judicialsupport

Legal Writing for Legal Reading!

Archive for the tag “protection”

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Termination of Parental Rights

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Termination of Parental Rights.”

Thanks!

__________

The termination of a parent’s rights over his children nearly always occurs in one of two circumstances: voluntary adoption and dependency.

When termination is an issue, the court must appoint an attorney to represent the child when one or both parents contest the termination.  Of course, the court is always free to appoint counsel and/or guardian ad litem for the child.  A lawyer may not represent both the child and one of the parents.  As far as the parents facing possible parental termination are concerned, the court may, upon petition, also appoint an attorney for one or both of them in the event he or she is unable to pay for an attorney.

There are times when parents are willing to voluntarily terminate their rights to their children, typically called relinquishment, say in the context of adoption.  Another option, besides relinquishment, is signing a consent. A parent can sign a consent for their child to be adopted and not have to appear at future hearings.  23 Pa.C.S. § 2504.  Upon receipt of a petition to relinquish parental rights, as mentioned above, a hearing will be scheduled, at least ten days from the filing of the petition, in order for the court to review and rule upon the petition.  Relinquishment is under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2501-2502 and requires a hearing wherein a judge should make sure the parent understands the consequences of relinquishment and is fully aware of his right to trial.  Usually there is a colloquy by the judge or by the parent’s attorney to establish their understanding.

It should be noted that if there is a putative father, which is to say a man who has not been formally legally established to be a child’s father, he may have his rights terminated if he had not filed an acknowledgment of paternity or a claim for paternity and fails to appear at the termination hearing.

Perhaps one of the most compassionate sections of the applicable law toward the parents subject termination is the fact that the court has the obligation to inquire into whether those parents have received counseling.  If not, the court can refer him or her to a qualified counselor.  In the alternative, a parent subject to termination may apply for a referral to counseling as well.  To help facilitate counseling, the state has established a counseling fund pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2505(e) to help those who are not in a financial position to afford counseling on their own.

Of course, termination of parental rights is a critical element of adoption and dependency.  Termination in the context of adoption is pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511.  In order to petition to terminate in this context, the parent must (1) evidence a “settled purpose of relinquishing [a] parental claim” over a child or fail to perform parental duties for a period of six (6) months immediately prior to filing to terminate; or, (2) demonstrate repeated abuse or neglect or continued incapacity; or, (3) the parent is the presumptive but not natural father of the child; or, (4) the child is in the custody of an agency and the parent is unknown (and does not claim the child within three months after being found); or, (5) the child has been removed from the care of the parent by court or voluntary agreement for a period of at least six months and the circumstances which led to the removal still persist with no reasonable expectation to improve; or, (6) a newborn child where the parent knows (or should know) of the child but takes no action to be a parent (e.g.: reside with the child or marry the other parent) for a four month period; or, (7) the parent is a father of a child conceived through rape; or, (8) the parent has been convicted of a serious crime (as listed in the statute); or, (9) the parent has committed sexual abuse or is a registered sex offender,

If a parent exhibits no sign of interest in the child over an extended period – typically about six months – he will be at risk of termination.  The Court has made it clear that a child is not an “unwanted toy” for a parent to pick up and play with at his whim and set it down again when tired of it.  Relatedly, being the fun and occasional playmate is not the same as being an involved parent.  Additionally, parental involvement is more than merely paying support or paying for various expenses.  A parent is more than a benefactor.  Interestingly, absence due to incarceration does not necessarily provide sufficient grounds for termination.  Of course, the six month interval is not mechanically applied.  The Court is to fully analyze the underlying matter to determine why there has been such extended absence, and to view the totality of circumstances before ordering termination.

Those who may petition to terminate another person’s parental rights are limited to (1) either parent; (2) an agency; (3) the person who has custody and standing as in loco parentis and has filed a report of intention to adopt; and/or (4) a guardian ad litem of a dependent child.

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the grounds listed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511.  If the aforesaid evidentiary standard is met, then the court may consider whether the termination is for the best interests of the child.  As with virtually any other issue regarding the custody or placement of children, the best interests of the child are paramount.  The court is to give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and/or emotional needs and welfare of the child.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)  The statute is clear that issues surrounding environmental factors will not be the sole basis of termination.  Environmental factors include housing, furnishings, income, clothing, medical care, and the like if they are beyond the control of the parent.  Finally, if a parent attempts to remedy the issues and conditions provoking the termination petition after the petition is filed, the court will likely not consider them.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)

After the filing of a petition for termination, a hearing is held with at least ten days’ notice to the parents, putative father, and parent of a minor parent who has not been terminated.  Following termination, the terminated parent may not object to any adoption proceeding for the child.  Terminated parents nearly always have the right to file updates of his or her personal medical history information after termination.

