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Mens Rea Applies Despite Practice of Religious Norms

In 2010, the Superior Court of New Jersey heard the matter of S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d. 412, 415 N.J.Super. 417. The Hudson County case involves the marriage of Plaintiff S.D. (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant M.J.R. (“Defendant”) and the domestic abuse that Defendant inflicted upon Plaintiff per his rights and privileges within the Islamic faith. Both the trial court and Superior Court in this matter analyzed the relationship between the legal concept of mens rea and Defendant’s state of mind when acting within the scope of his religion.

Plaintiff and Defendant are both Muslims from Morocco. Their marriage was arranged by their respective families in 2008 when Plaintiff was 17 years old. On July 31, 2008, Plaintiff and Defendant were married. After three months of marriage, Defendant asserted “his rights” as a Muslim husband in four separate incidents.

The first incident occurred when Plaintiff was unable to sufficiently cook a meal for Defendant’s friends. Once Defendant’s friends left, Defendant proceeded to inflict a punishment upon Plaintiff for her failure to cook what he believed was an adequate breakfast by pinching her on every part of her body for over an hour. His “punishment” left several bruises which were documented by the local prosecutor’s office weeks later. Defendant indicated to Plaintiff that the violence he was inflicting was to “correct” her behavior.

The second incident occurred when Defendant, knowing Plaintiff was not a skilled cook, asked her to prepare a dinner for friends. Plaintiff informed Defendant that she could not cook the meal he requested to his satisfaction. He then asked his mother to cook the meal instead (Defendant’s mother had moved in with them shortly after they were married). Plaintiff and her mother-in-law had an unpleasant exchange. When Defendant learned of this exchange, he proceeded to again inflict a punishment upon Plaintiff. This time he stripped Plaintiff of her clothes, and pinched her breasts and her vaginal area. Plaintiff tried to flee but Defendant locked the door so she could not escape. Defendant explained to her that she was his wife and she must do whatever he told her. After his punishment, Defendant then forcibly had sex with Plaintiff. This episode lasted several hours.

About a week later the third incident occurred after Plaintiff got into an argument with her mother-in-law. The argument got so heated that Plaintiff locked herself in her bedroom. Defendant removed the latch from the bedroom door, entered the bedroom, and proceeded to engage Plaintiff in nonconsensual sex. Subsequently, after some unrest, Plaintiff attempted to leave the apartment, but Defendant refused to allow her to leave and instead, pulled her back in and physically assaulted her by repeatedly slapping her in the face causing her lip to swell and bleed. Defendant then left the room which allowed Plaintiff time to escape the house through a window. Once outside, Plaintiff encountered a woman who noticed her injuries and called the police. The police took her to the hospital and documented her injuries. A police investigation also established that her bed sheets and pillow cases were stained with what appeared to be blood.

Subsequent to the above three incidents, Plaintiff moved out of the marital home. During this time it was discovered Plaintiff was pregnant with Defendant’s baby. In order to try and reach a remedy to their marital issues the Plaintiff, Defendant, and their Imam had a meeting. At the meeting, Plaintiff and Defendant reconciled on the following conditions: that Defendant would cease mistreating Plaintiff, that they both move back to Morocco, and that they live separate from Defendant’s mother.
On the night of their reconciliation, in January 2009, Defendant again engaged in nonconsensual sex with Plaintiff three times. Defendant continued to do so on subsequent days. During this period, Plaintiff was deprived of food and a telephone.

Defendant explained to her that according to Islamic faith, he can do anything he pleases to his wife and she should submit to him. Defendant eventually became dissatisfied with Plaintiff and performed an Islamic divorce in the presence of the above-mentioned Imam.

Ultimately, a complaint was filed in Superior Court and Plaintiff attempted to secure a restraining order against Defendant. While these domestic matters were proceeding, a parallel criminal matter was also pending. During the litigation of the above matters, the Imam confirmed that according to Islamic law “a wife must comply with her husband’s sexual demandsÉ The Imam did not definitively answer whether under Islamic law, a husband must stop his advances if his wife said Ôno.’”

