged by enshrining the revisionist view—thus answering the common question, “How would gay civil marriage affect you or your marriage?” Part I also shows that what revisionists often consider a tension in our view— that marriage is possible between an infertile man and woman—is easily resolved. Indeed, it is revisionists who can‐ not explain (against a certain libertarianism) why the state should care enough about some relationships to enact any mar‐ riage policy at all, or why, if enacted, it should have certain fea‐ tures which even they do not dispute. Only the conjugal view accounts for both facts. For all these reasons, even those who consider marriage to be merely a socially useful fiction have strong pragmatic reasons for supporting traditional marriage laws. In short, Part I argues that legally enshrining the conjugal view of marriage is both philosophically defensible and good for society, and that enshrining the revisionist view is neither. So Part I provides the core or essence of our argument, what could reasonably be taken as a stand‐alone defense of our position.

But many who accept (or at least grant) our core argument may have lingering questions about the justice or consequences of im‐ plementing it. Part II considers all of the serious concerns that are not treated earlier: the objections from conservatism (Why not spread traditional norms to the gay community?), from practical‐ ity (What about partners’ concrete needs?), from fairness (Doesn’t the conjugal conception of marriage sacrifice some people’s ful‐ fillment for others’?), from naturalness (Isn’t it only natural?), and from neutrality (Doesnʹt traditional marriage law impose contro‐ versial moral and religious views on everyone?).


As this Article makes clear, the result of this debate mat‐ ters profoundly for the common good. And it all hinges on one question: What is marriage?

  1. Equality, Justice, and the Heart of the Debate

Revisionists today miss this central question—what is mar‐ riage?—most obviously when they equate traditional marriage laws with laws banning interracial marriage. They argue that people cannot control their sexual orientation any more than they can control the color of their skin.6 In both cases, they ar‐ gue, there is no rational basis for treating relationships differ‐ ently, because the freedom to marry the person one loves is a fundamental right.7 The state discriminates against homosexu‐ als by interfering with this basic right, thus denying them the equal protection of the laws.8

But the analogy fails: antimiscegenation was about whom to allow to marry, not what marriage was essentially about; and sex, unlike race, is rationally relevant to the latter ques‐ tion. Because every law makes distinctions, there is nothing unjustly discriminatory in marriage law’s reliance on genu‐ inely relevant distinctions.

Opponents of interracial marriage typically did not deny that marriage (understood as a union consummated by conjugal acts) between a black and a white was possible any more than propo‐ nents of segregated public facilities argued that some feature of the whites‐only water fountains made it impossible for blacks to drink from them. The whole point of antimiscegenation laws in the United States was to prevent the genuine possibility of inter‐ racial marriage from being realized or recognized, in order to maintain the gravely unjust system of white supremacy.9

By contrast, the current debate is precisely over whether it is possible for the kind of union that has marriage’s essential fea‐ tures to exist between two people of the same sex. Revisionists do not propose leaving intact the historic definition of marriage and simply expanding the pool of people eligible to marry. Their goal is to abolish the conjugal conception of marriage in our law10 and replace it with the revisionist conception.

  1. See, e.g.,
  2. See, e.g.,
  3. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
  4. Throughout history, no society’s laws have explicitly forbidden gay mar‐ riage. They have not explicitly forbidden it because, until recently, it has not been thought possible. What is more, antimiscegenation laws, at least in the United States, were meant to keep blacks separate from whites, and thus in a position of social, economic, and political inferiority to them. But traditional marriage laws were not devised to oppress those with same‐sex attractions. The comparison is offensive, and puzzling to many—not least to the nearly two‐thirds of black vot‐ ers who voted to uphold conjugal marriage under California Proposition Eight. See Cara Mia DiMassa & Jessica Garrison, Why Gays, Blacks are Divided on Prop. 8, A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A1.

More decisively, though, the analogy to antimiscegenation fails because it relies on the false assumption that any distinc‐ tion is unjust discrimination. But suppose that the legal inci‐ dents of marriage were made available to same‐sex as well as opposite‐sex couples. We would still, by the revisionists’ logic, be discriminating against those seeking open, temporary, poly‐ gynous, polyandrous, polyamorous, incestuous, or bestial un‐ ions. After all, people can find themselves experiencing sexual and romantic desire for multiple partners (concurrent or serial), or closely blood‐related partners, or nonhuman partners. They are (presumably) free not to act on these sexual desires, but this is true also of people attracted to persons of the same sex.

Many revisionists point out that there are important differ‐ ences between these cases and same‐sex unions. Incest, for ex‐ ample, can produce children with health problems and may involve child abuse. But then, assuming for the moment that the state’s interest in avoiding such bad outcomes trumps what revisionists tend to describe as a fundamental right, why not allow incestuous marriages between adult infertile or same‐sex couples? Revisionists might answer that people should be free to enter such relationships, and all or some of the others listed, but that these do not merit legal recognition. Why? Because, the revisionist will be forced to admit, marriage as such just cannot take these forms, or can do so only immorally. Recog‐ nizing them would be, variously, confused or immoral.

Revisionists who arrive at this conclusion must accept at least three principles.

First, marriage is not a legal construct with totally malleable contours—not “just a contract.” Otherwise, how could the law get marriage wrong? Rather, some sexual relationships are in‐ stances of a distinctive kind of relationship—call it real mar‐ riage—that has its own value and structure, whether the state recognizes it or not, and is not changed by laws based on a false conception of it. Like the relationship between parents and their children, or between the parties to an ordinary promise, real marriages are moral realities that create moral privileges and ob‐ ligations between people, independently of legal enforcement.11

  1. For a brief defense of this idea, and the implications for our argument of de‐ nying it, see infra Part I.F.

Thus, when some states forbade interracial marriage, they ei‐ ther attempted to keep people from forming real marriages, or denied legal status to those truly marital relationships. Con‐ versely, if the state conferred the same status on a man and his two best friends or on a woman and an inanimate object, it would not thereby make them really married. It would merely give the title and (where possible) the benefits of legal mar‐ riages to what are not actually marriages at all.

Second, the state is justified in recognizing only real marriages as marriages. People who cannot enter marriages so understood for, say, psychological reasons are not wronged by the state, even when they did not choose and cannot control the factors that keep them single—which is true, after all, of many people who remain single despite their best efforts to find a mate.

Any legal system that distinguishes marriage from other, non‐ marital forms of association, romantic or not, will justly exclude some kinds of union from recognition. So before we can conclude that some marriage policy violates the Equal Protection Clause,12 or any other moral or constitutional principle, we have to deter‐ mine what marriage actually is and why it should be recognized legally in the first place. That will establish which criteria (like kinship status) are relevant, and which (like race) are irrelevant to a policy that aims to recognize real marriages. So it will establish when, if ever, it is a marriage that is being denied legal recogni‐ tion, and when it is something else that is being excluded.

As a result, in deciding whether to recognize, say, polyamor‐ ous unions, revisionists would not have to figure out first whether the desire for such relationships is natural or unchang‐ ing; what the economic effects of not recognizing polyamory would be; whether nonrecognition stigmatizes polyamorous partners and their children; or whether nonrecognition violates their right to the equal protection of the law. With respect to the last question, it is exactly the other way around: Figuring out what marriage is would tell us whether equality requires generally treating polyamorous relationships just as we do monogamous ones—that is, as marriages.

Third, there is no general right to marry the person you love, if this means a right to have any type of relationship that you desire recognized as marriage. There is only a presumptive right

not to be prevented from forming a real marriage wherever one is possible. And, again, the state cannot choose or change the essence of real marriage; so in radically reinventing legal mar‐ riage, the state would obscure a moral reality.

  1. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

There is a tension here. Some revisionists say that marriage is merely a social and legal construct, but their appeals to equal‐ ity undermine this claim. The principle of equality requires treating like cases alike. So the judgment that same‐sex and opposite‐sex unions are alike with respect to marriage, and should therefore be treated alike by marriage law, presupposes one of two things: Either neither relationship is a real marriage in the above sense, perhaps because there is no such thing, marriage being just a legal fiction (in which case, why not jus‐ tify apparent inequities by social‐utility considerations?13), or both relationships are real marriages, whatever the law says about them. The latter presupposition entails the belief, which most revisionists seem to share with advocates of the conjugal view, that marriage has a nature independent of legal conven‐ tions. In this way, the crucial question—the only one that can settle this debate—remains for both sides: What is marriage?

  1. Real Marriage Is—And Is Only—The Union

of Husband and Wife

As many people acknowledge, marriage involves: first, a comprehensive union of spouses; second, a special link to children; and third, norms of permanence, monogamy, and exclusivity.14 All three elements point to the conjugal under‐ standing of marriage.


  1. This point requires elaboration: Some revisionists might deny that there is a “real marriage” from which any relationship might deviate, and instead maintain that marriage is purely conventional. Those who think marriage is a useless or unjustifiable fiction have no reason to support any marriage law at all, while those who think it is a useful and legitimate fiction must explain why the state should keep even the restrictions on marriage that they support. On this latter point, see infra Part II.B. On the implications of regarding marriage as pure construction, see infra Part I.F.


  1. Among revisionists, see, for example, Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse? The case for Gay (and Straight) Marriage, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 18, avail‐ able at http://www.jonathanrauch.com/jrauch_articles/gay_marriage_1_the_case_for_ marriage; Ralph Wedgwood, The Fundamental Argument for Same‐Sex Marriage, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 225, 229 (1999); Jonathan Rauch, Not So Fast, Mr. George, INDEP. GAY (Aug. 2, 2006), http://igfculturewatch.com/2006/08/02/not‐so‐fast‐mr‐


  1. Comprehensive Union

Marriage is distinguished from every other form of friend‐ ship inasmuch as it is comprehensive. It involves a sharing of lives and resources, and a union of minds and wills—hence, among other things, the requirement of consent for forming a marriage. But on the conjugal view, it also includes organic bodily union. This is because the body is a real part of the per‐ son, not just his costume, vehicle, or property. Human beings are not properly understood as nonbodily persons—minds, ghosts, consciousnesses—that inhabit and use nonpersonal bodies. After all, if someone ruins your car, he vandalizes your property, but if he amputates your leg, he injures you. Because the body is an inherent part of the human person, there is a dif‐ ference in kind between vandalism and violation; between de‐ struction of property and mutilation of bodies.

Likewise, because our bodies are truly aspects of us as per‐ sons, any union of two people that did not involve organic bodily union would not be comprehensive—it would leave out an important part of each person’s being. Because persons are body‐mind composites, a bodily union extends the relationship of two friends along an entirely new dimension of their being as persons. If two people want to unite in the comprehensive way proper to marriage, they must (among other things) unite organically—that is, in the bodily dimension of their being.

This necessity of bodily union can be seen most clearly by imagining the alternatives. Suppose that Michael and Michelle build their relationship not on sexual exclusivity, but on tennis exclusivity. They pledge to play tennis with each other, and only with each other, until death do them part. Are they thereby married? No. Substitute for tennis any nonsexual activ‐ ity at all, and they still aren’t married: Sexual exclusivity— exclusivity with respect to a specific kind of bodily union—is required. But what is it about sexual intercourse that makes it uniquely capable of creating bodily union? People’s bodies can touch and interact in all sorts of ways, so why does only sexual union make bodies in any significant sense “one flesh”?

Our organs—our heart and stomach, for example—are parts of one body because they are coordinated, along with other parts, for a common biological purpose of the whole: our bio‐ logical life. It follows that for two individuals to unite organi‐ cally, and thus bodily, their bodies must be coordinated for some biological purpose of the whole.  Among supporters of the conjugal view, see, for example, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Supp., Q. 44, Art. 1.

That sort of union is impossible in relation to functions such as digestion and circulation, for which the human individual is by nature sufficient. But individual adults are naturally incomplete with respect to one biological function: sexual reproduction. In coi‐ tus, but not in other forms of sexual contact, a man and a woman’s bodies coordinate by way of their sexual organs for the common biological purpose of reproduction. They perform the first step of the complex reproductive process. Thus, their bodies become, in a strong sense, one—they are biologically united, and do not merely rub together—in coitus (and only in coitus), similarly to the way in which one’s heart, lungs, and other organs form a unity: by co‐ ordinating for the biological good of the whole. In this case, the whole is made up of the man and woman as a couple, and the biological good of that whole is their reproduction.

Here is another way of looking at it. Union on any plane— bodily, mental, or whatever—involves mutual coordination on that plane, toward a good on that plane. When Einstein and Bohr discussed a physics problem, they coordinated intellectu‐ ally for an intellectual good, truth. And the intellectual union they enjoyed was real, whether or not its ultimate target (in this case, a theoretical solution) was reached—assuming, as we safely can, that both Einstein and Bohr were honestly seeking truth and not merely pretending while engaging in deception or other acts which would make their apparent intellectual un‐ ion only an illusion.

By extension, bodily union involves mutual coordination to‐ ward a bodily good—which is realized only through coitus. And this union occurs even when conception, the bodily good toward which sexual intercourse as a biological function is ori‐ ented, does not occur. In other words, organic bodily unity is achieved when a man and woman coordinate to perform an act of the kind that causes conception. This act is traditionally called the act of generation or the generative act;15 if (and only



  1. if) it is a free and loving expression of the spouses’ permanent and exclusive commitment, then it is also a marital act.

Because interpersonal unions are valuable in themselves, and not merely as means to other ends, a husband and wife’s loving bodily union in coitus and the special kind of relationship to which it is integral are valuable whether or not conception results and even when conception is not sought. But two men or two women cannot achieve organic bodily union since there is no bod‐ ily good or function toward which their bodies can coordinate, reproduction being the only candidate.16 This is a clear sense in which their union cannot be marital, if marital means comprehen‐ sive and comprehensive means, among other things, bodily.

  1. Special Link to Children

Most people accept that marriage is also deeply—indeed, in an important sense, uniquely—oriented to having and rearing children. That is, it is the kind of relationship that by its nature is oriented to, and enriched by, the bearing and rearing of chil‐ dren. But how can this be true, and what does it tell us about the structure of marriage?

It is clear that merely committing to rear children together, or even actually doing so, is not enough to make a relationship a marriage—to make it the kind of relationship that is by its nature oriented to bearing and rearing children. If three monks agreed to care for an orphan, or if two elderly brothers began caring for their late sister’s son, they would not thereby become spouses. It is also clear that having children is not necessary to being married; new‐ lyweds do not become spouses only when their first child comes along. Anglo‐American legal tradition has for centuries regarded coitus, and not the conception or birth of a child, as the event that consummates a marriage.17 Furthermore, this tradition has never denied that childless marriages were true marriages.

  1. Pleasure cannot play this role for several reasons. The good must be truly common and for the couple as a whole, but pleasures (and, indeed, any psycho‐ logical good) are private and benefit partners, if at all, only individually. The good must be bodily, but pleasures are aspects of experience. The good must be inher‐ ently valuable, but pleasures are not as such good in themselves—witness, for example, sadistic pleasures. For more on this philosophical point, see LEE & GEORGE, supra note 1, 95–115, 176–97.


  1. The Oxford English Dictionary charts the usage of “consummation” as, among other definitions not relating to marriage, “[t]he completion of marriage by sexual intercourse.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY III, at 803 (2d ed. 1989). The

How, then, should we understand the special connection be‐ tween marriage and children? We learn something about a rela‐ tionship from the way it is sealed or embodied in certain activities. Most generically, ordinary friendships center on a un‐ ion of minds and wills, by which each person comes to know and seek the other’s good; thus, friendships are sealed in conver‐ sations and common pursuits. Similarly, scholarly relationships are sealed or embodied in joint inquiry, investigation, discovery, and dissemination; sports communities, in practices and games.

