judicialsupport

Legal Writing for Legal Reading!

Archive for the tag “supreme”

Suit Challenges Constitutionality of Tax Code Parsonage Allowance

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“In a lawsuit filed this week, the Freedom From Religion Foundation is again challenging the constitutionality of the Internal Revenue Code’s parsonage allowance.  The complaint (full text) in Gaylor v. Lew, (WD WI, filed 4/6/ 2016), contends that Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code–which allows clergy to exclude from taxable income a housing allowance paid as part of their compensation– violates the Establishment Clause.  The suit was brought by two FFRF officers who also received housing allowances.  One of the plaintiffs is an ordained minister who in prior years when employed by a church was able to claim the allowance.  In 2014, the 7th Circuit dismissed a similar suit on standing grounds because plaintiffs had not sought to exclude their FFRF allowances on their federal income tax returns or claim a tax refund. (See prior posting.) This time plaintiffs did file amended returns seeking a refund of taxes paid on their housing allowances. FFRF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Advertisements

9th Circuit: Denial of Exemption For Use of Cannabis Does Not Impose Substantial Burden On Religious Exercise

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

In Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii v. Lynch, (9th Cir., April 6, 2016), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a church and its founder were properly denied an exemption from federal laws that prohibit the possession and distribution of cannabis. Under RFRA, denial of an exemption does not impose a “substantial burden” on plaintiffs’ exercise of religion because the primary sacrament of the church is peyote.  Plaintiffs consume cannabis only as a substitute. They do not claim that peyote is unavailable or that cannabis serves a unique religious function.

You can learn more about this issue here.

Business Owner Unsuccessful In Suing Churches That Opposed New Strip Club

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“In Harrington v. Hall County Board of Supervisors, (D NE, March 31, 2016), a Nebraska federal district court dismissed a number of claims brought by the owner of an adult entertainment company against two churches that circulated a petition opposing attempts to open a strip club in Hall County, Nebraska. The court also dismissed claims against a director of one of the churches.  The adult entertainment company owner alleged that the churches engaged in a conspiracy to adopt and enforce an unconstitutional zoning resolution. Plaintiff also alleged violations of the antitrust laws, defamation, tortious interference with business relationships, infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.  The court additionally rejected the claim that individual members of the County Board of Supervisors violated the Establishment Clause when at a public hearing they thanked supporters of the petition for supporting Christian values.”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Dependent on Child Support in Dependency

It is widely known that it is public policy is to ensure children receive the support they need from their parents. In the vast majority of cases, a child support obligation terminates when a child reaches the age of majority (age 18) or graduates from high school, whichever is later, however, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent matter of Somerset County Children and Youth Services v. H.B.R., 155 A.3d 627 (Pa. Super. 2017), has addressed the atypical situation when a child reaches the age of majority yet still remains subject to a dependency order.

In H.B.R. the child-at-issue was put into placement following a dependency action. Consequent to the same, Children and Youth Services (CYS) filed a complaint for child support against the child’s father and, accordingly, an order for child support was entered. A little over two years after the child support order was entered, the father filed a petition to modify the child support order, requesting termination of the same, because the child, having reached the age of majority and graduated from high school, was emancipated. Despite reaching the age of majority and graduating from high school, the child voluntarily chose to remain in the custody of CYS until age 21, which is his right to do.

After the child support modification conference, the trial court entered an order terminating the child support order as the child is emancipated due to reaching the age of majority and graduating from high school. In response, CYS demanded a hearing contesting the termination of the child support order because, although having reached the age of majority and graduating from high school, the child continued to be dependent and in the custody of CYS and, therefore, financially subsidized by CYS. After the hearing mentioned above, the trial court affirmed the order mentioned above flowing from the conference terminating the support order. As a result, CYS appealed the matter to Pennsylvania Superior Court.