Resources:

  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2313
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2501
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2502
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2503
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2505
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2512
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2521
  • In Re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007)
  • Baby Boy A. v. Catholic Social Services, 517 A.2d 1244 (Pa.1986)
  • v. Arnold, 665 A.2d 836 (Pa.Super.1995)
  • In re Burns, 474 P. 615 (1977)
  • In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa.Super.2000)
  • In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738 (Pa.Super.2004)
  • In re K.K.R.-S., K.M.R. & K.A.R., 958 A.2d 529 (Pa.Super.2008)
Advertisements

Ethics Complaints Are Newest Tool In Wars Over Same-Sex Marriage

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

Legal ethics complaints appear to have become the most recent weapon in the culture wars.  After the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a series of complaints with the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission against Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore (see prior posting), an ally of Moore’s has turned the tables.  On July 28, Alabama attorney Trent Garmon and his wife Holly filed a complaint against Richard Cohen, president of the Southern Poverty Law Center, over Cohen’s comments attacking Moore for Moore’s actions opposing same-sex marriage.  As reported by AL.com, the complaint alleges that Cohen’s statements violated Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.2 that provides;

A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,

Cohen’s comments included a statement that Alabama “elected [Moore] to be a judge, not a pastor;” Cohen called Moore a demagogue and the “Ayatollah of Alabama,” and said he is unfit for office.

You can learn more about this issue here.

Settlement Reached In Suit Over Sheriff’s Religious Use of Department’s Facebook Page

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

A settlement agreement has been reached in American Atheists, Inc. v. Watson, a suit alleging that Bradley County, Tennessee Sheriff Eric Watson used the sheriff department’s Facebook page to promote the sheriff’s Christian religious beliefs. (See prior posting.)  According to an American Atheists press release yesterday, under the settlement the county will pay $15,000 in damages to American Atheists and the local plaintiffs as well as $26,000 in attorney’s fees.  Also under the settlement, the Sheriff’s Department  will create a new, information-only, Facebook page that will not be used to “promote or further any religion, religious organization, religious event or religious belief.” The original Facebook page has already been deactivated.  Sheriff Watson will be allowed to maintain a clearly marked personal Facebook page reflecting his personal opinions.

You can learn more about this issue here.

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Questions of Paternity

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Questions of Paternity.”

Thanks!

__________

III.       CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

C.     Questions of Paternity

Historically the law regarding children born out-of-wedlock (i.e.: so-called “bastards”) was different than that regarding a child born into a family, which disadvantaged and stigmatized them.  Now, however, by contrast, parents, no matter the circumstances of the birth of their children, all have equal rights under the law.  The establishment of paternity entitles the person who is awarded it to custodial rights over the child-at-issue.

There are six ways in which paternity can be established: (1) voluntary acknowledgment; (2) stipulation to be bound to the results of a genetic test; (3) estoppel; (4) presumption; (5) hearing/trial; and, (6) failing to appear for testing, trial, and/or hearing for paternity.  An action to determine paternity for a child born out of wedlock may be commenced at any time until the child turns eighteen years old.

A child born into a marriage is presumed to be the child of the father in that marriage and this presumption is typically only rebutted through showing impotence or the impossibility of sexual access.  23 Pa.C.S.A. §5104(g).  In situations when a child is born out-of-wedlock, paternity may be determined by (1) the parents eventually marrying and/or (2) through clear and convincing evidence that the purported father has provided financial support and/or received the child into his home and has held the child out as his, and/or (3) clear and convincing evidence of actual paternity (e.g. positive paternity testing which is prima facia evidence of paternity).  The presumption of paternity in the context of marriage is for the purpose of preserving stable family units for the children within them.

Of course, a putative father may also acknowledge paternity in a verified writing.  This is often done at a child support conference/hearing where a man submits to a support order for a child he acknowledges as his own.  If a man appears at a support hearing but refuses to acknowledge paternity, the court is to enter an order directing the parties to appear for genetic testing.  Perhaps obviously, the mother is, by statute (23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513(c)) considered to be a competent witness to paternity.  The putative father may contest the results of the genetic testing, but, to do so, he must marshal clear and convincing evidence that the test is somehow not reliable.  If the test itself is not conclusive (i.e.: results in less than 99% probability), the court will schedule the matter for trial.