If there is some conceptual connection between children and marriage, therefore, we can expect a correlative connection be‐ tween children and the way that marriages are sealed. That con‐ nection is obvious if the conjugal view of marriage is correct. Marriage is a comprehensive union of two sexually complemen‐ tary persons who seal (consummate or complete) their relation‐ ship by the generative act—by the kind of activity that is by its nature fulfilled by the conception of a child. So marriage itself is oriented to and fulfilled18 by the bearing, rearing, and education of children. The procreative‐type act distinctively seals or com‐ pletes a procreative‐type union.

Again, this is not to say that the marriages of infertile couples are not true marriages. Consider this analogy: A baseball team has its characteristic structure largely because of its orientation to winning games; it involves developing and sharing one’s athletic skills in the way best suited for honorably winning (among other things, with assiduous practice and good sportsmanship). But such development and sharing are possible and inherently valu‐ able for teammates even when they lose their games.

Just so, marriage has its characteristic structure largely be‐ cause of its orientation to procreation; it involves developing and sharing one’s body and whole self in the way best suited for honorable parenthood—among other things, permanently and exclusively. But such development and sharing, including the earliest such usage recorded in law was the bodily union of the generative act, are possible and inherently valuable for spouses even when they do not conceive children.19 1548 Act 2–3 Edw. VI, c. 23 § 2: “Sen‐ tence for Matrimony, commanding Solemnization, Cohabitation, Consummation and Tractation as becometh Man and Wife to have.” Id. In more modern usage, “consummation of marriage” is still regarded in family law as “[t]he first post‐ marital act of sexual intercourse between a husband and wife.” BLACK’S LAW DIC‐ TIONARY 359 (9th ed. 2009).

  1. That is, made even richer as the kind of reality it is.

Therefore, people who can unite bodily can be spouses without children, just as people who can practice baseball can be team‐ mates without victories on the field. Although marriage is a social practice that has its basic structure by nature whereas baseball is wholly conventional, the analogy highlights a crucial point: Infer‐ tile couples and winless baseball teams both meet the basic re‐ quirements for participating in the practice (conjugal union; practicing and playing the game) and retain their basic orientation to the fulfillment of that practice (bearing and rearing children; winning games), even if that fulfillment is never reached.

On the other hand, same‐sex partnerships, whatever their moral status, cannot be marriages because they lack any essen‐ tial orientation to children: They cannot be sealed by the gen‐ erative act. Indeed, in the common law tradition, only coitus (not anal or oral sex even between legally wed spouses) has been recognized as consummating a marriage.20

Given the marital relationship’s natural orientation to chil‐ dren, it is not surprising that, according to the best available sociological evidence, children fare best on virtually every in‐ dicator of wellbeing when reared by their wedded biological parents. Studies that control for other relevant factors, includ‐ ing poverty and even genetics, suggest that children reared in intact homes fare best on the following indices:21

Educational achievement: literacy and graduation rates;

Emotional health: rates of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and suicide;

Familial and sexual development: strong sense of identity, tim‐ ing of onset of puberty, rates of teen and out‐of‐wedlock pregnancy, and rates of sexual abuse; and

  1. For more on this point, see infra Part I.D.
  2. For more on the difference between infertile and same‐sex couples, see infra Part I.D.
  3. For the relevant studies, see Ten Principles on Marriage and the Public Good, signed by some seventy scholars, which corroborates the philosophical case for marriage with extensive evidence from the social sciences about the welfare of children and adults. THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC

GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 9–19 (2008), available at http://www.winst.org/ family_marriage_and_democracy/WI_Marriage.pdf.

Child and adult behavior: rates of aggression, attention deficit disorder, delinquency, and incarceration.

Consider the conclusions of the left‐leaning research institu‐ tion Child Trends:

[R]esearch clearly demonstrates that family structure mat‐ ters for children, and the family structure that helps children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low‐conflict marriage. Children in single‐parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in step‐ families or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes. . . . There is thus value for children in promoting strong, stable marriages between biological parents. . . .“[I]t is not simply the presence of two parents, . . . but the pres‐ ence of two biological parents that seems to support children’s development.22

According to another study, “[t]he advantage of marriage ap‐ pears to exist primarily when the child is the biological offspring of both parents.”23 Recent literature reviews conducted by the Brookings Institution, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, the Center for Law and Social Policy, and the Institute for American Values cor‐ roborate the importance of intact households for children.24

Note, moreover, that for a relationship to be oriented to chil‐ dren in this principled as well as empirically manifested way, sexual orientation as such is not a disqualifier. The union of a husband and wife bears this connection to children even if, say, the husband is also attracted to men. What is necessary in this respect is rather sexual complementarity. Two men, even if they are attracted only to women, cannot exhibit this kind of biological complementarity. In this sense, it is not individuals as such who are singled out—as being less capable of affection‐ate and responsible parenting, or anything else. Instead, what are systematically favored as bearing a special and valuable link to childrearing are certain arrangements and the acts that complete or embody them—to which, of course, particular in‐ dividuals are more or less inclined.


  1. Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?, CHILD TRENDS RE‐ SEARCH BRIEF, June 2002, at 1–2, 6, available at http://www.childtrends.org/ files/MarriageRB602.pdf.
  2. Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well‐Being in Cohabiting, Married, and Single‐Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 890 (2003).
  3. See Sara McLanahan, Elisabeth Donahue & Ron Haskins, Introducing the Is‐ sue, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 3 (2005); Mary Parke, Are Married Parents Really Better for Children?, CLASP POLICY BRIEF, May 2003; W. BRADFORD WILCOX ET AL.,
  1. Marital Norms

Finally, unions that are consummated by the generative act, and that are thus oriented to having and rearing children, can make better sense of the other norms that shape marriage as we have known it.

For if bodily union is essential to marriage,25 we can under‐ stand why marriage is incomplete and can be dissolved if not consummated, and why it should be, like the union of organs into one healthy whole, total and lasting for the life of the parts (“till death do us part”26). That is, the comprehensiveness of the union across the dimensions of each spouse’s being calls for a temporal comprehensiveness, too: through time (hence perma‐ nence) and at each time (hence exclusivity). This is clear also from the fact that the sort of bodily union integral to marriage grounds its special, essential link to procreation,27 in light of which it is unsurprising that the norms of marriage should cre‐ ate conditions suitable for children: stable and harmonious con‐ ditions that sociology and common sense agree are undermined by divorce—which deprives children of an intact biological family—and by infidelity, which betrays and divides one’s attention and responsibility to spouse and children, often with children from other couplings.

Thus, the inherent orientation of conjugal union to children deepens and extends whatever reasons spouses may have to stay together for life and to remain faithful: in relationships that lack this orientation, it is hard to see why permanence and exclusivity should be, not only desirable whenever not very costly (as stability is in any good human bond), but inherently normative for anyone in the relevant kind of relationship.28

  1. For more on this point see supra Part I.B.I.
  2. BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 220 (Oxford 1815).
  3. For more on this point see supra Part I.B.I.
  4. See infra Part I.E.3.
  1. How Would Gay Civil Marriage Affect You or Your Marriage?

At this point, some revisionists abandon the philosophical project of attacking the conjugal conception of marriage and simply ask, “what’s the harm?” Even if we are right, is imple‐ menting our view important enough to justify the emotional and other difficulties that some may experience as a result of being denied recognition of the sexual partnerships they have formed? Why should the state care about some abstract moral principle?

Revisionists often capture this point with a question: “How would gay marriage affect you or your marriage?”29 It is worth noting, first, that this question could be turned back on revi‐ sionists who oppose legally recognizing, for example, polya‐ morous unions: How would doing so affect anyone else’s marriage? If this kind of question is decisive against the conju‐ gal view’s constraints on which unions to recognize, it cuts equally against the revisionist’s. In fact it undermines neither since, as even many revisionists implicitly agree, public institu‐ tions like civil marriage have wide and deep effects on our cul‐ ture—which in turn affects others’ lives and choices.

Thus, supporters of the conjugal view often respond to this challenge—rightly, we believe—that abolishing the conjugal con‐ ception of marriage would weaken the social institution of mar‐ riage, obscure the value of opposite‐sex parenting as an ideal, and threaten moral and religious freedom. Here is a sketch of how.

  1. Weakening Marriage

No one deliberates or acts in a vacuum. We all take cues (in‐ cluding cues as to what marriage is and what it requires of us) from cultural norms, which are shaped in part by the law. In‐ deed, revisionists themselves implicitly concede this point. Why else would they be dissatisfied with civil unions for same‐ sex couples? Like us, they understand that the state’s favored conception of marriage matters because it affects society’s un‐ derstanding of that institution.

In redefining marriage, the law would teach that marriage is fundamentally about adults’ emotional unions, not bodily un‐ion30 or children,31 with which marital norms are tightly inter‐ twined.32 Since emotions can be inconstant, viewing marriage essentially as an emotional union would tend to increase mari‐ tal instability—and it would blur the distinct value of friend‐ ship, which is a union of hearts and minds.33 Moreover, and more importantly, because there is no reason that primarily emotional unions any more than ordinary friendships in gen‐ eral should be permanent, exclusive, or limited to two,34 these norms of marriage would make less and less sense. Less able to understand the rationale for these marital norms, people would feel less bound to live by them. And less able to understand the value of marriage itself as a certain kind of union, even apart from the value of its emotional satisfactions, people would in‐ creasingly fail to see the intrinsic reasons they have for marry‐ ing35 or staying with a spouse absent consistently strong feeling.

  1. See, e.g., Editorial, A Vermont Court Speaks, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1999, at

A22 (“[Gay marriage] no more undermine[s] traditional marriage than sailing undermines swimming.”).

In other words, a mistaken marriage policy tends to distort people’s understanding of the kind of relationship that spouses are to form and sustain. And that likely erodes people’s adher‐ ence to marital norms that are essential to the common good. As University of Calgary philosopher Elizabeth Brake, who supports legal recognition of relationships of any size, gender composition, and allocation of responsibilities, affirms, “mar‐ riage does not simply allow access to legal entitlements; it also allows partners to signal the importance of their relationship and to invoke social pressures on commitment.”36

Of course, marriage policy could go bad—and already has—in many ways. Many of today’s public opponents of the revisionist view—for example, Maggie Gallagher, David Blankenhorn, the U.S. Catholic bishops—also opposed other legal

here on the issue of same‐sex unions, not because it alone matters, but because it is the focus of a live debate whose results have wide implications for reforms to strengthen our marriage culture. Yes, social and legal developments have already worn the ties that bind spouses to something beyond themselves and thus more securely to each other. But recognizing same‐sex unions would mean cutting the last remaining threads. After all, underlying people’s adherence to the marital norms already in decline are the deep (if implicit) connections in their minds between marriage, bodily union, and children. Enshrining the revisionist view would not just wear down but tear out this foundation, and with it any basis for reversing other recent trends and restoring the many so‐ cial benefits of a healthy marriage culture.

  1. See supra Part I.B.1.
  2. See supra Part I.B.2.
  3. See supra Part I.B.3.
  4. See infra Part II.C.
  5. See infra Parts I.E.2–3.
  6. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 23, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/ 000/003/660zypwj.asp.
  7. Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Mar‐ riage Law, 120 ETHICS 302, 332 (2010) (emphasis added).
  8. RICHARD DOERFLINGER, FAMILY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1980), available at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/tdocs/FaithfulForLife.pdf; MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE


Those benefits redound to children and spouses alike. Because children fare best on most indicators of health and wellbeing when reared by their wedded biological parents,38 the further erosion of marital norms would adversely affect children, forc‐ ing the state to play a larger role in their health, education, and formation more generally.39 As for the adults, those in the poor‐ est and most vulnerable sectors of society would be hit the hard‐ est.40 But adults more generally would be harmed insofar as the weakening of social expectations supporting marriage would make it harder for them to abide by marital norms.

  1. Obscuring the Value of Opposite‐Sex Parenting As an Ideal

As we have seen in Part I.B, legally enshrining conjugal mar‐ riage socially reinforces the idea that the union of husband and wife is (as a rule and ideal) the most appropriate environment for the bearing and rearing of children—an ideal whose value  is strongly corroborated by the best available social science.41 Note, moreover, that the need for adoption where the ideal is practically impossible is no argument for redefining civil mar‐ riage, a unified legal structure of incentives meant precisely to reinforce the ideal socially and practically—to minimize the need for alternative, case‐by‐case provisions.





(1975), available at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/programs/rlp/ Marriage&FamilyLife75.pdf; Maggie Gallagher & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, End No‐Fault Divorce?, 75 FIRST THINGS 24 (1997).

  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. See THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, supra note 21.
  3. They are clearly the primary victims of the erosion that has already taken place. See Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, 1 NAT’L AFFAIRS 81, 88–93 (2009).

If same‐sex partnerships were recognized as marriages, how‐ ever, that ideal would be abolished from our law: no civil insti‐ tution would any longer reinforce the notion that children need both a mother and father; that men and women on average bring different gifts to the parenting enterprise; and that boys and girls need and tend to benefit from fathers and mothers in different ways.

In that case, to the extent that some continued to regard mar‐ riage as crucially linked to children, the message would be sent that a household of two women or two men is, as a rule, just as appropriate a context for childrearing, so that it does not matter (even as a rule) whether children are reared by both their mother and their father, or by a parent of each sex at all.

On the other hand, to the extent that the connection between marriage and parenting is obscured more generally, as we think it would be eventually,42 no kind of arrangement would be proposed as an ideal.

But the currency of either view would significantly weaken the extent to which the social institution of marriage provided social pressures and incentives for husbands to remain with their wives and children. And to the extent that children were not reared by both parents, they would be prone to suffer in the ways identified by social science.43

  1. Threatening Moral and Religious Freedom

Because the state’s value‐neutrality on this question (of the proper contours and norms of marriage) is impossible if there is to be any marriage law at all, abolishing the conjugal understanding of marriage would imply that committed same‐sex and opposite‐ sex romantic unions are equivalently real marriages. The state would thus be forced to view conjugal‐marriage  supporters as bigots who make groundless and invidious distinctions. In ways that have been catalogued by Marc Stern of the American Jewish Committee and by many other defenders of the rights of con‐ science, this would undermine religious freedom and the rights of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children.44


  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. See supra Part I.C.1.
  3. See supra Part I.B.2.

Already, we have seen antidiscrimination laws wielded as weapons against those who cannot, in good conscience, accept the revisionist understanding of sexuality and marriage: In Mas‐ sachusetts, Catholic Charities was forced to give up its adoption services rather than, against its principles, place children with same‐sex couples.45 In California, a U.S. District Court held that a student’s religious speech against homosexual acts could be banned by his school as injurious remarks that “intrude[s] upon the work of the schools or on the rights of other students.”46 And again in Massachusetts, a Court of Appeals ruled that a public school may teach children that homosexual relations are morally good despite the objections of parents who disagree.47

The proposition that support for the conjugal conception of marriage is nothing more than a form of bigotry has become so deeply entrenched among marriage revisionists that a Washing‐ ton Post feature story48 drew denunciations and cries of journalis‐ tic bias for even implying that one conjugal‐marriage advocate was “sane” and “thoughtful.” Outraged readers compared the profile to a hypothetical puff piece on a Ku Klux Klan member.49 A New York Times columnist has called proponents of conjugal marriage “bigots,” even singling an author of this Article out by name.50 Meanwhile, organizations advocating the legal redefini‐ tion of marriage label themselves as being for “human rights” and against “hate.”51 The implications are clear: if marriage is legally redefined, believing what every human society once be‐ lieved about marriage—namely, that it is a male‐female union— will increasingly be regarded as evidence of moral insanity, mal‐ ice, prejudice, injustice, and hatred.