The Judge in the restraining order matter found that Plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant engaged in harassment and assault. He further found that Plaintiff had not proven criminal restraint, sexual assault, or criminal sexual contact. To that end, the Judge specifically stated that:

This court does not feel that, under the circumstances, that this defendant had a criminal desire to or intent to sexually assault or to sexually contact the plaintiff when he did. The court believes that he was operating under his belief that it is, as the husband, his desire to have sex when and whether he wanted to, was something that was consistent with his practices and it was something that was not prohibited.

Therefore, in the Judge’s view, Defendant did not act with criminal intent. Finally, despite having found acts of domestic violence, the Judge found that issuing a final restraining order was unnecessary as the incidents described above were merely a “bad patch” in their marriage (despite the fact that the incidents occurred only three months into their marriage, and that they never actually ended), Plaintiff’s injuries were not severe, the parties had intentions to divorce and cease living with one another, at least one of them intended to move back to Morocco, and, he assumed, the parallel criminal matter would resolve the outstanding issues. Plaintiff appealed the ruling.

On appeal, the court first looked at the purpose and intent of the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. At the outset, the court found that the legislature elected to pass the Act, even though criminal statutes could also apply, because of the special and unique nature of domestic violence. Further, the court noted that sexual assault can occur when one engages in sex without the consent of one’s spouse. Most importantly, the court noted that neither the sexual assault statute nor the criminal sexual contact statute, applicable to the instant matter, specified what mental state must be demonstrated for an alleged perpetrator of sexual assault and/or criminal sexual contact. The court then clarified that when a state of mind is not specified, it defaults to “knowingly.” In essence, as the court observed, “criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does.” (Quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878).)

The court then proceeded to provide a brief historical review of situations where religious norms conflicted with the law. Specifically, the court highlighted the Mormon practice of polygamy, the Seventh Day Adventist practice of avoiding work on a Saturday, and the American Indian practice of sacramental ingestion of peyote. In the final analysis, the court affirmed the long-established law as set forth by many decades of United States Supreme Court precedent: “valid, generally applicable, and neutral laws may be applied to religious exercise even in the absence of a compelling governmental interest,” quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The court further determined that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.” (Quoting Smith above.) The court decided that the Smith case appears to control as the laws defining the crime of sexual assault and criminal sexual conduct are neutral laws of general application.

Acknowledging that the legislature recognizes the serious nature of domestic violence, and that Defendant violated neutral laws of general application when he physically and sexually assaulted Plaintiff, the court decided that there was a basis for a finding of domestic violence in the instant matter. The court further acknowledged that the trial judge in the matter also correctly found that Defendant had assaulted and harassed Plaintiff in violation of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

The appellate court rejected the trial judge’s conclusion that Defendant’s intention to act within the norms and expectation of his Islamic faith somehow resulted in Defendant having no mens rea to commit a crime and/or violate the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. From a practical point of view, the court was greatly distressed by what it believed to be an “unnecessarily dismissive view” of domestic violence on the part of the trial judge. Further, the court was concerned that the trial judge believed Muslim norms were not actionable, simply assumed the criminal court judge would take a certain action without following up to ensure that he did, presumed that the parties’ separation and/or divorce would resolve the abuse, and failed to sufficiently consider the impact the imminent birth of the couple’s child would have on the situation. Based upon all of the above, the court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for entry of such an order.

In the final analysis, the matter of S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d. 412, 415 N.J.Super. 417 presents attorneys, judges, and, of course, litigants, with the fact that practicing the religious norms of one’s faith cannot undercut the mens rea requirement of a criminal and/or domestic abuse statute. Knowingly committing an act of abuse, as defined by a neutral and generally applicable statute, is enough to hold one liable or guilty of the act regardless of what his religious imperatives are.

This article also appeared in the Philadelphia Bar Association’s “Upon Further Review” on April 13, 2011 and can be found here and on my website here.