Estoppel occurs when a man holds a child out as his own regardless of biological relationship.  It could also occur when a woman holds him out as the father despite biological relationship.  Estoppel, basically, is the prohibition of denying paternity after holding a child out as one’s own, regardless of his relation to the child.  Estoppel, at its essence, is designed to prevent putative fathers from denying parentage at some point in the future.  “Hold out as his own” is typically evidenced by spending time with the child, living with the child, the child bearing the man’s name, the child calling him “dad,” the man representing to others he is the father, and so on.  In situations such as this, this man will be estopped from denying paternity and genetic testing may not be admitted to contradict paternity.  Relatedly, if a man other than the apparent father denies paternity, a mother may not pursue genetic testing on the alleged father due to the presence of the apparent father.  Again, similar to the presumption from a marriage, it is believed permanency is in the best interests of the child.  Furthermore, estoppel is most often applied in situations where a man has held himself out as a child’s father only to try and deny paternity when/if child support is ordered at some point in the future.  As estoppel often relies upon timing (e.g.: failing to move immediately for genetic testing upon learning of a claim of paternity) the Pennsylvania Superior Court observed that the law is starting to soften on its application and stated “paternity by estoppel continues to pertain in Pennsylvania, but it will apply only where it can be shown, on a developed record, that it is in the best interests of the involved child.”  T.E.D. v. C.A.B. v. P.D.K., Jr., 74 A.3d 170 (Pa.Super.2013).

There are times, of course, when more than one man claims to be the father of a child.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled on who may request a paternity test and/or challenge paternity and/or be denied the right to seek paternity.  In the matter of Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241 (1997) the Supreme Court, through a plurality opinion, laid out the required analysis to determine the paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage.  First, one must determine whether the marriage presumption of paternity applies and, if so, whether it has been rebutted.  Second, if the presumption has been rebutted, one must then determine if estoppel applies to bar either a plaintiff from making a claim or a defendant from denying paternity.

The underlying principle of the presumption is the preservation of marriage, in other words, the protection of an intact family.  If the presumption does not apply one must then determine whether the man seeking paternity is estopped from attempting to strip another man’s claim to paternity of a child born during marriage and/or held out as his own.  It should be noted that one’s delay or inactivity in seeking paternity may bar him from doing so.  Again, best interests – in this instance the stability of a child’s life – is paramount.

Of course, there are times when fraud is claimed regarding paternity and, if demonstrated, the argument of estoppel could be precluded.  In order to successfully argue fraud, a party must demonstrate: (1) a misrepresentation; (2) a fraudulent utterance; (3) intention to induce action by the recipient; (4) justifiable reliance on the utterance; and, (5) damages.

Resources:

  • R.C.P. 1910.15
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2313
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2502
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4343
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5102
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5103
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5104
  • Rosado v. Diaz, 425 Pa.Super. 155 (1993)
  • Liebner v. Simcox, 834 A.2d 606 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • Karner v. McMahon, 640 A.2d 926 (1994)
  • John M. v. Paul T., 524 Pa. 306 (1990)
  • Freeman v. McCandless, 539 Pa. 584 (1995)
  • Buccieri v. Campagna, 889 A.2d 1220 (Pa.Super.2005)
  • Conroy v. Rosenwald, 940 A.2d 409 (Pa.Super.2007)
  • Warfield v. Warfield, 815 A.2d 1073 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403 (Pa.Super.2002)
  • Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.2006)
  • O. v. C.O., 404 Pa.Super. 127 (1991)

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation.”

Thanks!

__________

III.       CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

B.   Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation

A party to a custody order has a right to seek its modification.  Contrary to popular belief, one does not need to allege that there has been a change in circumstances in order to seek, or have, a modification of a custody order.  The form and process of drafting and filing a petition to modify custody is substantially the same as a complaint for custody and the series of hearings which follow are also the same.

            There are instances where an attorney files something entitled a complaint (or petition) to “Confirm Custody.”  It does not appear that such a filing is derived from an actual procedural category or practice.  Instead, it merely appears to be a standard complaint or petition for custody given a different title for, apparently, the sole purpose of giving the filer some sort of rhetorical capital or high ground, as “confirming custody” implies that person is already entitled to custody and is merely filing to “confirm” it.  Alternatively, it is sometimes used in situations where there is already an existing “informal” custody arrangement (i.e.: without a court order), and the person filing merely wishes to “confirm” that custody arrangement in a court order.  This merely appears to be a stylistic preference, and not based on any law or procedure, and, therefore, has no practical effect on a custody matter.