  1. Marc D. Stern, Same‐Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME‐SEX MARRIAGE

AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 11–14 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). This collection of essays includes the views of scholars on both sides of the same‐sex marriage question, who conclude that conflicts with religious liberty are inevitable where marriage is extended to same‐sex couples.

  1. Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston: The Coming Conflict Between Same‐Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, THE WKLY. STANDARD, May 5, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/191kgwgh.asp.
  2. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1122 (S.D. Cal.


  1. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
  2. Monica Hesse, Opposing Gay Unions With Sanity & a Smile, WASH. POST., Aug. 28, 2009, at C01.
  3. Andrew Alexander, ‘Sanity & a Smile’ and an Outpouring of Rage, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2009, at A17.

These points are not offered as arguments for accepting the conjugal view of marriage. If our viewpoint is wrong, then the state could be justified in sometimes requiring others to treat same‐sex and opposite‐sex romantic unions alike, and private citizens could be justified in sometimes marginalizing the op‐ posing view as noxious. Rather, given our arguments about what marriage actually is,52 these are important warnings about the consequences of enshrining a seriously unsound conception of marriage. These considerations should motivate people who accept the conjugal view but have trouble seeing the effects of abolishing it from the law.

In short, marriage should command our attention and en‐ ergy more than many other moral causes because so many di‐ mensions of the common good are damaged if the moral truth about marriage is obscured. For the same reason, bypassing the current debate by abolishing marriage law entirely would be imprudent in the extreme. Almost no society that has left us a trace of itself has done without some regulation of sexual rela‐ tionships. As we show in Part I.E.1 (and the data cited in Part I.B.2 suggest), the wellbeing of children gives us powerful pru‐ dential reasons to recognize and protect marriage legally.

  1. If Not Same‐Sex Couples, Why Infertile Ones?

Revisionists often challenge proponents of the conjugal view of marriage to offer a principled argument for recognizing the unions of presumptively infertile couples that does not equally justify the recognition of same‐sex partnerships. But this chal‐ lenge is easily met.


  1. Frank Rich, Op‐Ed., The Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009 (Week in Review), at 10.
  1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (self‐identifying the organization as a 501(c)(4) advocacy group “working for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender equal rights”); Annie Stockwell, Stop the Hate: Vote No on 8, ADVOCATE.COM (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.advocate.com/ Arts_and_Entertainment/People/Stop_the_Hate (framing opposition to Califor‐ nia’s Proposition Eight, which provides that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” as a struggle against hate).
  2. See supra Part I.B.
  1. Still Real Marriages

To form a real marriage, a couple needs to establish and live out the kind of union that would be completed by, and be apt for, procreation and child‐rearing.53 Since any true and honor‐ able harmony between two people has value in itself (not merely as a means), each such comprehensive union of two people—each permanent, exclusive commitment sealed by or‐ ganic bodily union—certainly does as well.

Any act of organic bodily union can seal a marriage, whether or not it causes conception.54 The nature of the spouses’ action now cannot depend on what happens hours later independ‐ ently of their control—whether a sperm cell in fact penetrates an ovum. And because the union in question is an organic bod‐ ily union, it cannot depend for its reality on psychological fac‐ tors. It does not matter, then, if spouses do not intend to have children or believe that they cannot. Whatever their thoughts or goals, whether a couple achieves bodily union depends on facts about what is happening between their bodies.55

It is clear that the bodies of an infertile couple can unite or‐ ganically through coitus. Consider digestion, the individual body’s process of nourishment. Different parts of that proc‐ ess—salivation, chewing, swallowing, stomach action, intesti‐ nal absorption of nutrients—are each in their own way oriented to the broader goal of nourishing the organism. But our salivation, chewing, swallowing, and stomach action re‐ main oriented to that goal (and remain digestive acts) even if on some occasion our intestines do not or cannot finally absorb nutrients, and even if we know so before we eat.56

  1. See supra Parts I.B.1–3.
  2. See supra Part I.B.1.
  3. Whether bodily union is truly marital depends on other factors—for exam‐ ple, whether it is undertaken freely to express permanent and exclusive commit‐ ment. So bodily union is necessary but not sufficient for marital union.
  1. Professor Andrew Koppelman has argued that “[a] sterile person’s genitals are no more suitable for generation than an unloaded gun is suitable for shooting. If someone points a gun at me and pulls the trigger, he exhibits the behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for shooting, but it still matters a lot whether the

Similarly, the behavioral parts of the process of reproduction do not lose their dynamism toward reproduction if non‐behavioral factors in the process—for example, low sperm count or ovarian problems—prevent conception from occurring, even if the spouses expect this beforehand. As we have argued,57 bodies coordinating toward a single biological function for which each alone is not sufficient are rightly said to form an organic union.

Thus, infertility is no impediment to bodily union and there‐ fore (as our law has always recognized) no impediment to mar‐ riage. This is because in truth marriage is not a mere means, even to the great good of procreation.58 It is an end in itself, worthwhile for its own sake. So it can exist apart from children, and the state can recognize it in such cases without distorting the moral truth about marriage.

Of course, a true friendship of two men or two women is also valuable in itself. But lacking the capacity for organic bodily un‐ ion, it cannot be valuable specifically as a marriage: it cannot be the comprehensive union59 on which aptness for procreation60 and distinctively marital norms61 depend. That is why only a gun is loaded and whether he knows it.” ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 87–88 (2002).

Professor Koppelman’s objection is mistaken and misses an important point. Natural organs and organic processes are unlike man‐made objects and artificial processes, which retain their dynamism toward certain goals only so long as we use them for those goals—which in turn presupposes that we think them capable of actually realizing those goals. That is, the function of man‐made objects and processes is imposed on them by the human beings who use them. Thus, a piece of metal becomes a knife—an artifact whose function is to cut—only when we intend to use it for cutting. When it is no longer capable of cutting and we no longer intend to use it for cutting, it is no longer really a knife.

The same does not hold for the union between a man and a woman’s human bodies, however, because natural organs are what they are (and thus have their natural dynamism toward certain functions) independently of what we intend to use them for and even of whether the function they serve can be brought to com‐ pletion. Thus, in our example, a stomach remains a stomach—an organ whose natural function is to play a certain role in digestion—regardless of whether we intend it to be used that way and even of whether digestion will be successfully completed. Something analogous is true of sexual organs with respect to repro‐ duction.

  1. See supra Part I.B.1.
  2. On the conjugal view, spouses pledge to form a union that is comprehensive and thus bodily, and thus procreative by nature. They do not and cannot pledge to form a union that results in procreation.


  1. See id.
  2. See supra Part I.B.2.
  3. See supra Part I.B.3.
  1. Still in the Public Interest

man and a woman can form a marriage—a union whose norms and obligations are decisively shaped by its essential dynamism toward children. For that dynamism comes not from the actual or expected presence of children, which some same‐sex partners and even cohabiting brothers could have, and some opposite‐sex couples lack, but from the way that marriage is sealed or con‐ summated:62 in coitus, which is organic bodily union.

Someone might grant the principled point that infertility is not an impediment to marriage, and still wonder what pub‐ lic benefit a marriage that cannot produce children would have. Why, in other words, should we legally recognize an infertile marriage?

Practically speaking, many couples believed to be infertile end up having children, who would be served by their parents’ healthy marriage; and in any case, the effort to determine fertil‐ ity would require unjust invasions of privacy. This is a concern presumably shared by revisionists, who would not, for exam‐ ple, require interviews for ascertaining partners’ level of affec‐ tion before granting them a marriage license.

More generally, even an obviously infertile couple—no less than childless newlyweds or parents of grown children—can live out the features and norms of real marriage and thereby contrib‐ ute to a healthy marriage culture. They can set a good example for others and help to teach the next generation what marriage is and is not. And as we have argued63 and will argue,64 everyone bene‐ fits from a healthy marriage culture.

What is more, any marriage law at all communicates some message about what marriage is as a moral reality. The state has an obligation to get that message right, for the sake of people who might enter the institution, for their children, and for the commu‐ nity as a whole. To recognize only fertile marriages is to suggest that marriage is merely a means to procreation and child‐ rearing—and not what it truly is, namely, a good in itself.65 It may also violate the principle of equality to which revisionists appeal,66 because infertile and fertile couples alike can form unions of the same basic kind: real marriages. In the absence of strong reasons for it, this kind of differential treatment would be unfair.


  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. See supra Part I.C.
  3. See infra Part I.E.1.
  4. See supra Parts I.B.1–2

Finally, although a legal scheme that honored the conjugal con‐ ception of marriage, as our law has long done, would not restrict the incidents of marriage to spouses who happen to have chil‐ dren, its success would tend to limit children to families led by legally married spouses. After all, the more effectively the law teaches the truth about marriage, the more likely people are to enter into marriage and abide by its norms. And the more people form marriages and respect marital norms, the more likely it is that children will be reared by their wedded biological parents. Death and tragedy make the gap impossible to close completely, but a healthier marriage culture would make it shrink. Thus, en‐ shrining the moral truth of marriage in law is crucial for securing the great social benefits served by real marriage.


  1. Challenges for Revisionists

Although the conjugal view is, despite its critics, not only infer‐ able from certain widely accepted features of marriage and good for society, but also internally coherent, no version of the revision‐ ists’ view accounts for some of their own beliefs about marriage: namely, that the state has an interest in regulating some rela‐ tionships, but only if they are romantic—presumptively sex‐ ual—and only if they are monogamous.

Though some unsatisfactory efforts have been made, revision‐ ists are at a loss to give principled reasons for these positions.67 Unless something like the conjugal understanding of marriage is correct, the first point becomes much harder to defend, and a principled defense of the second and third becomes impossible.

  1. The State Has an Interest in Regulating Some Relationships?

Why does the state not set terms for our ordinary friendships? Why does it not create civil causes of action for neglecting or even betraying our friends? Why are there no civil ceremonies for forming friendships or legal obstacles to ending them? It is simply

because ordinary friendships do not affect the political common good in structured ways that justify or warrant legal regulation.

  1. See supra Part I.A.1.
  2. Note that only sound arguments based on true principles can be inherently decisive.

Marriages, in contrast, are a matter of urgent public interest, as the record of almost every culture attests—worth legally rec‐ ognizing and regulating.68 Societies rely on families, built on strong marriages, to produce what they need but cannot form on their own: upright, decent people who make for reasonably con‐ scientious, law‐abiding citizens. As they mature, children benefit from the love and care of both mother and father, and from the committed and exclusive love of their parents for each other.69

Although some libertarians propose to “privatize” marriage,70 treating marriages the way we treat baptisms and bar mitzvahs, supporters of limited government should recognize that marriage privatization would be a catastrophe for limited government.71 In the absence of a flourishing marriage culture, families often fail to form, or to achieve and maintain stability. As absentee fathers and out‐of‐wedlock births become common, a train of social patholo‐ gies follows.72 Naturally, the demand for governmental policing and social services grows. According to a Brookings Institute study, $229 billion in welfare expenditures between 1970 and 1996 can be attributed to the breakdown of the marriage culture and the resulting exacerbation of social ills: teen pregnancy, poverty, crime, drug abuse, and health problems.73 Sociologists David Popenoe and Alan Wolfe have conducted research on Scandina‐ vian countries that supports the conclusion that as marriage cul‐ ture declines, state spending rises.74

This is why the state has an interest in marriages that is deeper than any interest it could have in ordinary friendships: Marriages bear a principled and practical connection to children.75 Strength‐ ening the marriage culture improves children’s shot at becoming upright and productive members of society. In other words, our reasons for enshrining any conception of marriage, and our rea‐ sons for believing that the conjugal understanding of marriage is the correct one, are one and the same: the deep link between mar‐ riage and children. Sever that connection, and it becomes much harder to show why the state should take any interest in marriage at all. Any proposal for a policy, however, has to be able to ac‐ count for why the state should enact it.

  1. See Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J. 33, 51–52 (2004).
  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. See, e.g., David Boaz, Privatize Marriage: A Simple Soution to the Gay‐Marriage Debate, SLATE (Apr. 25, 1997), http://slate.com/id/2440/.
  3. This is because, if the State failed to recognize the institution of marriage al‐ together, social costs would be imposed, in large part on children, due to the breakdown of traditional family structures which lend stability.


  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. Isabel V. Sawhill, Families at Risk, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION AND BEYOND 97, 108 (Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999); see also THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 15.




  1. Only if They Are Romantic?

Some argue simply that the state should grant individuals certain legal benefits if they provide one another domestic support and care. But such a scheme would not be marriage, nor could it make sense of the other features of marriage law.

Take Joe and Jim. They live together, support each other, share domestic responsibilities, and have no dependents. Because Joe knows and trusts Jim more than anyone else, he would like Jim to be the one to visit him in the hospital if he is ill, give direc‐ tives for his care if he is unconscious, inherit his assets if he dies first, and so on. The same goes for Jim.

So far, you may be assuming that Joe and Jim have a sexual re‐ lationship. But does it matter? What if they are bachelor brothers? What if they are best friends who never stopped rooming together after college, or who reunited after being widowed? Is there any reason that the benefits they receive should depend on whether their relationship is or even could be romantic? In fact, would it not be patently unjust if the state withheld benefits from them on the sole ground that they were not having sex?

Someone might object that everyone just knows that marriage has some connection to romance. It requires no explanation. But that is question‐begging against Joe and Jim, who want their benefits. And it prematurely stops searching for an answer to why we tend to associate marriage with romance. The explanation brings us back to our central point: Romance is the kind of desire that aims at bodily union, and marriage has much to do with that.

Once this point is admitted, we return to the question of what counts as organic bodily union. Does hugging? Most think not. But then why is sex so important? What if someone derived more pleasure or felt intimacy from some other behav‐ ior (tennis, perhaps, as in our earlier example)? We must finally return to the fact that coitus, the generative act, uniquely unites human persons, as explained above.76 But that fact supports the conjugal view: The reason that marriage typically involves ro‐ mance is that it necessarily involves bodily union, and romance is the sort of desire that seeks bodily union. But organic bodily union is possible only between a man and a woman.

  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  1. Only if They Are Monogamous?

Go back now to the example of Joe and Jim, and add a third man: John. To filter the second point out of this example, assume that the three men are in a romantic triad. Does anything change? If one dies, the other two are coheirs. If one is ill, either can visit or give directives. If Joe and Jim could have their romantic relation‐ ship recognized, why should not Joe, Jim, and John?

Again, someone might object, everyone just knows that mar‐ riage is between only two people. It requires no explanation. But this again begs the question against Joe, Jim, and John, who want their shared benefits and legal recognition. After all, it is not that each wants benefits as an individual; marriage is a un‐ ion. They want recognition of their polyamorous relationship and the shared benefits that come with that recognition.

But if the conjugal conception of marriage is correct, it is clear why marriage is possible only between two people. Marriage is a comprehensive interpersonal union that is consummated and renewed by acts of organic bodily union77 and oriented to the bearing and rearing of children.78 Such a union can be achieved by two and only two because no single act can organically unite three or more people at the bodily level or, therefore, seal a comprehensive union of three or more lives at other levels. In‐ deed, the very comprehensiveness of the union requires the marital commitment to be undivided—made to exactly one other person; but such comprehensiveness, and the exclusivity that its orientation to children demands, makes sense only on the conjugal view.79 Children, likewise, can have only two par‐ ents—a biological mother and father. There are two sexes, one of each type being necessary for reproduction. So marriage, a re‐ productive type of community, requires two—one of each sex.


  1. See supra Part I.B.1.
  2. See supra Part I.B.1.
  3. See supra Part I.B.2.

Some may object that this is a red herring—that no one is clamoring for recognition of polyamorous unions. Aren’t we invoking an alarmist “slippery slope” argument?