On appeal, CYS essentially argued that as it must still outlay money for the support of the child, due to his remaining dependent, the father should contribute to the same through a child support order. Furthermore, CYS claimed that the child support process may be the only mechanism available to it to seek recoupment of its costs for the emancipated child.

In rendering its decision, the court first noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that a parent has no legal duty to provide educational support to an emancipated child. Based on this, Superior Court, specifically agreeing with the trial court, said that “a parent has no duty in Pennsylvania to provide support to a college-age child who has graduated from high school and who suffers from no infirmities which would prevent that child from earning income to help support himself.”

In light of the above, the court ruled that CYS failed to convince it that the trial court’s order, described above, is “manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice and partiality.” Instead, the Superior Court noted, the trial court’s order is precisely consistent with applicable law, especially considering that the child is emancipated and capable of self-support. Therefore, the father has no legal obligation to continue paying child support.

As part of its analysis, the court distinguished this case from the matter of Erie County Office of Juvenile Probation v. Schroeck, 721 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. 1998). In Schroeck, the parent was obliged to pay the cost of care for the child-at-issue in that case even though the child was over 18 years old and graduated from high school and therefore emancipated. Despite meeting the two primary factors for emancipation, the child was also adjudicated delinquent and placed in a court-ordered residential program. In ordering support for this child, the court’s reasoning in Schroeck was that, due to being adjudicated delinquent and in a residential program, the child was rendered effectively unemployable and incapable of self-support. By contrast, the Superior Court noted, the child in H.B.R. has no such limitations which would trigger a support obligation. The court pointed out that his decision to remain in the custody of CYS is not mandatory and does not render the child incapable of self-support.

Ultimately, Superior Court affirmed the termination of the father’s child support obligation. The court observed that CYS may have other avenues to pursue under 62 Pa.C.S. Section 704.1 and an action to seek reimbursement due to the child being able to engage in self-support, but elected not to provide any guidance as it does not issue advisory opinions.

Originally published on June 29, 2017 in The Legal Intelligencer and can be seen here.

Qualified Immunity For Commissioners Asking Religious Questions To Constable Candidate

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“In Lloyd v. Birkman, (WD TX, April 1, 2016), a Texas federal district court held that members of the Williamson County (Texas) Commissioners’ Court enjoyed qualified immunity in a suit by an unsuccessful candidate for County Constable.  The position was normally an elected one, but the current Constable resigned and the next election was over one year away. Thus under state law the Commissioners had the power to appoint a new Constable to serve until the next general election.  During interviews for the position, Commissioners asked candidates about their church membership, views on gay marriage and abortion, and political ideology. Plaintiff contended that these questions violated his rights of free expression and association, as well as the free exercise and establishment clauses. The court, however, concluded that there was not “clearly established law” that this line of questioning was improper in the context of private interviews for an interim appointment to a normally elective position. (See prior related posting.) ”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Refusal To Enter Requested Surname on Birth Certificate Did Not Violate Free Exercise Rights

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“In Nix El v. Williams, (D DC, March 30, 2016), the D.C. federal district court rejected a claim by the father of a newborn daughter that his religious rights were infringed when D.C. Department of Health officials refused to list his daughter’s surname on her birth certificate as “Nix El” rather than as “Nix”, the parents’ surname. D.C. statutes require the surname to match that of a family member. Plaintiff, who is a member of the Moorish Science Temple, contended that he wished to add “El” to his daughter’s name because it is a title of nobility. In the suit, plaintiff had asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages of $136 million plus punitive damages of $1 million per day for each day his daughter did not have a birth certificate.”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Montana Court Issues Preliminary Injunction To Allow Parochial School Participation In Tax Credits

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“According to The Missoulian, in Montana on Thursday, a state trial court judge issued a preliminary injunction barring the Montana Department of Revenue from enforcing its rule that excludes religiously affiliated schools from participating in the state’s new School Contributions Tax Credit law. (See prior posting.) The Department of Revenue takes the position that participation in the school aid program by religiously affiliated schools violates state constitutional bans on that prohibit direct and indirect payments or appropriations to religious or sectarian schools. ”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Catholic School Principal’s Title VII Suit Dismissed Under “Ministerial Exception”