 

 

Native American Cannot Claim Religious LiIberty Defense In Prosecution for Unlawful Hunting

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

In State of Washington v. McMeans, (WA App., Aug. 9, 2016), a Washington state appeals court upheld a trial court’s refusal to give the jury an instruction on a free exercise defense asserted by a Yakima Tribe designated hunter in a prosecution of him for unlawful hunting.  Defendant Ricky Watlamet killed 4 elk to provide meat for the funeral of a tribal elder.  The elk harvesting took place outside of elk hunting season on land of co-defendant who sought help to get rid of elk damaging her property.  Under an 1855 treaty, the Yakima tribe is allowed to hunt on “open and unclaimed lands,” but not private property.  The court said in part:

The defense presented substantial evidence that Mr. Watlamet had sincere religious beliefs and that he used the elk meat for religious purposes. However, he did not provide any evidence that the McMeans property was the only available location to obtain the elk meat. In fact, the record shows that Mr. Watlamet could lawfully hunt elk on State land, Federal land, tribal land, or any open and unclaimed land. The record also indicates that at the time in question there were numerous elk on the reservation as well as elk on state land adjacent to the McMeans property. Mr. Watlamet could have hunted these elk without running afoul of any regulation. He presented no evidence that either these particular elk or this particular place were necessary, preferable, or even convenient, nor has he presented any evidence that hunting the lawfully available elk was in any way burdensome.

You can learn more about this issue here.

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: A Petition for Visitation and/or Custody

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Child Custody and Visitation Rights: A Petition for Visitation and/or Custody.”

Thanks!

__________

CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

  1. A. Petition for Visitation and/or Custody

Like nearly any other court case, all custody actions – regardless of how much custody is being sought (e.g.: primary, partial, or visitation, etc) – begin with the filing a complaint.  The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a standard form for a complaint, which can be found in Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1915.15 and 1915.16.

The various county courts in the Philadelphia area offer forms for custody complaints, and they can be found at the following websites:

 

  • Elements of a Complaint

As one can see from reviewing the forms mentioned above, a standard complaint for custody is to include, more or less, the following information:

Unlike a civil complaint, very little additional information or advocacy needs to be included in the complaint for custody.  The opportunity to advance additional information and/or advocacy is when interacting with the opposing party or attorney and/or at a hearing scheduled pursuant to the filing of the Complaint.  The purpose of the custody complaint is merely to get the most basic information before the court: who the case involves, what the Plaintiff wants, and an assertion that no other court has jurisdiction.

When requesting relief in the complaint, it is important to use the proper language which best describes why the Plaintiff is seeking.  23 Pa.C.S.A. §5322 lays out the terms and their definitions.  Pursuant 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5322, the relevant terms are as follows (as quoted directly from the statute):

  • legal custody: the right to make major decisions on behalf of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational decisions.
  • sole legal custody: the right of one individual to exclusive legal custody of the child.
  • shared legal custody: the right of more than one individual to legal custody of the child.
  • physical custody: the actual physical possession and control of a child.
  • sole physical custody: the right of one individual to exclusive physical custody of the child.
  • primary physical custody: the right to assume physical custody of the child for the majority of time.
  • shared physical custody: the right of more than one individual to assume physical custody of the child, each having significant periods of physical custodial time with the child.
  • partial physical custody: the right to assume physical custody of the child for less than a majority of the time.
  • supervised physical custody: custodial time during which an agency or an adult designated by the court or agreed upon by the parties monitors the interaction between the child and the individual with those rights.
  • In a statutory provision other than in this chapter, when the term “visitation” is often used in reference to child custody, and may be construed to mean:

(1) partial physical custody;

(2) shared physical custody; or

(3) supervised physical custody.

In the vast majority of case, the only issue in dispute is physical custody as, unless there is unusual and/or extenuating custody (e.g.: incarceration, absence, abuse), the parents of a child are both presumed to have a right to shared legal custody.  As defined above, physical custody is when a parent actually has a child personally with him.  By contrast, legal custody is the right of a parent to have access to, and make decisions regarding, important parenting and lifestyle issues.

It is also important to observe the fact that the specific definitions of/for the terms above do not always coincide with popular or colloquial usage.  It is very common for a client, when consulting with his attorney, to use one or more of the terms above without reference to its technical, legal, definition; therefore, it is important to discern precisely what a client is seeking instead of assuming even a vague familiarity, much less a fluency, with the terms mentioned above.  For example, many clients, when consulting with their attorney or filing a custody petition on a pro se basis, frequently indicate they are seeking “full custody” of their children, despite the fact that no such designation exists; similarly, they often refer to “sole custody” in the same way.  In addition, it is not uncommon for someone to use the term “visitation” when he really means “partial custody.”  So, it is important to discern what the client actually means sometimes despite the precise words being used.