It should be noted, to begin with, that there is nothing inher‐ ently wrong with arguing against a policy based on reasonable predictions of unwanted consequences. Such predictions would seem quite reasonable in this case, given that prominent figures like Gloria Steinem, Barbara Ehrenreich, and Cornel West have already demanded legal recognition of “multiple‐ partner” sexual relationships.80 Nor are such relationships un‐ heard of: Newsweek reports that there are more than 500,000 in the United States alone.81

Still, this Article does not aim to predict social or legal conse‐ quences of the revisionist view. The goal of examining the criteria of monogamy and romance (Part I.E.2) is to make a simple but crucial conceptual point: Any principle that would justify the le‐ gal recognition of same‐sex relationships would also justify the legal recognition of polyamorous and non‐sexual ones. So if, as most people—including many revisionists—believe, true mar‐ riage is essentially a sexual union of exactly two persons, the revi‐ sionist conception of marriage must be unsound. Any revisionist who agrees that the state is justified in recognizing only real mar‐ riages82 must either reject traditional norms of monogamy and sexual consummation or adopt the conjugal view—which ex‐ cludes same‐sex unions.

University of Calgary’s Professor Elizabeth Brake embraces this result and more. She supports “minimal marriage,” in which “individuals can have legal marital relationships with more than one person, reciprocally or asymmetrically, themselves deter‐mining the sex and number of parties, the type of relationship involved, and which rights and responsibilities to exchange with each.”83 But the more that the parties to a “minimal marriage” determine on a case‐by‐case basis which rights and duties to ex‐ change—as they must if a greater variety of recognized unions is available—the less the proposed policy itself accomplishes. As we deprive marriage policy of definite shape, we deprive it of purpose. Rigorously pursued, the logic of rejecting the conjugal conception of marriage thus leads, by way of formlessness, to‐ ward pointlessness: It proposes a policy of which, having re‐ moved the principled ground for any restrictions, it can hardly explain the benefit. Of course, some revisionists will base their support for their preferred norms instead on contingent calcula‐ tions of prudence or feasibility, which we address next. But we challenge the many revisionists who support norms, like mo‐ nogamy, as a matter of moral principle to complete the follow‐ ing sentence: Polyamorous unions and nonsexual unions by nature cannot be marriages, and should not be recognized legally, because . . .

  1. See supra Part I.B.3.
  2. Beyond Same‐Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision For All Our Families & Rela‐ tionships, BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG (July 26, 2006), http://beyondmarriage.org/ html.


  1. Jessica Bennett, Only You. And You. And You: Polyamory—relationships with multiple, mutually consenting partners—has a coming‐out party, NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/07/28/only‐you‐and‐you‐and‐you.html.


  1. See supra Part I.A.


  1. Isn’t Marriage Just Whatever We Say It Is?

Of those who do base marriage policy on contingent calcula‐ tions of prudence or feasibility, some are what we might call “constructivists.”84 They deny that there is any reality to marriage independent of custom—any set of objective conditions that a re‐ lationship must meet to ground the moral privileges and obliga‐ tions distinctive of that natural kind of union which we have called real marriage.85 For constructivists, rather, marriage is whatever social and legal conventions say that it is, there being no separate moral reality for these conventions to track. Hence it is impossible for the state’s policy to be wrong about marriage: dif‐ ferent proposals are only more or less feasible or preferable.86


  1. Brake, supra note 36, at 303.
  2. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1421–22 (“A social constructivist history emphasizes the ways in which marriage is ‘constructed’ over time, the institution being viewed as reflecting larger social power relations.”).


  1. See id. at 1434 (“[M]arriage is not a naturally generated institution with cer‐ tain essential elements. Instead it is a construction that is linked with other cul‐ tural and social institutions, so that the old‐fashioned boundaries between the public and private life melt away.”).


  1. See Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (Saxe, , dissenting) (“Civil marriage is an institution created by the state . . . .”); Ander‐ sen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1018 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting)


This view is belied by the principled distinction between the whole spectrum of ordinary friendships on the one hand, and on the other hand those inherently valuable relationships that first, organically extend two people’s union along the bodily dimen‐ sion of their being; second, bear an intrinsic orientation to child‐ bearing and rearing; and third, require a permanent and exclusive commitment. Marriage’s independent reality is only confirmed by the fact that the known cultures of every time and place have seen fit to regulate the relationships of actual or would‐be parents to each other and to any children that they might have.

Even if marriage did not have this independent reality, our other arguments against revisionists would weigh equally against constructivists who favor legally recognizing same‐sex unions: They would have no grounds at all for arguing that our view in‐ fringes same‐sex couplesʹ natural and inviolable right to marriage, nor for denying recognition to unions apparently just as socially valuable as same‐sex ones, for marriage would be a mere fiction designed to efficiently promote social utility. The needs of chil‐ dren would still give us very strong utility‐based reasons to have a marriage policy in the first place.87 And the social damage that we could expect from further eroding the conjugal view would more than justify preserving it in the law.88 This justification would only be strengthened by the possibility of meeting other pragmatic goals in ways that do not threaten the common good as redefining marriage would.89 So even constructivists about marriage could and should oppose legally recognizing same‐sex partnerships.



  1. Why Not Spread Traditional Norms to the Gay Community?

Abstract principles aside, would redefining marriage have the positive effect of reinforcing traditional norms by increas‐ ing the number of stable, monogamous, faithful sexual unions to include many more same‐sex couples? There are good rea‐ sons to think not.

(“[M]arriage draws its strength from the nature of the civil marriage contract itself and the recognition of that contract by the State.”).

  1. See supra Part I.B.2.
  2. See supra Parts I.C, I.D.2.
  3. See supra Part II.B.

First, although the principles outlined above are abstract, they are not for that reason disconnected from reality. People will tend to abide less strictly by any given norms the less those norms make sense. And if marriage is understood as revisionists understand it—that is, as an essentially emotional union that has no principled connection to organic bodily union and the bear‐ ing and rearing of children—then marital norms, especially the norms of permanence, monogamy, and fidelity, will make less sense. In other words, those making this objection are right to suppose that redefining marriage would produce a conver‐ gence—but it would be a convergence in exactly the wrong di‐ rection. Rather than imposing traditional norms on homosexual relationships, abolishing the conjugal conception of marriage would tend to erode the basis for those norms in any relation‐ ship. Public institutions shape our ideas, and ideas have conse‐ quences; so removing the rational basis for a norm will erode adherence to that norm—if not immediately, then over time.

This is not a purely abstract matter. If our conception of marriage were right, what would you expect the sociology of same‐sex romantic unions to be like? In the absence of strong reasons to abide by marital norms in relationships radically dissimilar to marriages, you would expect to see less regard for those norms in both practice and theory. And on both counts, you would be right.

Consider the norm of monogamy. Judith Stacey—a prominent New York University professor who testified before Congress against the Defense of Marriage Act and is in no way regarded by her academic colleagues as a fringe figure—expressed hope that the triumph of the revisionist view would give marriage “varied, creative, and adaptive contours . . . [leading some to] question the dyadic limitations of Western marriage and seek . . . small group marriages.”90 In their statement “Beyond Same‐Sex Marriage,” more than 300 “LGBT and allied” scholars and advocates— including prominent Ivy League professors—call for legal recog‐ nition of sexual relationships involving more than two partners.91 Professor Brake thinks that we are obligated in justice to use such legal recognition to “denormalize[] heterosexual monogamy as a way of life” for the sake of “rectifying past discrimination against homosexuals, bisexuals, polygamists, and care networks.”92


  1. See Gallagher, supra note 68, at 62.
  2. Beyond Same‐Sex Marriage, supra note 80.

What about the connection to children? Andrew Sullivan says that marriage has become “primarily a way in which two adults affirm their emotional commitment to one another.”93 E.J. Graff celebrates the fact that recognizing same‐sex unions would make marriage “ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link between sex and diapers.”94

And exclusivity? Mr. Sullivan, who extols the “spirituality” of “anonymous sex,” also thinks that the “openness” of same‐sex unions could enhance the relationships of husbands and wives:

Same‐sex unions often incorporate the virtues of friendship more effectively than traditional marriages; and at times, among gay male relationships, the openness of the contract makes it more likely to survive than many heterosexual bonds. . . . [T]here is more likely to be greater understanding of the need for extramarital outlets between two men than between a man and a woman. . . . [S]omething of the gay re‐ lationship’s necessary honesty, its flexibility, and its equality could undoubtedly help strengthen and inform many het‐ erosexual bonds.95

Of course, “openness” and “flexibility” here are Sullivan’s euphemisms for sexual infidelity.

Indeed, some revisionists have positively embraced the goal of weakening the institution of marriage. “[Former President George W.] Bush is correct . . . when he states that allowing same‐sex couples to marry will weaken the institution of mar‐ riage.”96 Victoria Brownworth is no right‐wing traditionalist, but an advocate of legally recognizing gay partnerships. She contin‐ ues: “It most certainly will do so, and that will make marriage a far better concept than it previously has been.”97 Professor Ellen

  1. Brake, supra note 36, at 336, 323.
  2. Andrew Sullivan, Introduction, in SAME‐SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER, at xvii, xix (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1st ed. 1997).
  3. J. GRAFF, Retying the Knot, in SAME‐SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 93, at 134, 136.



HOMOSEXUALITY 202–03 (1996).

  1. Victoria A. Brownworth, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Is Marriage Right for Queers?, in I DO/I DON’T: QUEERS ON MARRIAGE 53, 58–59 (Greg Wharton
  • Ian Philips eds., 2004).
    1. at 59.

Willis, another revisionist, celebrates that “conferring the legiti‐ macy of marriage on homosexual relations will introduce an im‐ plicit revolt against the institution into its very heart.”98

Michelangelo Signorile, a prominent gay activist, urges same‐ sex couples to “demand the right to marry not as a way of ad‐ hering to society’s moral codes but rather to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution.”99 Same‐sex couples should “fight for same‐sex marriage and its benefits and then, once granted, redefine the institution of marriage completely[, be‐ cause t]he most subversive action lesbians and gay men can un‐ dertake . . . is to transform the notion of ‘family’ entirely.”100

Some revisionist advocates, like Jonathan Rauch, sincerely hope to preserve traditional marriage norms.101 But it is not puzzling that he is severely outnumbered: other revisionists are right to think that these norms would be undermined by redefining marriage.

Preliminary social science backs this up. In the 1980s, Professors David McWhirter and Andrew Mattison, themselves in a roman‐ tic relationship, set out to disprove popular beliefs about gay part‐ ners’ lack of adherence to sexual exclusivity. Of 156 gay couples that they surveyed, whose relationships had lasted from one to thirty‐seven years, more than sixty percent had entered the rela‐ tionship expecting sexual exclusivity, but not one couple stayed sexually exclusive longer than five years.102 Professors McWhirter and Mattison concluded: “The expectation for outside sexual activ‐ ity was the rule for male couples and the exception for heterosexu‐ als.”103 Far from disproving popular beliefs, they confirmed them.

On the question of numbers of partners, it is important to avoid stereotypes, which typically exaggerate unfairly, but also to con‐ sider the social data in light of what is suggested in this Article about the strength, or relative weakness, of the rational basis for permanence and exclusivity in various kinds of relationships. A 1990s U.K. survey of more than 5,000 men found that the median numbers of partners for men with exclusively heterosexual, bi‐ sexual, and exclusively homosexual inclinations over the previous five years were two, seven, and ten, respectively.104 A U.S. survey found that the average number of sexual partners since the age of eighteen for men who identified as homosexual or bisexual was over 2.5 times as many as the average for heterosexual men.105

  1. Ellen Willis, Can Marriage Be Saved? A Forum, THE NATION, July 5, 2004, at 16, 16.
  2. Michelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec.–Jan. 1994, at 68, 161.




  1. at 3.

So there is no reason to believe, and abundant reason to doubt, that redefining marriage would make people more likely to abide by its norms. Instead, it would undermine peo‐ ple’s grasp of the intelligible basis for those norms in the first place. Nothing more than a Maginot line of sentiment would be left to support belief in sexual fidelity and hold back the change of attitudes and mores that a rising tide of revisionists approv‐ ingly expect same‐sex marriage to produce.

Nor is legal regulation the answer; the state cannot effec‐ tively encourage adherence to norms in relationships where those norms have no deep rational basis. Laws that restrict people’s freedom for no rational purpose are not likely to last, much less to have significant success in changing people’s be‐ havior by adherence. On the other hand, traditional marriage laws merely encourage adherence to norms in relationships where those norms already have an independent rational ba‐ sis.106 Preliminary evidence suggests that same‐sex couples in jurisdictions that legally recognize their unions tend to be sexually “open” by design. The New York Times reported on a San Francisco State University study: “[G]ay nuptials are por‐ trayed by opponents as an effort to rewrite the traditional rules of matrimony. Quietly, outside of the news media and court‐ room spotlight, many gay couples are doing just that . . . .”107 The argument from conservatism is very weak indeed.


  1. H. Mercer et al., Behaviourally bisexual men as a bridge population for HIV and sexually transmitted infections? Evidence from a national probability survey, 20 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 87, 88 (2009).


  2. See supra Part I.B.3.
  3. Scott James, Many Successful Gay Marriages Share an Open Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/ 29sfmetro.html?ref=us.


  1. What About Partners’ Concrete Needs?

Andrew Sullivan questions one of the authors of this Article:

It also seems to me to be important to ask George what he proposes should be available to gay couples. Does he be‐ lieve that we should be able to leave property to one an‐ other without other family members trumping us? That we should be allowed to visit one another in hospital? That we should be treated as next‐of‐kin in medical or legal or cus‐ tody or property tangles? Or granted the same tax status as straight married couples? These details matter to real peo‐ ple living actual lives, real people the GOP seems totally uninterested in addressing.108

First, the benefits cited have nothing to do with whether the relationship is or could legally be romantic or sexual. But treat‐ ing essentially similar cases as if they were radically different would be unfair. So these benefits would need to be available to all types of cohabitation if they were made available to any.109 If the law grants them to a cohabiting male couple in a sexual part‐ nership, surely it should grant them, say, to two interdependent brothers who also share domestic responsibilities and have simi‐ lar needs. The two brothers’ relationship would differ in many ways from that of two male sexual partners, but not in ways that affect whether it makes sense to grant them domestic benefits.

But a scheme that granted legal benefits to any two adults upon request—for example, romantic partners, widowed sis‐ ters, or cohabiting celibate monks—would not be a marriage scheme. It would not grant legal benefits on the presumption that the benefitted relationship is sexual. So we have no objec‐ tion to this policy in principle. It would not in itself obscure the nature and norms of marriage.

Still, there are questions to answer before such sexually‐neutral benefits packages are granted. What common good would be served by regulating or so benefitting what are essentially ordi‐ nary friendships? Why would that good be served only by rela‐ tionships limited to two people? Can three cohabiting celibate monks not do as much good for each other or society as two? And whatever common good is at stake, does it really depend on, and justify, limiting people’s freedom to form and dissolve such friendships, as legal regulation would inevitably do? Does it jus‐ tify diluting the special social status of real marriages, as generic schemes of benefits would inevitably do?

  1. Andrew Sullivan, Only the Right Kind of Symbolic Sex, THE DAILY DISH (Aug. 4, 2009, 11:11 AM), http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/08/ only‐the‐right‐kind‐of‐symbolic‐sex.html.
  2. See supra Part I.E.1.