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

In Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, (SD NY, March 29, 2016), a New York federal district court held that the “ministerial exception” to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act precludes the former lay principal of a Catholic elementary school from suing for employment discrimination.  Plaintiff alleged that her employment was terminated as a result of gender discrimination and retaliation. In relying on the ministerial exception doctrine as set out in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, the district court said in part:

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not be considered a minister for purposes of Church governance. But the issue here is one of U.S., not canon, law, and “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception has a far broader meaning than it does for internal Church purposes.

You can learn more about this issue here.

Sikhs Sue Over Army Accommodation of Religious Practices

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

“A lawsuit was filed yesterday by three observant Sikhs who have enlisted in the Army, but who are encountering difficulties in obtaining accommodation to allow them to continue to wear beards, uncut hair, and turbans.  The 54 page complaint (full text) in Singh v. McConville, (D DC, filed 3/29/2016), alleges in part:

[T]he Army has a long pattern and practice of discriminating against Sikhs…. The Army’s regulations promise that soldiers whose religious exercise poses no significant obstacle to the military’s mission will be generously accommodated…. [H]owever, the regulations themselves are defective and foster religious discrimination on a number of levels…. [T]hey force soldiers who need religious accommodations to violate their religious beliefs before they can apply for an accommodation, even if their religious exercises would clearly have no impact on the military’s compelling interests.

The regulations are also … require soldiers to reapply for a religious accommodation every time they have a “transfer of duty stations, or other significant change in circumstances”….. The ambiguity in the regulations also creates an environment where the Army feels free to delay resolving requests for accommodation for long periods of time, leaving future soldiers in limbo and potentially forcing them to forgo other education and career opportunities while they wait for the Army’s decision.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Supreme Court In Unusual Order Floats Alternative Compromise In Contraceptive Mandate Cases

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

The U.S. Supreme Court today issued an unusual Order (full text) in Zubik v. Burwell and the six other cases consolidated with it, less than a week after the Court heard oral arguments in the case.  In what is apparently an attempt to avoid a 4-4 split in the case, the Court has essentially drafted its own version of a compromise on provision of contraceptive coverage in health insurance policies for employees of religious non-profits, and is asking the parties whether they will buy into it. The Order reads in part:

The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs that address whether and how contraceptive coverage may be obtained by petitioners’ employees through petitioners’ insurance companies, but in a way that does not require any involvement of petitioners beyond their own decision to provide health insurance without contraceptive coverage to their employees.  Petitioners with insured plans are currently required to submit a form either to their insurer or to the Federal Government (naming petitioners’ insurance company), stating that petitioners object on religious grounds to providing contraceptive coverage. The parties are directed to address whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies, without any such notice from petitioners.

For example, the parties should consider a situation in which petitioners would contract to provide health insurance for their employees, and in the course of obtaining such insurance, inform their insurance company that they do not want their health plan to include contraceptive coverage of the type to which they object on religious grounds. Petitioners would have no legal obligation to provide such contraceptive coverage, would not pay for such coverage, and would not be required to submit any separate notice to their insurer, to the Federal Government, or to their employees. At the same time, petitioners’ insurance company—aware that petitioners are not providing certain contraceptive coverage on religious grounds—would separately notify petitioners’ employees that the insurance company will provide cost-free contraceptive coverage, and that such coverage is not paid for by petitioners and is not provided through petitioners’ health plan.

The parties may address other proposals along similar lines, avoiding repetition of discussion in prior briefing…..

Initial reactions from the non-profits suggest that they may be willing to accept this version of the compromise. A press release from the Becket Fund, counsel for Little Sisters of The Poor, petitioners in one of the cases, describes the Court’s Order as an “excellent development.”

You can learn more about this issue here.

Post Navigation