Exceptions to Ecclesiastical Employment Exemptions

In the article titled “Episcopalian In-Fighting Spreads to Montgomery County Courthouse,” published in the March 2009 edition of Upon Further Review, I reported on the employment matter raised by the Rev. David Moyer against the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania regarding his termination by the Diocese from his position as priest in the Church. Suffice it to say here, the Court did not rule in favor of Fr. Moyer as it did not want to entangle itself into an interchurch squabble.  However, a recent Pennsylvania case, Mundie v. Christ United Church of Christ, 2009 Pa.Super. 262, has delved into the question of when a court may interject itself into a church employment matter.

In Mundie, the Plaintiff, the Rev. Melvin S. Mundie, was employed as a clergyman at Christ United Church of Christ, the Defendant.  Defendant’s governing body, the Consistory, entered into an employment contract with Plaintiff on May 26, 2005.  Along with salary, health insurance, and being permitted to reside in the parsonage, the employment contract also specifically stated that the term of Plaintiff’s employment at Defendant would conclude on June 30, 2007, unless otherwise agreed in writing.  During the course of Plaintiff’s ministry with Defendant, so-called “church problems” arose between Plaintiff and the congregation that led to, ostensibly, a coup, resulting in the congregation taking over the Consistory and firing Plaintiff on August 28, 2006.

Due to what he perceived as an unlawful termination, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant for breach of his employment contract.  Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to work for Defendant, collect a salary and health care benefits, and reside in the parsonage until June 30, 2007.  Defendant filed preliminary objections stating that Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was a religious issue into which courts may not intrude.

The Court noted that, as a basic principle, Defendant is correct; a court may not involve itself in what amounts to a religious issue.  It is also correct to note that, generally speaking, a religious body’s decisions to hire, fire and prescribe duties to its clergy are constitutionally protected and exempt from a court’s analysis.  However, contrarily, a religious body may not avoid a court’s involvement into issues that are exclusively secular.  For example, as theMundie Court noted, issues that are not doctrinal issues include “the meaning of agreements on wills, trusts, contracts, and property ownership.  These disputes are questions of civil law and are not predicated on any religious doctrine.”  Therefore, the narrow issue before theMundie Court was Defendant’s preliminary objections dealing with whether Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was simply a contractual issue or one that was doctrinal in nature and exempt from court review.

The Court overruled the preliminary objections on the grounds that insufficient discovery had been conducted to shed light on the question of whether Plaintiff’s termination is simply a breach of a secular contract or one that is of more significant doctrinal import.  As a light most favorable to the facts plead in Plaintiff’s Complaint must be shed, the Court concluded, for the purposes of the preliminary objections, that Plaintiff’s claims could be exclusively secular.  Without an Answer or any discovery, Defendant simply did not have sufficient facts to demonstrate anything to the contrary this early in its litigation.  Now that Defendant’s preliminary objections have been overruled, Defendant will have to file an Answer and discovery will presumably ensue.  If, through discovery, it is revealed that this matter is a simple breach of contract, Plaintiff’s case may progress; if it is considered to be a matter of doctrine, the Rev. Mundie’s suit will likely face the same fate as that of Fr. Moyer’s.

Originally published in Upon Further Review on March 4, 2010 and can be viewed here and on my website here.

Lines Drawn Against First Amendment Rights in Public Schools

A Marple Newtown School District kindergarten student has recently found himself at the center of a First Amendment controversy involving religious expression in public schools in the matter of Busch v. Marple Newtown School District, 2007 WL 1589507, appealed to the 3rd Circuit 2009 WL 1508513 (neither decision is reported).  The trial court found against the Plaintiffs per a Motion for Summary Judgment and the 3rd Circuit affirmed the decision.