The value of such a policy—at least for individuals who share the responsibilities of living together—seems to lie in its benefits to the individuals themselves, like hospital‐visitation and inheritance rights. But these could be secured just as well by distinct legal arrangements (like power of attorney), which we think that anyone should be free to make with anyone else. Why create a special legal package for generic partnerships? There may be an argument for this in some jurisdictions where, for example, people would otherwise lack the education or re‐ sources to make their own legal arrangements. But if such a scheme is not susceptible to the powerful (and, we think, deci‐ sive) objections that apply to legal redefinitions of marriage, that is because it is not a redefinition of marriage at all.

  1. Doesn’t the Conjugal Conception of Marriage Sacrifice Some

People’s Fulfillment for Others’?

Some might be unmoved by our arguments because, as they see it, we treat homosexually oriented people as if they were in‐ visible, leaving them no real opportunity for fulfillment. After all, they might say, human beings need meaningful companionship, which involves sex and public recognition. This objection is rooted in a misunderstanding not only of the nature of marriage, but also of the value of deep friendship.

Our view about marriage, like most people’s views about any moral or political issue, is motivated precisely by our concern for the good of all individuals and communities—that is, for the common good. We have offered reasons for thinking that this good is served, not harmed, by traditional marriage laws; and harmed, not served, by abolishing them in favor of the revision‐ ist understanding.

But to see a few of the problems with this objection, consider some of its hidden assumptions:

First: Fulfillment is impossible without regular outlets for sexual release.

Second: Meaningful intimacy is impossible without sex.

Third: Fulfilling relationships are impossible without legal recognition.

Fourth: Homosexual orientation is a basic human identity, such that any state that doesn’t actively accommodate it nec‐ essarily harms or disregards a class of human beings.

Some of these assumptions are radically new in the history of ideas, and themselves depend on further significant, often un‐ critically accepted assumptions. More to the point, though, all four are either dubious or irrelevant to this debate.

Because bodies are integral parts of the personal reality of hu‐ man beings,110 only coitus can truly unite persons organically and, thus, maritally.111 Hence, although the state can grant members of any household certain legal incidents, and should not prevent any from making certain private legal arrangements,112 it cannot give same‐sex unions what is truly distinctive of marriage—i.e., it can‐ not make them actually comprehensive, oriented by nature to children, or bound by the moral norms specific to marriage.113 At most the state can call such unions marital, but this would not— because, in moral truth, it cannot—make them so; and it would, to society’s detriment, obscure people’s understanding about what truly marital unions do involve. In this sense, it is not the state that keeps marriage from certain people, but their circumstances that unfortunately keep certain people from marriage (or at least make marrying much harder). This is so, not only for those with exclusively homosexual attractions, but also for people who can‐ not marry because of, for example, prior and pressing family obli‐ gations incompatible with marriage’s comprehensiveness and orientation to children, inability to find a mate, or any other cause. Those who face such difficulties should in no way be marginal‐ ized or otherwise mistreated, and they deserve our support in the face of what are often considerable burdens. But none of this es‐ tablishes the first mistaken assumption, that fulfillment is impos‐ sible without regular outlets for sexual release—an idea that devalues many people’s way of life. What we wish for people un‐ able to marry because of a lack of any attraction to a member of the opposite sex is the same as what we wish for people who can‐not marry for any other reason: rich and fulfilling lives. In the splendor of human variety, these can take infinitely many forms. In any of them, energy that would otherwise go into marriage is channeled toward ennobling endeavors: deeper devotion to fam‐ ily or nation, service, adventure, art, or a thousand other things.


  1. See supra Part I.B.1.
  2. Again, we do not think all acts of coitus even within marriages are marital. Unloving coitus between spouses, especially where it is based on coercion or ma‐ nipulation, is not truly marital—it fails to embody and express true (comprehen‐ sive) spousal communion.
  3. See supra Part II.B.
  4. See supra Parts I.B.1–3.

But most relevantly, this energy could be harnessed for deep friendship.114 Belief in the second hidden assumption, that meaningful intimacy is not possible without sex, may impover‐ ish the friendships in which single people could find fulfill‐ ment—by making emotional, psychological, and dispositional intimacy seem inappropriate in nonsexual friendships. We must not conflate depth of friendship with the presence of sex. Doing so may stymie the connection between friends who feel that they must distance themselves from the possibility or appear‐ ance of a sexual relationship where none is wanted.115 By en‐ couraging the myth that there can be no intimacy without romance, we deny people the wonder of knowing another as what Aristotle so aptly called a second self.116

The third assumption is baffling (but not rare) to find in this context. Even granting the second point, legal recognition has nothing to do with whether homosexual acts should be banned or whether anyone should be prevented from living with any‐ one else. This debate is not about anyone’s private behavior. In‐ stead, public recognition of certain relationships and the social effects of such recognition are at stake. Some have described the push for gay marriage as an effort to legalize or even to decrimi‐ nalize such unions. But you can only decriminalize or legalize what has been banned, and these unions are not banned. (By contrast, bigamy really is banned; it is a crime.) Rather, same‐sex unions are simply not recognized as marriages or granted the benefits that we predicate on marriage. Indeed, recognizing same‐sex unions would limit freedom in an important sense: it would require everyone else to treat such unions as if they were marriages, which citizens and private institutions are free to do or not under traditional marriage laws.

  1. Many same‐sex attracted people who do not support legally recognizing same‐sex unions have explored the special value for themselves of deep friend‐ ships. See, e.g., John Heard, Dreadtalk: ‘Holy Sex & Christian Friendship’ John Heard‐ Life Week 2009 At The University of Sydney‐Remarks, DREADNOUGHTS (May 4, 2009, 3:33 PM), http://johnheard.blogspot.com/2009/02/dreadtalk‐holy‐sex‐christian‐ friendship.html.
  2. For more on the effects of a sexualized culture on friendship, see Anthony Esolen, A Requiem for Friendship: Why Boys Will Not Be Boys & Other Consequences of the Sexual Revolution, 18 TOUCHSTONE MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 21, available at http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=18‐07‐021‐f.
  3. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 260 (Terrence Irwin trans., Hackett Co. 1985).

The fourth assumption draws an arbitrary distinction be‐ tween homosexual and other sexual desires that do not call for the state’s specific attention and sanction. It often leads people to suppose that traditional morality unfairly singles out people who experience same‐sex attractions. Far from it. In everyone, traditional morality sees foremost a person of dignity whose welfare makes demands on every other being that can hear and answer them. In everyone, it sees some desires that cannot be integrated with the comprehensive union of marriage. In eve‐ ryone, it sees the radical freedom to make choices that tran‐ scend those inclinations, heredity, and hormones; enabling men and women to become authors of their own character.

  1. Isn’t It Only Natural?

The discussion in the last section of whether homosexual ori‐ entation is a basic human identity relates to another objection, the answer to which may be inferred from the structure of ar‐ guments until this point. Some people on both sides of this de‐ bate are concerned with whether same‐sex attractions are innate—and therefore, some theists conclude, intended by God—or merely a result of outside factors.117 If homosexual de‐ sire is innate, they suppose, then same‐sex unions should be le‐ gally recognized. After all, how could anything natural or intended by God be an impediment to a good such as marriage?

We do not pretend to know the genesis of same‐sex attrac‐ tion, but we consider it ultimately irrelevant to this debate. On this point, we agree with same‐sex marriage advocate Pro‐ fessor John Corvino:

The fact is that there are plenty of genetically influenced traits that are nevertheless undesirable. Alcoholism may have a genetic basis, but it doesnʹt follow that alcoholics ought to drink excessively. Some people may have a genetic predisposition to violence, but they have no more right to at‐ tack their neighbors than anyone else. Persons with such tendencies cannot say “God made me this way” as an excuse for acting on their dispositions.118

  1. Phyllis Zagano, Nature vs. Nurture, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER (Sept. 30, 2010), http://ncronline.org/blogs/just‐catholic/nature‐vs‐nurture.

Neither we nor Professor Corvino mean to equate same‐sex attraction with diseases like alcoholism or injustices like vio‐ lence against one’s neighbor. The point is simply that whether same‐sex unions can be marriages has nothing to do with what causes homosexual desire. Surely the fact that some‐ thing is natural in the sense that it isn’t caused by human choice proves nothing: Disabilities or pressing special obliga‐ tions can be natural in that sense, and yet they may prevent some people from getting married.

Similarly, if we discovered (plausibly) a genetic basis for male desire for multiple partners, that would not be an argu‐ ment for polygamy; and if we discovered (implausibly) that no sexual desire had a genetic basis, that would not be an argu‐ ment against marriage in general. There is simply no logical connection between the origin of same‐sex desire and the pos‐ sibility of same‐sex marriage.

  1. Doesn’t Traditional Marriage Law Impose Controversial Moral

and Religious Views on Everyone?

This objection comes at the end for a reason. By now, as promised in the introduction, this Article has made a case for enshrining the conjugal view of marriage and addressed many theoretical and practical objections to it, without appeals to revelation or religious authority of any type. This reflects a cru‐ cial difference between marriage and matters of purely reli‐ gious belief and practice, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, the enlightenment of the Buddha, baptisms, bar mitzvahs, and rules concerning ritual purification, fasting and prayer. Unlike these matters, the human good of marriage, and its implications for the common good of human communi‐ ties, can be understood, analyzed, and discussed without en‐ gaging specifically theological issues and debates.

Of course, many religions do have ceremonies for recogniz‐ ing marriages and teach the conjugal view of marriage (or something much closer to it than to the revisionist view). And many people are motivated to support the conjugal view for reasons that include religious ones. But none of these facts set‐ tles the debate about which view of marriage should be em‐ bodied in public policy. After all, some religions today teach, and motivate people’s advocacy of, the revisionist view. Thus, religious motivations must disqualify both the conjugal and the revisionist views from policy debates, or neither.


  1. John Corvino, Nature? Nurture? It Doesn’t Matter, INDEPENDENT GAY FORUM (Aug. 12, 2004), http://igfculturewatch.com/2004/08/12/nature‐nurture‐it‐ doesnt‐matter/. Professor Corvino’s piece deals specifically with the morality of same‐sex relations, which is not our topic here. But the same points apply.

Even so, some would say, enshrining the conjugal view of mar‐ riage involves privileging a controversial moral belief. Again, such an argument would equally exclude the revisionist view. Both would involve claims about which types of relationship we should publicly honor and encourage—and, by implication, which we should not. The revisionist view, at least in the version described above, would honor and privilege monogamous same‐ sex unions but not, for example, polyamorous ones. As we have pointed out,119 our law will teach one lesson or another about what kinds of relationship are to be encouraged, unless we abol‐ ish marriage law, which we have strong reasons not to do.120 In this sense, there is no truly neutral marriage policy.

Finally, it is important to realize that there is nothing special in these respects about marriage. Many other important policy is‐ sues can be resolved only by taking controversial moral posi‐ tions, including ones on which religions have different teachings: for example, immigration, poverty relief, capital pun‐ ishment, and torture. That does not mean that the state cannot, or should not, take a position on these issues. It does mean that citizens owe it to one another to explain with candor and clarity the reasons for their positions, as we have tried to do here.


A thought experiment might crystallize our central argument. Almost every culture in every time and place has had some insti‐ tution that resembles what we know as marriage. But imagine that human beings reproduced asexually and that human off‐ spring were self‐sufficient. In that case, would any culture have developed an institution anything like what we know as mar‐ riage? It seems clear that the answer is no.


  1. See supra Part I.D.2.
  2. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.E.2.

And our view explains why not. If human beings reproduced asexually, then organic bodily union—and thus comprehensive interpersonal union—would be impossible, no kind of union would have any special relationship to bearing and rearing chil‐ dren, and the norms that these two realities require would be at best optional features of any relationship. Thus, the essential fea‐ tures of marriage would be missing; there would be no human need that only marriage could fill.

The insight that pair bonds make little sense, and uniquely an‐ swer to no human need, apart from reproductive‐type union merely underscores the conclusions for which we have argued: Marriage is the kind of union that is shaped by its comprehen‐ siveness and fulfilled by procreation and child‐rearing. Only this can account for its essential features, which make less sense in other relationships. Because marriage uniquely meets essential needs in such a structured way, it should be regulated for the common good, which can be understood apart from specifically religious arguments. And the needs of those who cannot pru‐ dently or do not marry (even due to naturally occurring factors), and whose relationships are thus justifiably regarded as different in kind, can be met in other ways.

So the view laid out in this Article is not simply the most fa‐ vorable or least damaging trade‐off between the good of a few adults, and that of children and other adults. Nor are there “mere arguments” on the one hand squaring off against people’s “concrete needs” on the other. We reject both of these dichoto‐ mies. Marriage understood as the conjugal union of husband and wife really serves the good of children, the good of spouses, and the common good of society. And when the arguments against this view fail, the arguments for it succeed, and the ar‐ guments against its alternative are decisive, we take this as evi‐ dence that it serves the common good. For reason is not just a debater’s tool for idly refracting arguments into premises, but a lens for bringing into focus the features of human flourishing.


Click to access What-is-Marriage.pdf

The sexual revolution devours its children

This is from edwardfeser.blogspot.com which you can find here.  This blog is written by Edward Feser who is a Christian philosopher who I have been recently introduced to who I think provides effective clear, sobering, and direct responses to the advance of secular culture.


In two recent posts, we looked at philosopher Alex Byrne’s criticisms of claims made by some transgender activists to the effect that sex is not binary and that it is socially constructed.  Byrne is by no means the only philosopher alarmed at the increasingly bizarre claims being made by such activists – and the shrillness with which they are making them.  Kathleen Stock worries that such ideas will cause harm to women.  Daniel A. Kaufman warns that they threaten nothing less than the end of civil rights.  Nor are these philosophers conservatives who are hostile to the sexual revolution.  They are progressives concerned about extremism and anti-intellectualism in their own ranks.  And as if to prove the critics’ point, some of the activists have in response tried to get the critics fired and otherwise to silence them.

[Correction: Dan Kaufman kindly responds to this post in the combox below, and offers the following clarification: “I do believe in both the rightness and the viability of the modern liberal project, a la Locke and Mill [but] I do not consider myself a progressive of any sort.”]

The identificationist extreme

Kaufman gives the label “identificationism” to the thesis that a person is whatever he takes himself to be, which underlies claims like the ones criticized by Byrne.  To understand the absurd implications Kaufman takes this thesis to have, consider the following example.  (The details of the example are mine, not Kaufman’s.)  Suppose Pat is biologically male, having male chromosomes, male sex organs, and so forth.  The traditional or commonsense view of sex would be that Pat is a man, full stop.  Suppose that Chris, meanwhile, is biologically female, having female chromosomes and female sex organs.  The traditional or commonsense view would be that Chris is a woman, full stop.  And suppose also that Chris is sexually attracted only to other women.  Then common sense would say that Chris is a lesbian – since, as Kaufman writes, “until about five minutes ago, everyone knew what a lesbian is, namely a homosexual woman.

But now suppose that Pat “self-identifies” as a woman, but also as a woman who is sexually attracted only to other women.  Then Pat too, despite being what common sense would regard as a man, is also a lesbian!  Suppose also that Chris is in no way sexually attracted to “lesbians” like Pat, and indeed finds distasteful the idea of being romantically or sexually involved with them (given that they have male sexual organs, etc.).  Then, according to the identificationist transgender activists criticized by Kaufman, Chris is guilty of “bigotry” against Pat.  On the activists’ view, for Chris to refuse to treat people like Pat the way she would treat any other lesbian is a kind of unjust discrimination.

In effect, these activists are claiming that it is wrong for Chris (who, common sense says, is a woman) not to be sexually and romantically attracted to people like Pat (who, common sense says, is a man).  But this sort of claim, Kaufman points out, “used to be the exclusive province of religious fundamentalists and other assorted social conservatives and reactionaries”!  In short, the identificationist transgender activists are in Kaufman’s view undermining the whole point of the gay liberation movement, which was to validate preferences like Chris’s.