Armed Forces Court of Appeals Interprets RFRA In Military Context

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

In United States v. Sterling, (US Armed Forces Ct. App., Aug. 10, 2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a Marine Lance Corporal failed to establish a prima facie case under RFRA in defending against charges growing out of her work space posting of unauthorized signs containing Biblical quotations.  Appellant, in the wake of other personnel issues, posted 3 signs reading “[n]o weapon formed against me shall prosper.”  The signs did not indicate that these were Bible verses. She refused orders to remove them and was court martialed.  The majority held in part:

while the posting of signs was claimed to be religiously motivated at least in part and thus falls within RFRA’s expansive definition of “religious exercise,” Appellant has nonetheless failed to identify the sincerely held religious belief that made placing the signs important to her exercise of religion or how the removal of the signs substantially burdened her exercise of religion in some other way. We decline Appellant’s invitation to conclude that any interference at all with a religiously motivated action constitutes a substantial burden, particularly where the claimant did not bother to either inform the government that the action was religious or seek an available accommodation.

The court spelled out its understanding of what must be shown to establish that the government imposed a substantial burden on appellant’s religious exercise:

[W]hile we will not assess the importance of a religious practice to a practitioner’s exercise of religion or impose any type of centrality test, a claimant must at least demonstrate “an honest belief that the practice is important to [her] free exercise of religion” in order to show that a government action substantially burdens her religious exercise…. A substantial burden is not measured only by the secular costs that government action imposes; the claimant must also establish that she believes there are religious costs as well, and this should be clear from the record….

In contrast, courts have found that a government practice that offends religious sensibilities but does not force the claimant to act contrary to her beliefs does not constitute a substantial burden…. We reject the argument that every interference with a religiously motivated act constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions before this Court, the trial evidence does not even begin to establish how the orders to take down the signs interfered with any precept of her religion let alone forced her to choose between a practice or principle important to her faith and disciplinary action.

Judge Ohlson dissented, saying in part:

Unfortunately, instead of remanding this case so that it can be properly adjudicated by the court below, the majority instead has chosen to impose a stringent, judicially made legal standard in this and future religious liberty cases that is not supported by the provisions of RFRA. Contrary to the majority’s holding, the plain language of the statute does not empower judges to curtail various manifestations of sincere religious belief simply by arbitrarily deciding that a certain act was not “important” to the believer’s exercise of religion.  Neither does the statute empower judges to require a believer to ask of the government, “Mother, may I?” before engaging in sincere religious conduct. And further, nowhere in the statute are service members required to inform the government of the religious nature of their conduct at the time they engage in it.

You can learn more about this issue here.

RFRA Does Not Impact Bankruptcy Code’s Denial of Discharge

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

The Bankruptcy Code, Sec. 727(a)(2)(A) provides that a bankruptcy court should deny a discharge if the debtor has within one year of filing for bankruptcy transferred property with the intent to hinder, defraud or delay a creditor.  In In re Crabtree2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2922 (MN Bkr., Aug. 8, 2016), a Minnesota federal bankruptcy judge held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not prevent applying this provision to a family’s donation of a box of 500 silver coins, valued at $12,000.00, to their church, Firestarters Worship Center.

You can learn more about this issue here.

Football Coach Sues Seeking Right To Pray At 50-Yard Line

This is from religionclause.blogspot.com which you can find here:

Yesterday Bremerton, Washington, High School assistant football coach Joe Kennedy who was placed on paid leave for insisting on praying at mid-field at the end of games (see prior posting) filed suit against the Bremerton school district alleging free exercise, free speech and Title VII violations.  The complaint (full text) in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, (WD WA, filed 8/9/2016), contends that Kennedy is compelled by his sincerely held Christian religious beliefs to engage in brief private religious expression at the conclusion of school football games. He offers a prayer of thanksgiving as part of a covenant he made with God.  The complaint argues that the school district’s directive which bans any “demonstrative religious activity” that is “readily observable” to students or members of the public is unconstitutional. The suit seeks declaratory relief as well as an order reinstating Kennedy and granting him a religious accommodation that allows him to pray at the 50-yard line at the conclusion of games.  Seattle Times reports on the lawsuit.  First Liberty has also created a website with details of the case.

You can learn more about this issue here.

Post Navigation