In October 2004 a kindergarten class was in the midst of a unit of study called “All About Me”.  The assignments in the unit included the opportunity for the children to make a poster with pictures and/or drawings of their interests, hobbies, and/or families; bring in a toy or other item to share with the class; bring a snack; and, bring a parent in to share a talent, short game, small craft, or story with the class.  The Plaintiffs (a mother and son) in the matter elected to have an excerpt from Plaintiff-Son’s favorite book read by Plaintiff-Mother to the class to fulfill that portion of the assignment; Plaintiff-Son’s favorite book is the Bible.  Plaintiff-Mother intended to read Psalms 118:1 – 4 and 14 without further comment on them (the aforesaid verses read as follows as translated in the Authorized Version of the Bible: “O give thanks unto the LORD; for he is good: because his mercy endureth for ever. Let Israel now say, that his mercy endureth forever. Let the house of Aaron now say, that his mercy endureth forever. Let them now that fear the LORD say, that his mercy endureth forever. The LORD is my strength and song, and is become my salvation.”). This portion of the Bible was selected because it had no reference to Jesus, was generally inspirational, and was a form of poetry, according to the Plaintiff-Mother.  Plaintiff-Mother went to Plaintiff-Son’s class at the appointed time and told his teacher what she intended to read.  His teacher indicated that she would have to confer with the principal before she could allow Plaintiff-Mother to read from the Bible to the class. The principal refused to permit Plaintiff-Mother from reading from the Bible to the class for fear of violating the law, specifically a breach of the “separation of church and state.” Believing their constitutional rights have been violated, Plaintiff-Mother brought suit on behalf of her son alleging Constitutional breaches of his freedom of speech, the Establishment Clause, and equal protection of the law.

In making its ruling, the Court attempted to navigate the tangled web of law surrounding the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment balanced by the limitations of the Establishment Clause in a public school.  At the outset, the Court first had to discern what sort of “forum” a school (and a kindergarten class in particular) is for First Amendment purposes which determines the level of scrutiny the Court applies to the circumstances before it.  The parties agreed in this matter that a public school classroom (and a kindergarten class in particular) is not a public forum, which gives the government wide latitude to implement its curriculum.  The second tier of analysis is for the Court to determine whether the school engaged in viewpoint discrimination.  The Court ruled that, with specific exceptions, the government cannot discriminate speech based upon its viewpoint.  After review of all of the facts presented, it did concede that the school district discriminated against Plaintiff-Mother’s speech based upon its viewpoint (i.e.: the Bible).  The Court’s next step in its inquiry is to determine if the school’s viewpoint discrimination fits into one of the constitutionally permissible exceptions.  In taking this step, the Court noted that the various Circuit Court rulings are across the spectrum on the issue of what precisely is and is not permissible viewpoint discrimination.  Finally, the Plaintiffs alleged that the school district violated their 14th Amendment rights by subjecting them to disparate treatment based on their religious beliefs.  The Plaintiffs argued that the school permitted other religions to be exposed to the class and discriminated against Christianity by prohibiting the Plaintiffs from reading from the Bible.

A primary focus of the Court’s analysis was to determine whether the situation presented a perception of school-endorsed speech.  The listeners of the speech have to know that the religious speech at issue does not originate from and is not endorsed by the school.  Additionally, the Court noted that a school may restrict speech inasmuch as it is reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.  Essentially, the government cannot be perceived as promoting religion.  As a general rule, the younger the child, the more control over speech a school may exercise as it is generally assumed that young children are more impressionable and less likely to discern whether speech is endorsed by and/or originated from the school as opposed to a student.

After a fairly extensive review of the facts and law relevant to the matter, the Court ultimately ruled that the school district was correct to restrict Plaintiffs from reading from the Bible in the classroom.  The Court decided that, in this matter, young children of a kindergarten age are specifically protected by the Constitution and are not able to discern school-endorsed speech from speech from an individual student.  The fact that was of central importance to the Court’s analysis was that the Plaintiff who read the Bible in the classroom was the mother whom, as a parent of a child in the class, the Court believed would be viewed as an authority figure by the children.  The Court believed that an impressionable kindergarten student would view the reading of the Bible by an authority figure (i.e.: parent) in a classroom as (unconstitutionally) coming from the school district and unable to discern that it was coming from the parent individually.  In terms of the equal protection claim, the Court noted that the other religions were presented “culturally” whereas it believed that Bible reading to a class was “proselytizing” restricted by Establishment Clause.