Moreover, Kaufman says, identificationists never explain why there is something “bigoted” about Chris’s set of preferences but not about Pat’s set of preferences.  They simply arbitrarily insist that Pat’s are unobjectionable and must be affirmed and that Chris’s are bad and must be condemned.

Stock worries that identificationism threatens to strip concepts like “woman” and “female” of any clear meaning, and that this will undermine efforts to deal with the unique problems faced by women.  She writes:
[Women] face… a heightened vulnerability to rape, sexual assault, voyeurism and exhibitionism; to sexual harassment; to domestic violence; to certain cancers; to anorexia and self-harm; and so on. If self-declared trans women are included in statistics, understanding will be hampered. A male’s self-identification into the category of “female” or “women” doesn’t automatically bring on susceptibility to these harms; nor does a female’s self-identification out of those categories lessen it. In a sexist world which often disadvantages females, as such, we need good data.

Furthermore, Stock argues, allowing anyone who self-identifies as a woman into areas traditionally reserved for women (changing rooms, women’s prisons, etc.) is bound to increase the incidence of violence against women.  Like Kaufman, Stock is also concerned that identificationism makes the concept “lesbian” so fluid that the self-understanding of those traditionally classified as lesbians, as well as their “special protections as a discriminated-against minority” and their “access to special sources of charity funding,” will be threatened.

In short, just as Kaufman worries that identificationism threatens the gay rights movement, Stock worries that it threatens feminism.  Kaufman argues that it also threatens racial equality.  For racial and ethnic differences are, he argues, no less plausibly socially constructed than sex differences.  Hence if identificationism entails that a person can make himself a man or a woman simply by self-identifying as such, then it no less plausibly entails that he can make himself a member of a certain race or ethnic group simply by self-identifying as such.

Philosopher Rebecca Tuvel made a similar claim last year – and faceda storm of outrage from some of her fellow left-wingers – and, of course, Rachel Dolezal famously faced similar outrage for claiming to be a black woman.  But Kaufman argues that if one grants the identificationist premises, there can be no rational justification for the outrage.  He writes:
Dolezal’s efforts to “self-identify” as black may have backfired, but I would suggest that this is only because she came to the identificationist party a bit too early.  Another such effort, five or ten years from now, done offensively, rather than defensively, in the manner of contemporary gender activism (i.e. by way of accusing critics of bigotry and “violence” and demanding their silencing and worse), might very well succeed.

If it does, he says, this will be “the last nail in the coffin of the traditional conception of civil rights,” because the notions of race and ethnicity, like the notion of sex, will have been evacuated of any clear meaning.

The liberal middle ground
Like Byrne, Kaufman and Stock do not challenge the claim thatgender (as opposed to sex) is socially constructed, and thus do not object to a more moderate transgender position.  Again, they also want to uphold the standard liberal positions on feminism, gay liberation, and the sexual revolution in general.  The difference between their moderate liberal position and the identificationist extremism they reject, Kaufman says, is that identificationism rests on a “hubristic deformation of the modern conception of the self.”  He writes:
The reasonable version of this conception entails a rejection of the pre-modern idea that a person is defined entirely in terms of his or her position in a social framework that is governed by a normatively thick conception of natural law, in favor of the notion that (to a substantial degree) who we are is a matter of our internal consciousness and thus, is determined by us.  It was an idea whose ultimate aim was to ground the moral and political autonomy of the individual necessary for life in a modern, democratic polis.

But identificationism goes beyond this to:
a complete rejection of material or social reality… maintaining that the individual is entirely self-made; that who and what I am is a matter of my own consciousness and will alone, irrespective of nature or social consensus. The result is an incoherent, unstable ground.

Kaufman sees in this extreme position an echo of Descartes’ substance dualism, Locke’s “continuity of consciousness” account of personhood, and Kant’s “noumenal self” – all of which essentially make the body, and materiality in general, something external to the self.  If you take yourself to be only contingently related to your body and to materiality in general, then it can seem plausible to hold that your genitalia, chromosomes, etc. are irrelevant to making you what you are, and that you can define yourself entirely independently of them.

The moderate position Kaufman favors, by contrast, “[does] not deny that the relevant material realities exist, but rather, that they have any legitimate moral or political valence in a modern, democratic society.”  Kaufman, Stock, and other critics of identificationism want to affirm that biology is partially constitutive of a person in a way that rules out the extreme thesis that you can make yourself male or female simply by self-identifying as such, but without abandoning gay liberation, feminism, moderate transgender activism, and the sexual revolution in general.

Now, the 64 dollar question is whether this middle ground liberal position between identificationism on the one hand, and “a normatively thick conception of natural law” on the other, is stable.  And the fuzziness in Kaufman’s characterization of it does not lend confidence.  Kaufman says that a person should not be “definedentirely” in terms of his position within a social framework governed by natural law, that what we are is determined by our consciousness of ourselves only “to a substantial degree,” that we should be wary of a “complete rejection” of our material nature, and that we are therefore not “entirely self-made.”  

That indicates that what a person is is at least partially determined by what Kaufman calls “material realities” – by biological facts of the kind the natural law tradition puts heavy emphasis on and the identificationist position ignores entirely.  Kaufman wants to let in enough biology to rule out the latter position but not enough to let in the former.  But exactly where do we draw the line, and why there?  Kaufman does not tell us.

Of course, no one can do everything in one article.  But the question is not some quibble over details.  It is a challenge to the very possibility of a middle ground liberal position.  If there is no principled or non-arbitrary way to draw the line, then either we have to go the whole hog for identificationism or we have to reconsider the possibility that the natural law position was right all along.

Can the center hold?
Here’s one way to see the problem.  It is notoriously difficult to characterize biological features except in functional terms.  You cannot adequately characterize the eye without making reference to the function of seeing, or the heart without making reference to the function of pumping blood.  This is as true of sexual features as of any others.  For example, male genitalia serve the function of getting male gametes together with female gametes.  It is also true of some psychological features no less than of physiological ones.  For example, hunger and thirst have the function of getting us to eat and drink, so that we will have the nutrients and hydration needed to sustain ourselves.

Claims about biological function are not undermined by examples of organisms that fail to perform the function well or at all.  The existence of blind people doesn’t undermine the claim that the function of eyes is to allow us to see.  Nor does it show that the eyes of blind people have a different function than those of people with sight.  The eyes of blind people and of people with sight have exactly the same function.  It’s just that blind people can’t perform that function, for whatever reason (e.g. damage to the eye or to the optic nerve).  Similarly, the existence of people who suffer from pica – the compulsion to eat things that have no nutritional value (dirt, stones, metal, etc.) – does not cast any doubt on the claim that hunger has the function of getting us to take in nutrients by eating.  Nor does it show that hunger has a different function in people who suffer from pica than it does in other people.  Hunger has exactly the same biological function in everyone.  It’s just that, because of a psychological abnormality, people who suffer from pica do not perform that function as well.
Now, according to the natural law tradition associated with thinkers like Aquinas (and which Kaufman rejects as the opposite extreme from identificationism), intersexuality, homosexuality, and the like are analogous to blindness, pica, and other dysfunctions.  For example, on the natural law view, having physiological sex characteristics that are not unambiguously male or female is like having eyes or optic nerves that are damaged.  It in no way shows that sexual organs do not have the biological function of getting the gametes of the opposite sexes together, and neither does it show that the sexual organs of intersex people have a different function from those of other people.  Rather, their sexual organs have exactly the same function as that of everyone else.  It’s just that, due to genetic defect, physiological abnormality, etc., they are not capable of performing that function well or at all.

Similarly, on the natural law view, sexual desire has the biological function of getting us to mate with people of the opposite sex, and the existence of people with sexual desires that are partly or wholly homosexual does not show otherwise.  Nor does it show that the function of sexual desire in people with same-sex attraction is different from the function it has in other people.  Rather, the function of sexual desire is the same in everyone.  It’s just that in people with desires that are partly or wholly homosexual, that function is not performed as well.  According to the natural law view, same-sex attraction is comparable to pica.  

Thus does Aristotle explicitly draw this comparison in his discussion of disordered pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics (at 1148b 15 – 19a 20).  Thus does Plato – his own homosexual inclinations notwithstanding – argue in The Laws that sexual relations are natural only when procreation is possible (at 839a), so that sexual pleasure is natural when indulged between men and women but unnatural in the context of same-sex sexual activity (636c).  Despite the prevalence of homosexuality in Greek culture, the Greeks didn’t see homosexuality as a kind of identity or basic orientation, any more than blindness or pica entails a kind of identity or orientation.  They saw it merely as the having of certain desires, the goodness or badness of which needed to be evaluated the way any other desire is evaluated.  Some of them judged such desires acceptable, whereas others (like Aristotle and the later Plato) did not.  The medieval natural law tradition that built on Plato and Aristotle inherited both this approach to understanding same-sex desire, and the negative evaluation of it.  Like the Greeks, they didn’t see the question of homosexuality as a matter of either affirming or condemning a class of people, but merely of affirming or condemning a certain kind of desire.

The implication of this view is that no one is really homosexual if being homosexual is interpreted as a kind of natural state or basic orientation.  According to the natural law analysis, being attracted to people of the same sex is not like being sighted or having a natural inclination to eat and drink, but more like being blind or suffering from pica.  The blind person no less than everyone else is naturallyoriented toward seeing, the person suffering from pica no less than everyone else is naturally oriented toward eating what will provide nutrition, and people with homosexual desires no less than everyone else are naturally oriented toward having sexual relations with people of the opposite sex.  It’s just that physiological dysfunction frustrates the realization of the natural end in the case of blind people, and psychological dysfunction frustrates the realization of the natural end in the case of people exhibiting pica and in people with homosexual desires.  On the natural law analysis, everyone is naturally oriented toward sight, eating nutritional food, and heterosexual sexual relations.
Now, the point of this exposition is to make concrete the difficulty facing the middle ground liberal position of Kaufman, Stock, et al.  They would, of course, disagree with the natural law analysis of homosexuality.  The problem is that it is hard to see how they can do so in a principled way given their rejection of identificationism.  Again, Kaufman rejects identificationism on the grounds that it entirely divorces our “material” or biological attributes from the self.  In Kaufman’s view, one’s biological features can make it the case that one simply is, as a matter of objective fact, a male, and that’s that.  The fact that one might not feel like a male is in Kaufman’s view irrelevant to the biological facts.  Hence he rejects talk of “’girl-penises,’ sex not being bimodal and the like.”  

But in that case, why should we not also say that every person is naturally heterosexual, whether all people feel that way or not?  Why does biology trump one’s self-conception in the case of a male who thinks of himself as really being female, but not in the case of a male who thinks of himself as really being homosexual?  If we say that the former is as a matter of fact male, even if he thinks of himself as female, why shouldn’t we say that the latter is as a matter of factmade for sex with females, even if he thinks of himself as made for sex with males?  Or, if we say that the latter is correct to take his natural orientation to be toward sex with other males, biology notwithstanding, then why shouldn’t we say that the former is correct to hold that he is really a female, biology notwithstanding?

It seems, then, that the identificationist is on to something.  The movement for gay rights effectively severed a person’s self-identifiedsexual orientation from biology, and the identificationist is pointing out that if we are going to do that, then to be consistent we will have to sever one’s self-identified sex from biology.  If appeals to biological function cut no ice in the one case, neither do they cut any ice in the other.

There are three ways that Kaufman, Stock, et al. might try to respond to this, though none seems very promising.  The first would be to dismiss talk of biological function as a mere teleological façon de parler that has no deep philosophical implications.  Now, just on general philosophy of biology grounds, I don’t think this sort of move can work.  I would argue that the notion of biological function is both ineliminable and irreducible.  That is to say, we can’t make sense of the biological facts without it, and we can’t analyze it in non-teleological terms.  

But put that to one side for present purposes.  The trouble for defenders of the liberal middle ground position is that to make this strategy work, they not only need to get rid of the notion of biological function, but to do so in a way that doesn’t give the game away to identificationism.  And I don’t think that is possible.  As I noted in my posts on Byrne, it is very difficult to spell out the biological difference between male and female in non-teleological terms.  Hence, if Kaufman, Stock, et al. were to chuck out function talk altogether so as to avoid having to accept the natural law view that homosexual desire is dysfunctional, then they would also undermine the case for saying that there is an objective biological difference between male and female.

A second strategy would be to accept the notion of biological function but deny that consistency requires treating claims about sex and sexual orientation as on a par.  On this strategy, we could say that there is an objective matter of biological fact about whether someone is male or female, but no objective matter of fact about whether sexual desire has the function of getting us to mate with people of the opposite sex.  The trouble with this move is that it seems both ad hoc and biologically implausible.  What criteria for biological function could one draw up that would make it plausible to say that eyes are for seeing and hunger for getting us to eat, but that sexual desire isnot for getting us to mate with the opposite sex?  Why would one even try to look for such gerrymandered criteria if it weren’t for thead hoc purpose of trying to avoid both identificationism and natural law theory?

A third strategy for the middle ground liberal position would be to argue that sexual orientation is more like gender than it is like sex.  Again, Kaufman, Stock, et al. have no beef with the transgender activist who says that gender is self-made.  Like Byrne, they object only to the claim that sex is self-made.  With sex, biology determines that you are either male or female, but with gender things are more fluid.  Someone who is biologically male might well identify as a woman.  Now, Kaufman, Stock, et al. might argue that a similar distinction might be made where sexual orientation is concerned.  They might allow that as a matter of biological fact sexual desire is naturally heterosexual, but then argue that sexual orientation is like gender in being fluid and socially constructed.  

But this strategy won’t work either, because to allow that sexual desire has, as a matter of biological fact, a heterosexual function, would be to imply that homosexual desire is biologicallydysfunctional.  And if you are going to say that, then it is hard to see why you wouldn’t also have to say that for a biological male to think of himself as a woman is also dysfunctional.  But once you do that, then it is hard to see how you can maintain a sharp distinction between the biology of sex on the one hand, and gender and sexual orientation on the other, without lapsing into the precisely the radical Cartesian/Lockean/Kantian divide between persons and their biology that Kaufman wants to avoid. 

As I suggested in my posts on Byrne, the reason that identificationists take the extreme position they do is that they perceive that the distinction between sex and gender is not in fact a sharp one.  The more robust the biological distinction between the sexes is, the less plausibly fluid gender is.  The more fluid the distinction between the genders is, the less plausibly robust the biological distinction between the sexes.  Hence if you are going to insist on fluid gender differences, you are going to have to deny robust biological sex differences.  The identificationist transgender activists can plausibly say to Kaufman: “We are not the ones positing a radical Cartesian divide between persons and their biology; you are!  It is precisely because we see persons and their biology as continuous that we conclude that, since gender is socially constructed, so too must the biology of sex be socially constructed.”  

If this is right, then the identificationist is not, after all, committed to a kind of Cartesian divide in human nature, but rather to a kind of biological anti-realism or social constructivism.  The natural law tradition, meanwhile, is committed to a robust realism about human biology.  So, who are the ones positing a radical Cartesian/Lockean/Kantian divide in human nature, then?  Defenders of the middle ground liberal position like Kaufman, Stock, and Byrne, that’s who!
The natural law diagnosis

So, again, it is hard to see how to find a principled or non-arbitrarymiddle ground between identificationism on the one hand and the natural law position on the other.  If one rejects the identificationist position as incoherent or biologically unsound, then it seems that one will have to reconsider the possibility that the natural law tradition was correct after all.  Or, if in the name of the sexual revolution one rejects the natural law position, then it seems that one will have to go the whole hog for identificationism.  If this is correct, then in one respect the identificationists are being perfectly logical.
In another respect, of course, they are not – namely, insofar as they present their position in a shrill and ad hominem way that is destructive of fruitful philosophical debate and free speech.  Kaufman is right to complain and worry about that, and to his credit he has repeatedly insisted that tactics like flinging epithets and shouting down opposition have no place in philosophy.