Obviously the Court’s decision is controversial and the Plaintiffs are considering filing an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  The Court’s decision is far from having unshakable support in either law or fact.  Indeed, matters such as this are extremely fact specific, and the law on which a court must base its ruling is extraordinarily tangled.  To complicate matters further, the Court spent a few paragraphs of its analysis of the matter detailing what the Plaintiff-Mother and her husband believe an Evangelical Christian to be.  It also attempted to discern the theological significance of the Bible verses selected for the reading.  Neither lines of inquiry are relevant to whether Plaintiffs’ speech is constitutionally permissible and, in fact, give the appearance that Christianity itself is, inappropriately, on trial.  In fact, it is through these flawed lines of analysis that the Court hinted that the Plaintiffs were actually engaged in proselytizing as opposed to their own stated intentions of merely presenting Plaintiff-Son’s favorite book.

One could argue that the Court did not take the assignment in proper consideration. One could very logically assume that the children listening to a presentation within the context of “All About Me” would readily understand that the Bible reading was, by definition, “all about” Plaintiff-Son and his favorite book as opposed to the school.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ intention to read from the Plaintiff-Son’s favorite book was responsive to and complied with the assignment given by the school itself.  No evidence was presented by the Defendant that the students would somehow be confused over whether Bible reading in class was student or school sponsored.  Indeed, the reading of the verses would have taken less than thirty (30) seconds; one can hardly argue that that would somehow have an “adverse” effect on the children in the class.  To fit its ruling, the Court makes impossible distinctions.  For example, the Court distinguishes between expressing one’s love of the Bible from reading from it as well as incredulously stating that an assignment to help students learn about one another (i.e.: the “All About Me” project) somehow does not permit students to express their religious beliefs if they are important to those students.  In other words, students can learn about one another, except when it comes to religion.

It was noted during the trial – and in the Court’s opinion – that religion and the kindergarten class have crossed paths before.  The classroom contains various books dealing with religious holidays (both Jewish and Christian).  Furthermore, the school has allowed a presentation to the class by a Jewish woman about the significance of Hanukkah and Passover.  Ironically, the Plaintiff-Son included pictures of a church on his “All About Me” poster with captions saying “I love to go to the house of the Lord”, and even that was permitted.  The school district obviously did not see any of the above as impermissible entanglements of religion and the kindergarten class.  One wonders how the Court could credibly draw such imperceptible distinctions between these religious incursions into public schools and the reading of 5 innocuous verses from the Bible in a classroom.

Finally, it could be argued that the school district was generally overly sensitive and discriminatory to the presence of Christianity in its schools.  For example: the school district has likely unconstitutional policies of (1) prohibiting students from “advocating” a religious point of view or preference in any context; (2) ensuring that public schools are not a forum for a student to express his personal religious preference/doctrine; and, (3) suggesting calling a Christmas tree a “holiday” tree.  These policies are based upon the false premise that the Constitution calls for “separation of church and state”.  It is noteworthy to point out, as a sort of final slap in Plaintiffs’ faces, that when the Bible was rejected as a book to be read to the class, the teacher offered the Plaintiffs a book about witches as an alternative.  It hardly shows any appropriate sensitivity to the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs on the part of the school district to suggest a book about the occult – something well known to be taboo among professed Christians – as somehow a viable alternative to the Bible.

It remains to be seen whether this case will be appealed; if so it may be a viable case to be heard by the United States Supreme Court due to the general confusion and inconsistency among the various Circuits.  Regardless of whether this case is appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the fact remains that the relationship of religion and public schools is a very sensitive and fact specific one.  Ultimately, we are all called to be respectful and tolerant of one another and our religious, or nor non-religious, views.  One would hope that the lesson being learned in public schools is that there is a wide diversity of religious views and that it is possible for us all too peacefully co-exist without having to sacrifice one’s own religion in the process.

Originally published on August 10, 2009 in “Upon Further Review” which can be found here or on my website here.

National Church v. Regional Diocese: Property Ownership by a Religious Institution

One of the oldest religions in the United States is at the forefront of the development of property and First Amendment law. In 1607, with the celebration of Holy Eucharist on a fallen log under a tent in Jamestown Virginia, the Episcopal Church found its beginning as the American branch of the worldwide Anglican Communion. Today, under the leadership of Rt. Rev. Robert Duncan, the Bishop of Pittsburgh, the seeds of the demise of the Episcopal Church as we know it have been planted as the synods of the Dioceses of Pittsburgh, PA, San Joaquin, CA, Quincy, IL, and Fort Worth, TX, and potentially more to follow, have voted themselves out of the Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania (which consists of the Philadelphia five county area) is the fifth largest Diocese in the Episcopal Church. If a critical mass of the faithful formed a sufficiently significant voting bloc, the Diocese of Pennsylvania could be another diocese that departs from the Episcopal Church in 2009.

Over the last forty years, there has been a slowly growing movement of liberal theology within the Episcopal Church causing many faithful Episcopalians to lose faith in the National Church to adequately preach, maintain, and defend the historic Christian faith. As a result, Episcopalians have been leaving the Episcopal Church in greater numbers with each successive year, reaching a peak in 2008 with the departure of entire dioceses. The departure of dioceses from the National Church has raised as yet unanswered questions about the nature of the property ownership by a religious institution. Specifically, what entity owns church property, the National Church or the diocese?

Of course, property disputes among religious bodies and their members are hardly new. Over the last century and a half, Courts from around the country have generally used two overarching guidelines when ruling on such cases: (1) avoid involvement into inter-church politics as much as possible and (2) church property in a hierarchical church is owned by the diocese (or presbytery, etc). The distinctive issue that has arisen, in contrast to previous cases, is that now entire dioceses, as opposed to individual parishes/congregations, have attempted to leave the National Church.

Supporters of the National Church keeping the properties cite to the so-called Dennis Canon. The Dennis Canon (Title I.7.4 of the Episcopal Church canons), allegedly passed by the 66th General Convention of the Episcopal Church in 1979 states that “[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission, or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission, or Congregation is located.” Therefore, under the Dennis Canon, those seceding from the National Church must abandon their property, as it remains the property of the National Church. Supporters of the dioceses seceding from the National Church argue that the Dennis Canon was never actually passed by General Convention and none of the records surviving from the General Convention indicate that it ever passed. Suffice it to say, the court is loath to inject itself into this sort of interchurch squabble. Instead, when such issues are litigated in a civil court, the court will analyze the matter based upon property ownership and the corporate relationship between parish, diocese, and national church.

If the Diocese of Pennsylvania, at its next Diocesan Convention, votes to disassociate itself from the Episcopal Church, it would be very likely the National Church would bring an action against the Diocese for possession of diocesan property, including the real estate and all personal property owned by the diocese, such as the fixtures, prayer books, hymnals, and vestments, as well as the ejectment of parochial authorities, like rectors or perhaps even vestries. Supporters of the National Church would assert that the National Church is the top of the hierarchy for which all dioceses hold their property in trust and such a view is consistent with the spirit and tenor of existing case law. Those in favor of seceding from the National Church would assert that the National Church is an association that dioceses freely joined and from which can just as freely withdraw. For example, dioceses in the American South withdrew from the National Church along with the states in which they are situated when they seceded from the United States before the Civil War. These dioceses withdrew from the National Church without objection from the same, and were freely readmitted after the War. Furthermore, it is worth noting that properties within dioceses are virtually always deeded to the diocese itself and not the National Church.

2008 saw the departure of four dioceses from the Episcopal Church and 2009 could see further departures. A concerted movement among traditional Episcopalians in the Philadelphia area could lead to the introduction of legislation at the next Diocesan Convention to move the Dioceses out of the National Church. If successful, significant civil litigation by the Episcopal Church against those seceding is likely. At present the Episcopal Church is weighing its options regarding the withdrawn dioceses. Many expect protracted, expensive, wide spread, and large scale litigation. However, as more parishes and dioceses withdraw, litigation may prove to be prohibitively expensive as with each withdrawn parish or diocese is withdrawn tithers to the National Church causing it to lose more revenue with each successive withdrawal. Although lawyers may be interested to see how courts may rule in a matter such as this, perhaps the best, and most Christian, way forward would be an amicable separation allowing each side to go its separate ways taking its property along with it.

This article was originally published in Upon Further Review on January 9, 2009 and can be found here or on my website here.

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