What is the explanation of the shrillness and illiberalism of many identificationists?  The natural law tradition suggests an answer. In Books VIII and IX of The Republic, Plato was famously critical of democracy, which he took to be the worst form of polity next to tyranny.  Indeed, he thought it had a tendency to degenerate into tyranny.  What he objected to in democracy was not primarily its procedural elements, but rather the egalitarian character type that it fostered.  On Plato’s account, the egalitarian tendency is to give every desire and way of life equal respect, and this entails a leveling down of standards.  The egalitarian becomes increasingly unwilling even to consider the possibility that some desires or ways of life are worse than others.  The very idea becomes intolerable to him.  Since he is unwilling to subject his appetites to the evaluation of dispassionate reason, he gradually comes to be ruled by them.  And sexual desire, because it is uniquely unruly and concerns the most intense of pleasures, tends especially to dominate him.

As each citizen becomes less and less willing to allow social norms or legal restraints to limit the indulgence of his desires, an egalitarian society tends to degenerate into a war of competing subjectivities.  What happens eventually is that the more ruthless and cunning of these appetitive personalities figure out ways to impose their wills on the others, and that is when democracy starts to give way to tyranny.  The tyrannical character type is, on Plato’s account, essentially an extreme version of the lawless and appetite-driven character type produced by egalitarian societies, and he is especially prone to be dominated by lust.

Plato’s analysis suggests, then, that the more someone of an egalitarian personality type is dominated by his sexual desires, the less capable he is going to be of a dispassionate and objective evaluation of those desires, and the more ruthlessly willful he is likely to be in pursuing them.  An egalitarian society given to the indulgence of ever more exotic sexual tastes is, if Plato is right, also bound to be a society in which those tastes are championed in an increasingly intolerant way.
Aquinas makes some complementary points in his account of what he calls the “daughters of lust” in Summa Theologiae II-II.153.5 (of which I offered an exposition in an earlier post).  Sexual indulgence that is excessive or involves acts that are unnatural or that is disordered in some other way has a tendency in Aquinas’s view to lead to what he calls “blindness of mind.”  The intensity of sexual pleasure can make it difficult to think logically and dispassionately about matters of sex even in the best circumstances.  And when repeated indulgence has habituated a person to sexual activity that is disordered, he is likelynot to want to think dispassionately about it, and to be increasingly incapable of doing so.  The very idea of there being an objective standard by reference to which his indulgence is disordered becomes intolerable to him, and he becomes increasingly willful in his indulgence and hostile to anything that might block it.

Aquinas’s account, like Plato’s, would thus lead us to expect that the more indiscriminate people become about matters of sex, the less willing they will be to discuss such matters in a calm and rational way, and the less capable they will be of doing so.  No doubt some would be inclined to respond by simply shouting “Bigot!” at Plato and Aquinas and ignoring their arguments.  Which, of course, only confirms their diagnosis. 

You can find this post here.

Byrne on why sex is binary

This is from edwardfeser.blogspot.com which you can find here.  This blog is written by Edward Feser who is a Christian philosopher who I have been recently introduced to who I think provides effective clear, sobering, and direct responses to the advance of secular culture.


At Arc Digital, philosopher Alex Byrne defends the proposition that there are only two sexes, while suggesting that this has no implications one way or the other for transsexuality, gender dysphoria, and related issues. Let’s consider both claims.

Byrne argues that it is a mistake to suppose that one’s sex isfundamentally a matter of what chromosomes one has or even what sorts of genitals one has.  Hence it is also a mistake to point to examples such as individuals who have male chromosomes but female external genitalia, or people who have only an X chromosome or XXY chromosomes, as evidence against the thesis that sex is binary.  In fact, Byrne suggests, chromosomes and genitalia are reflections of a deeper distinction, and the nature of that distinction is not captured by a mere description of the chromosomes and genitalia:


To be chromosomally female is to have the sex chromosomes typical of (human) females; to be genitally female is to have the genitalia typical of (human) females, and so on.  But what is it to be, simply, female or male?

Byrne’s answer is that the sexes are defined in terms of the gametes they produce:

Specifically, females produce large gametes (reproductive cells), and males produce small ones. (Since there are no species with a third intermediate gamete size, there are only two sexes.) A glance at the huge variety of females and males across the animal and vegetable kingdoms will confirm that there is nothing else the sexes can be. For instance, the equation female=XX is confused for a fundamental reason having nothing to do with human chromosomal variation: females of numerous species either have different sex chromosomes (as in birds) or else no sex chromosomes at all (as in some reptiles). The XX/XY system is merely the mechanism by which placental mammals like humans typically become female and male; other animals and plants use different means to achieve the same end result.

End quote.  Byrne does not make use of Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysical notions in order to make his point, but it is illuminating to do so.  Scholastics distinguish between the essence of a thing and its properties (or “proper accidents”).  A thing’s properties flow orfollow from its essence, but are not to be identified with its essence. For example, the essence of a human being is to be a rational animal, and a capacity for language is a property that flows or follows from this essence.  It is a kind of byproduct of being a rational animal insofar as it will always manifest in a mature and healthy specimen.

Of course, some individual human beings are deficient in or lacking this capacity, but that is because the “flow” is, as it were, being blocked (by immaturity, brain damage, dementia, etc.).  It does not follow from such cases that the capacity for language is not a true property of human beings, but rather merely that an immature or damaged human being will not manifest all of his properties. Similarly, the exercise even of rationality itself can be impaired or blocked by genetic defect, brain damage, aging, etc.  For the Scholastic, this does not mean that some human beings are not rational animals, but rather that they are rational animals whose actual exercise of their rationality is being frustrated.

Now, what Byrne is proposing can be interpreted as the thesis that the essence of being either male or female involves having the capacity to produce either smaller or larger gametes, respectively. And having certain chromosomes and having genitalia of a certain type are properties which flow or follow from having one or the other essence.  In particular, having XY chromosomes, a penis, testicles, etc. are properties of human males, and having XX chromosomes, a vagina, ovaries, etc. are properties of human females.  As with other properties, the manifestation of these can be distorted or blocked due to immaturity, defect, damage, etc.

Again, Byrne doesn’t use such language, but he at least implicitly gestures at something like the essence/properties distinction insofar as he notes that:

There is a complication. Females and males might not produce gametes for a variety of reasons. A baby boy is male, despite the fact that sperm production is far in his future (or even if he dies in infancy), and a post-menopausal woman does not cease to be female simply because she no longer produces viable eggs.

In other words, immaturity prevents the manifestation of the relevant properties in a baby boy, whereas aged organs being worn out prevents the manifestation in a post-menopausal woman.

This brings us to another Aristotelian notion that illuminates Byrne’s point, viz. that of intrinsic teleology.  As longtime readers of this blog know, intrinsic teleology is the kind that a thing manifests naturally, just by virtue of being the kind of thing it is.  A stock example would be an acorn’s tendency to grow into an oak, a tendency it has simply qua acorn.  This contrasts with extrinsic teleology, which is the kind a thing possesses only insofar as some end or purpose has been imposed on it from outside.  A stock example would be the time-telling function of a watch, which is not intrinsic to the bits of metal that make up a watch, but has to be imposed by the maker and users of the watch.  (Again, see Scholastic Metaphysics for detailed exposition and defense of this distinction.)

To have an essence involves having certain intrinsic teleological properties.  For example, having the essence of a rational animal entails having faculties that are directed toward or aim at ends such as acquiring knowledge.

Now, Byrne speaks of “the mechanism by which… humans typicallybecome female and male” and says that “other animals and plants use different means to achieve the same end result.”  That is teleological language, and since he is talking about natural kinds rather than artifacts, it is the language of intrinsic teleology, specifically.

Similarly, when Byrne says that “a baby boy is male, despite the fact that sperm production is far in his future (or even if he dies in infancy),” it is natural to read this in teleological terms.  In particular, it is natural to read it as implying that a baby boy’s physiology is naturally directed toward the eventual production of sperm, and is so directed even if this end is never realized (because of the death of the baby).  Furthermore, the claim that “a post-menopausal woman does not cease to be female simply because she no longer produces viable eggs” can also be read in teleological terms.  The idea would be that a woman’s ovaries are directed toward the production of viable eggs, and remain so directed even if age leaves them no longer capable of realizing that end.  (Something similar is true of organs in general.  For example, the eye is forseeing, and it retains that function even if genetic defect, injury, or old age leave it incapable of fulfilling that function well or at all.)

This reading is especially natural in light of these follow-up remarks from Byrne:

In the light of these examples, it is more accurate (albeit not completely accurate) to say that females are the ones who have advanced some distance down the developmental pathway that results in the production of large gametes — ovarian differentiation has occurred, at least to some extent. Similarly, males are the ones who have advanced some distance down the developmental pathway that results in the production of small gametes.

End quote.  Talk of “developmental pathways” is naturally read as teleological.  The development in question is not just in any old direction, after all, but is a development toward the production of the gametes.  The “pathway” has a specific natural destination.

All the same, I presume that Byrne would not want to commit himself to anything like Aristotelian essentialism and teleology.  He may hold, as contemporary philosophers often do, that teleological-sounding talk is a mere façon de parler which can be replaced with a purely efficient-causal description.  But even the hint of an essentialist and teleological metaphysics accounts for why many with “progressive” views about sex are, as Byrne complains, reluctant to acknowledge that sex is binary.

After all, if anything has teleology, gametes do, and it has to do with getting together with the gametes of the opposite sex.  And if, as Byrne’s account suggests, chromosomes and genitalia play a secondary role relative to gametes, it isn’t hard to figure out theirteleology too.  It has to do with facilitating the getting together of the gametes of the opposite sexes.  Hence the extremely well-known suitability of penises to get male gametes into the vicinity of female gametes, etc.

Before you know it, the evolutionary psychologists will show up and start pointing out that psychological drives (like sexual arousal, romantic attraction, and the like) are no less plausibly described in functional terms than genitalia are, and that the psychological functions in question have to do with facilitating the physiological processes by which male gametes get together with female gametes. Add Aristotelian essentialism and teleology to the mix, and the function talk takes on normative significance.  Deviations from the physiological and psychological functions in question take on the status of malfunctions and deformations, no less bad for the organism than other malfunctions and deformations are.  All that’s left at that point is for the natural law theorists to come along and draw out the implications for sexual morality – though the progressive will by that time already have started hyperventilating, in a most unsexy way.

So, the skittishness of some progressives about acknowledging that sex is binary is understandable.  The messier sex can be madenaturally to seem, the easier it will be to resist natural law conclusions.  But again, Byrne holds that to acknowledge that sex is binary should give the progressive nothing to worry about.  Is he right?

Well, if essentialism and intrinsic teleology are rejected, then the moral conclusions the progressive dislikes won’t follow.  (Though only because no moral conclusions about anything at all can survive the abandonment of essentialism and teleology, or so I would argue – butthat is a topic for another time.)  And as I have said, I presume that Byrne would reject them, though this is not a topic he addresses.

The trouble is that it is very difficult at best to reduce or eliminate essentialist and teleological notions in the context of biology.  To be sure, the assertion that they can be reduced or eliminated is extremely common.  But actually pulling this job off is something no one has really done.  For example, attempts to reduce the notion of biological function (e.g. in causal terms or in terms of natural selection) are famously problematic.  Furthermore, as writers likeMarjorie GreneAndre Ariew, and J. Scott Turner have argued, natural selection in any event at most casts doubt on teleology where questions about adaptation are concerned, but leaves untouched the need for teleological descriptions of developmental processes.  It is often thought that resort to computational notions (such as characterizations of the genome as a kind of software or program) provides a handy replacement for teleology.  But as I argued inanother recent paper, the computational descriptions in fact implicitly presuppose something like Aristotelian essentialism and teleology.

Again, Byrne himself describes the phenomena with which he is concerned in terms that suggest teleology.  Even if (as, again, I presume) he would hold that such talk can be cashed out in non-teleological terms, it is another thing actually to show exactly how this could be done.  In particular, one would need to capture everything we know about gametes, chromosomes, genitalia, etc. in a way that makes no implicit reference at all to teleological features. For example, one would have to be able to give a complete description of male gametes without saying anything that implies that they have the end or telos of getting together with female gametes; one would have to be able to give a complete description of genitalia without saying anything that implies that they have the function of getting gametes together with those of the opposite sex; one would have to give a complete description of immature testicles without implying that they aim or are directed toward sperm production years down the line; and so on.

Since, again, it’s very hard to pull off such a consistently non-teleological re-description (where any aspect of biology is concerned, not just sex), it is no surprise that some progressives prefer to muddy the waters where the biological facts are concerned.  If sex is not binary, then the teleology is messier, and if the teleology is messier, then the dreaded conservative moral conclusions are easier to resist.

So, Byrne’s remarks about the biology are plausible, but his remarks about the implications or lack thereof for progressive views about sex, not so much.

Related reading:

Love and sex roundup

You can find this post here.

January 2019, “The Evangelist” Newsletter from St. John the Evangelist Anglican Church, Abington, PA

The Evangelist is the monthly newsletter of St. John the Evangelist Anglican Church in Abington, Pennsylvania.  The January 2019 issue of The Evangelist is now out which you can read here.

The World Order in Danger

Every now and again I come across a fantastic article the warrants posting here; I recently came across one in Splice Today by my old philosophy professor Dr. Crispin Sartwell from back in my Penn State days which, I thought, was pretty insightful. Be edified.


There’s no downside to Trump freaking out traditionalists.

Perhaps you didn’t realize that we were living under a world government, until Donald Trump started messing with it and everybody freaked out. “In Trump,” warns a Washington Postheadline, “some fear the end of the world order.” The reporter, Karen Tumulty, explains the world order (WO) as “the Western-dominated order that has ruled the world for the past seven decades.” She continues by quoting “officials,” speaking for some reason on condition of anonymity: “Trump cares very little about the traditional world order.” The Irish Times describes Trump as “a threat to the world order,” while the Independent attributes the claim that Trump presents a threat to the WO, not to “some,” or to “officials”, but to “experts.”

We might ask whether there’s a “liberal” order that has “ruled the world” for 70 years, and if so whether it’s done a good job. The phrase has a distinguished history. In the 1970s, for example, conspiracy theorists asserted that the WO was imposed and administered by Henry Kissinger and the Trilateral Commission. This style of theorizing was a fringe view at the time. Yet it’s now the conventional wisdom of officials and experts and the Post that the world has been ruled all this time by people like that, who apparently set the “norms” for world trade that have been scrupulously observed by everyone since 1946.

Continuing through our brief etymology of the WO, George H. W. Bush welcomed a New WO after the first Gulf invasion and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It’s hard to tell if the NWO was the same WO that the Post thinks had already ruled the world for 45 years before that, or just what the relations of these alleged WOs might be. In response, Marxists and post-Marxists started talking about “the neo-liberal order” (NLO), which might which might also refer to the WO, but definitely refers to the NWO, or international capitalism, or international state-corporate configurations, or interlocked monetary and trade policies and activities, trans-national economic organizations such as the World Bank, the WTO, and EU. Probably the Trilateral Commission is still ticking along underneath, running the whole shebang.

And perhaps all the conspiracy theories hook up nicely, as one way that Trump is attacking the WO is by attacking the American “Deep State,” or the surveillance machine that helps constitute the police force for the WO. Again, there appears to be no such thing until it’s attacked, whereupon it’s suddenly speaking with many voices on television, sounding like James Clapper and for that matter Jim Acosta. One WO-violating feature of Trump’s approach is how explicit his attacks are and how they are launched: Trump just starts insulting people on Twitter, whether it’s Justin Trudeau or James Comey.

And as much as anything, Trump allegedly endangers the alleged WO by the way he talks. He endangers the WO by the way he talks about and to Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin, for example. There’s no telling, at this moment, how much of this—the protectionism that really does have establishment DC in a panic, or the wild swings in rhetoric engulfing American foreign policy—may end up having good effects. But Trump’s approach makes some concealed facts apparent and raises fundamental questions. It’s dangerous in certain ways, though these are exaggerated; it’s also invigorating, and opens up new possibilities in a world that’s often seemed stuck in an immovable hierarchy. It’s been a long 70 years.

First, Trump’s radical thrashing about shows that people—“experts,” “unidentified officials,” journalists—do think that there is a world economic order, despite all the rivalries, or the obvious differences in interests between people in, for example, Brazil, Uzbekistan, Beijing, and Cleveland. They think that the world is administered by the G7, or that, as Trump said sarcastically as he headed to Canada, “We’ve got a world to run.”

It’s surely a miserable simplification to believe that there has ever been any such single world economic order, or world state, and so it’s surely a miserable simplification to think that it’s disintegrating right now due to Trump’s shenanigans. The world economy has always been multi-polar and a site where many interests are contested and none is flatly dominant. But to the extent that there really has been a world economic order, it has presided, for example, over long-term increases in inequality, or the immiseration of the third world for the benefit of the first. At a minimum, the effect of whatever degree of order the world in fact displays have been highly equivocal, and some people have done much better than others. In particular, the G7 have done alright for themselves, though the populations of each of these countries is also divided between those who have benefited from the WO, such as it is, and those who have not.

Some of Trump’s iconoclastic or impulsive moves against the alleged WO, or the people who understand themselves to be the WO, give you the sense of possibilities opening up, just because Trump is ignoring how things have long been done. He suggested, for example, that all countries should remove all tariffs on all goods. That’s an interesting notion to throw into the hopper, and makes you realize that a lot of what Trump is doing is just posturing for negotiation, but in a far more dramatic way than the last dozen presidents would have countenanced. He just doesn’t appear to harbor the same assumptions that the people who think they have a world to run have brought to these matters for 70 years. Perhaps many of these assumptions are false, however.

And then the way he has dealt with Kim Jong-un has been entirely unconventional: threatening and insulting him, praising him and offering all sorts of rewards. The idea of the summit itself disturbs the world order. Lord knows how it will all come out, but it has not, so far, made things worse. And it represents the biggest change in the Korea situation in a couple of generations. I think these were cases in which Trump played the policy direction by ear, or improvised the stuff on Twitter. This has proven remarkably refreshing, even if it also presents dangers.

There’s a reason that the WO formulation is popular among conspiracy theories; the phrase has real creepiness, which makes it odd for The Washington Post, the WTO, Justin Trudeau, or James Clapper to defend. They’re definitely hoping to freak you out by formulating it this way: “reality itself, the WO, is breaking down!” But it’s not absolutely obvious that, if such a thing exists, it should not be smashed, though one might not like the smasher in this case. At any rate, people in particular who regard themselves as being on the left might think several times before they directly portray themselves as the representatives of the WO that has ruled the globe for 70 years. If that’s who they are, they’ve got a lot to answer for.

This article can be found here.

Iowa Supreme Court Says DOT Doesn’t Have The Authority To Regulate Traffic Cameras

I have been writing in opposition to traffic cameras for a few years now (you can find all of my articles and posts on traffic cameras here).  They are consistently controversial and violative of basic rights as described in the article below.


DES MOINES — The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled in favor of cities and their use of traffic cameras.

Cedar Rapids, Des Moines and Muscatine argued the DOT does not have the right to make rules that forced them to move or take down traffic cameras. The Supreme Court ruling agrees –saying while the Iowa Legislature gives the agency specific authority in other areas — traffic cameras are not included.

The DOT had argued the camera rules fall under their authority to remove “obstructions” from highway right-of-ways. But the Supreme Court says that’s a stretch because the cameras are on poles over the highway and the DOT was okay with cameras just being shut down and not removed.

The ruling says under the DOT argument, if the cities decided to station numerous patrol cars on Interstates 380 and 235 to catch and ticket speeders, the DOT could not issue a rule banning the practice on the grounds that it has “jurisdiction and control” over the highways.

The Supreme Court says when the legislature has given an agency general rulemaking authority but has also granted specific authority in particular areas, the agency cannot then extend the specific grants beyond their scope. It cited an earlier case where the court ruled that the DNR had the authority to quarantine a deer with CWD, but did not have the authority to quarantine the land where the infected deer was discovered, because the DNR was not given that specific authority.

The ruling says the ban on the use of drones for traffic enforcement passed in 2014 shows the legislature has the ability to enact rules for new types of traffic enforcement, but says lawmakers have not taken the step for traffic cameras.

Here’s the full ruling: Traffic-Camera-ruling-PDF

Originally published on April 27, 2018 by KGLO and can be found here.

Capitalists Against the Free Market

This article is part of my posts on the economic system of distributism.  This is from practicaldistributism.blogspot.com which you can find here:


If you listen to the apologists of capitalism, there is one thing they consistently argue for when they rail against things like socialism or even distributism; the Free Market. They say that they believe that the Market should determine what products and services succeed and fail without artificial support or suppression from the government. Customers should be free to decide what products and services they want to buy and it is up to the producers and service providers to convince consumers to choose theirs instead of others. It is interesting to note those cases where they not only fail to support this idea, but actively work against it.

In order for consumers to be able to make a decision that truly represents the action of a free market, the consumer must have the right to know certain things about the products and service providers between which they are choosing. For example, it has generally been recognized that consumers have the right to know the ingredients of food. This is not just for reasons of health, but for other reasons as well. Vegetarians and vegans have the right as consumers to know whether or not the food they are purchasing contains meat or other animal products. This allows them to make a truly free market choice. Consumers also have the right to know who makes a product because, if they think the producer is unscrupulous, they need to have the ability to choose a competitor’s product. If they are prevented from doing this by allowing the producer to be hidden, then the consumer is prevented from making a free market decision they actively want to make.
An important aspect of this consumer choice is that the consumer’s reason does not have to be deemed “reasonable” by others. If you choose not to buy from a particular provider because they support things which you oppose on moral grounds, it doesn’t matter if those things you oppose have nothing to do with the product in question. In a truly free market, you would have the right to refuse to do business with any provider for whatever reason you want. In a truly free market, the consumer would have the right to know what he needs to know to make a truly free decision, and providers should therefore be required to provide this information and prevented from taking steps to hide it. It is the burden of providers to convince consumers to purchase their products and to do so in an open and honest way. If they fail to convince, then their failure is a result of the “invisible hand” of the free market.
In my state, Washington, there was a movement to require the labeling of products containing GMO ingredients. There are various reasons why people are making their free economic choice to not purchase products with patented genetically modified organisms, and these people were asking that their right to make that free market decision be honored by requiring that products containing these ingredients be labeled so that consumers would know what they are buying. What is truly interesting in regard to this article are the arguments I heard made by avowed capitalists against this. The capitalist pundits almost uniformly opposed the legislation on various grounds. The two main arguments made by these capitalists involved the impact to prices and the irrationality of those who opposed GMO products.

They claimed that the cost of changing the labeling would be prohibitively high and the cost of food would skyrocket as a result. There are two points which easily disprove this claim. First, companies change their labels quite frequently when it serves their purpose. They change pictures and rearrange things, they add special sections about offers. If these label changes don’t cause prices to skyrocket, then requiring the labels for future packages to indicate the presence of GMO ingredients won’t either. Second, the requirement has been made in several other countries and their prices didn’t skyrocket. Those who pointed this out were often treated with disdain by these capitalists.

The argument that those who oppose GMO products were doing so irrationally was typically in the form of saying they didn’t understand the science behind the GMO process. However, that isn’t a valid reason to oppose consumer information because the burden is on the producer to convince them to want to buy their products. If a group of consumers decides they would never purchase those products, that is still a free market decision even if the reasons for their choice are incorrect. We should expect avowed capitalists to support the right of consumers to make that decision even if they disagree with the decision itself.

While supporters of the legislation did voice their reasons for not wanting to choose GMO products, their argument about the legislation itself was essentially that they wanted the right to make their free market decision, and they couldn’t effectively do so if these ingredients were allowed to be hidden from them in the marketplace.
Since we know that the labeling requirement would not actually cause prices to skyrocket, what then is the real reason to refuse to indicate that a product contains GMO ingredients? An obvious answer is the loss of sales. In a free market with informed consumers, some of them will freely choose, for whatever reason, not to purchase products that contain GMO ingredients. In terms of free market capitalist economics, that is not only they way things work, but the way they should work. For a producer to refuse or oppose labeling that would inform the consumer about these ingredients is nothing less than deliberately working against free market values; hiding information you know the consumers want in order to effectively trick them into purchasing a product you know they don’t want. This is duplicitous at best.
Why then did so many capitalist who claim to advocate the free market vociferously oppose consumers being allowed to make informed free market decisions? They didn’t even seem to realize that they were opposing a position that essentially said, “let the free market decide the fate of GMO products in the marketplace.” In essence, they were opposing the free market itself.

Are Traffic Cameras Rigged Against Drivers?

I have been writing in opposition to traffic cameras for a few years now (you can find all of my articles and posts on traffic cameras here).  They are consistently controversial and violative of basic rights as described in the article below.


There are some studies that have found that traffic cameras slow down traffic, increase wait times, and fuel an increase in rear-end accidents.

And critics say that they are more about trying to make money for the state than they are about trying to keep the roads safer. The intentions behind them might have been good, but in the end the cameras might be causing more harm than any good.

While some studies have found negative results from the traffic cameras, there are others, such as one that was funded by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which found different results; that they allegedly reduced collisions.

However, it appears that a growing number of people are starting to question the efficiency of the cameras; considering the resources that go into maintaining and replacing them etc. As well as the billions of dollars in funding that they are helping to collect for the state.

Are they causing more harm than good?

One recent study that looked at 148 intersections that were located in at least 28 different cities in the US, found that the total number of crashes had increased roughly 10.14 percent compared to the data they had collected prior to installing traffic cameras.

There have been several attempts to ban red-light traffic cameras and to have them removed from various jurisdictions, some public officials have even including it as a campaign promise to voters. But many efforts thus far have failed. However, they did have some success recently in Arizona a few months ago, after House legislators there decided to pass a bill to get rid of traffic cameras; sending it to the Senate for further approval.

The Senate in Texas has also recently voted to ban the use of traffic cameras statewide. One Senator from Texas, Sen. Don Huffines, previously declared that he wants the state to reimburse the victims of these traffic cameras and he wants the entire program turned off; he’s made multiple attempts to try and see that happen.

Regardless of the growing number of critics who are trying to make efforts to have the cameras removed, there are still a great deal of law enforcement personnel and other public officials etc, who maintain that there is a need to continue using them across the country.

One critic of the cameras, an engineer from Sweden, Mats Jarlstrom, who now resides in Oregon, decided to conduct his own investigation on the cameras and he was slapped with a fine from the state for having engaged in unlicensed practice of engineering because he isn’t a licensed professional in the eyes of the state of Oregon.

Jarlstrom launched his mission several years ago and he’s been looking to prove that the cameras are setting drivers up for tickets; they’re rigged against the laws of nature, he says.

He’s even taken his findings to the Oregon State Board of Examiners for Engineering and Land Surveying so that those who have the ability to, might possibly work to make the appropriate changes if there is such a problem with the cameras. That didn’t happen however, instead they decided to accuse him of having practiced engineering without the appropriate permission from the state.

He’s already been fined hundreds of dollars by the state and been under investigation, simply for trying to point out what he believes is a problem that they should be concerned with correcting.

It all started several years ago after Jarlstrom’s wife allegedly received her own ticket and he became interested with the math behind the traffic lights, and he says that because of a flaw with its timing that it’s rigged against drivers.

He fought back, and won.

Jarlstrom filed a federal lawsuit in defense, he argued that their crackdown equated to a violation of his 1st Amendment Constitutionally-protected right to free speech. After all, shouldn’t free speech apply to discussions about math? It took several years but recently the attorney general in Oregon allegedly admitted that they had violated his free speech rights with their actions. Jarlstrom has partnered with the Institute for Justice and he isn’t over yet because he says that he wants the law declared unconstitutional; he doesn’t want to see others fall victim just like he did for what should be considered protected speech.


This article was published in Steemit and can be found here.



Check out Faye Cohen’s post to her blog Toughlawyerlady!


I started writing this blog 3 months ago, but its topic, which involves all of the drama and passion of a morality play, has been the subject of ongoing change as reported in the news, so I amended it before posting. The story involves a homeless drug-addicted man, Johnny Bobbitt, who allegedly used his last $20 to help a young lady, Kate McClure, when she allegedly ran out of gas near the spot where Bobbitt was panhandling. In turn, McClure and her boyfriend, Mark D’Amico, started a GoFundMe.com page for the purpose of helping Bobbitt with his drug addiction problems and finding him a home. The public responded graciously and $400,000 was raised to assist Bobbitt. As this story involves the human attributes of kindness, sympathy, greed and avarice, and highlights the heights and depths, follies and foibles of the human experience, the news media has given it much coverage…

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An Economics of Justice & Charity

This article is part of my posts on the economic system of distributism.  This is from practicaldistributism.blogspot.com which you can find here:


The Church has always concerned itself with issues of justice in society, and popes have taught extensively on the topic since the late 1800s. Unfortunately, many Catholics in our day are not aware of this teaching, or only consider it in regard to things like helping the poor. Helping the poor is a very important aspect of it, but the scope of the Church’s teaching on matters of social justice go much further. Any aspect of social life which involves questions of ethics or morality fall within the scope of this teaching. Thomas Storck’snew book, An Economics of Justice & Charity, is a guide that shows how the Church’s teaching is very clear, has never changed, and definitely applies to areas of social life like economics.
In this new book published by Angelico Press, readers of Practical Distributism and The Distributist Review will encounter some ground already covered by Mr. Storck. However, he has expanded this coverage and included more material for consideration. Especially important for the Catholic reader, and others who wish to understand the Church’s teaching on social justice, are the sections covering claims, sometimes made by Catholics, that the Church’s teaching has somehow changed since the Second Vatican Council, particularly with the encyclical of St. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus. Quoting those who claim that the Church’s teaching has changed, or that the Church has now wholeheartedly endorsed capitalism, Mr. Storck handily refutes those claims.
Another topic of interest to our readers is that of usury. On this topic, Mr. Storck clearly shows that, while the Church’s position on certain financial considerations may seem to indicate a change of teaching, the Church still condemns usury today as she always has. Through his examination of these financial considerations, Mr. Storck shows that the Church always sides with justice and maintains her teaching clear and unchanged without presenting an impossible burden for those of us who live in a world with a financial system that stands opposed to her teaching. However, he also points out that there are different financial options available to us. If we sincerely believe our Faith and strive to live by the teachings Christ has passed down to us through His Church, we need to choose options which are most consistent with those teachings whenever possible.
I wholeheartedly recommend An Economics of Justice & Charity. Consider this book for your own library and for those with whom you would like to share this important aspect of the Church’s teaching. Changing society is a slow and gradual process that must begin with getting people to consider alternatives to the status quo. This book can be a valuable tool in that most important work. Consider heading over to the Angelico Press web site to order a copy.

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