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American Airlines Flight Attendants To Appeal Facebook Harassment Ruling

The Melissa Chinery and Laura Medlin cases against American Airlines, cases currently being litigated by my firm, the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen, P.C., have been featured in an article entitled “American Airlines Flight Attendants To Appeal Facebook Harassment Ruling,” in Savvy Stews b published on September 2, 2018, which can be found here.

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We’ve all read company policy regarding employee conduct on social media sites. Although one would assume that these policies are there to put a stop to and even prevent workplace bullying, they are only useful if companies enforce them.

In a blow to two American Airlines flight attendants this week, Judge Eduardo C. Robreno ruled that the evidence of workplace bullying and harassment brought forth by flight attendants Melissa Chinery and Laura Medlin was insufficient and untimely. The harassment was also experienced by several additional women who issued affidavits but were not part of the lawsuit itself.

The worst part, American Airlines didn’t do a thing to stop it in the first place.

“The company called me when this all started. My flight service manager said that he was getting calls that I was being harassed publicly on Facebook. My manager called me, then failed to take any action to stop the problem” – Chinery

Faye Riva Cohen, the law firm that represents the plaintiffs, issued the following statement:

“We are disappointed by the Judge’s decision.  Our clients were victims of gender-based discrimination. Given the unique nature of social media, the harassment our clients experienced was all-pervasive and impossible to escape. We believe that the Judge failed to adequately consider the power of social media and its impact on the workplace.

Additionally, we believe that American Airlines acted improperly. American Airlines maintains a social media policy that is used to police the online conduct of its employees. Nevertheless, American Airlines failed to take our clients’ complaints seriously. Until employers treat online bullying with the severity that it deserves, women will continue to be at a disadvantage in the workplace. Our clients are weighing their options to appeal the decision.”

Ms. Chinery shares, The company called me when this all started. My flight service manager said that he was getting calls that I was being harassed publicly on Facebook. My manager called me, then failed to take any action to stop the problem. No apologies from anyone, just an escalated attack.”

RINGLEADER EMBOLDENED BY RULING

Jim Brown, one of the flight attendants accused of the harassment, began gloating on Facebook immediately following the judge’s ruling. He may have spoken too soon since the plaintiffs are planning to appeal the judge’s decision which could legally expose him and American Airlines.

Jim Brown, accused of harassment, has been given cushy positions in the Purser program and others.

In his deposition, Jim Brown admitted to sending a complaint to the company about Chinery that he thought would be anonymous. He also admitted fabricating a story regarding referring to Chinery as “flipper” (slang for “whore”) “to cover my tracks by creating another post and a fake person” (from Brown’s deposition). Despite lying about his words, Brown remains a member of several committees and in the training department and to date has not been investigated. He continues to publicly post on social media, on the day of Judge Robreno’s ruling, saying he was, “Feeling delighted… My message is about Karma working it’s [sic] judicious magic!”

BROWN-NOSING HAS ITS PRIVILEGES?

American Airlines has yet to investigate the harassment claims internally and the men named in the lawsuit remain on special projects, in training positions, and continue to be rewarded with promotions as they are paid and deployed to publicize company messaging to their coworkers. Rewards even included invitations to the wedding of American’s Chief Financial Officer, creating the appearance of special treatment and selective enforcement of company policy.

One may wonder who is responsible for the selection of these individuals to serve in special assignment and training positions. What consequences may they eventually face?

ONLINE WORKPLACE HARASSMENT GROWING PROBLEM

There is a lawsuit against United Airlines for failing to intervene in a pilot’s harassment of a flight attendant. American’s failure to put a stop to the bullying that took place against Ms. Chinery may eventually end up opening a Pandora’s box of liability for the carrier as others step forward to share their experiences and American’s lack of support.

In his memorandum, Judge Robreno writes, “Medlin details only a handful of instances of alleged sexual harassment between 2012 and 2015…including…the general use of sexually-oriented profanity.” Judge Robreno further stated that “insults in the workplace do not constitute discrimination ‘merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.’” Judge Robreno also contends the alleged harassment was not physically threatening despite the litigants having complained to American Airlines about threats of physical harm.

THEY GANGED UP

Jim Brown wasn’t the only one allowed to get away with behavior that conflicted with the American Airlines social media policy:

[From evidence submitted to the court]

Rick Haskins, a male flight attendant, writing regarding coworkers who voted against a union contract proposal, “Those sixteen people should be shot.”

Daniel Datzer another flight attendant wrote, “I do not respect the 51 percent…… And I NEVER will…. Clowns, fools, morons… This will drastically come back to bite them in their uneducated, bilious, petty, small-minded, redneck lazy tired asses…. I will NEVER stop asking how people voted each time I fly and they will be treated accordingly… This is not a joke…. My anger and deep seated frustration WILL have a place to go… Directly at the enemy. I will maintain the level of professionalism that I have for myself…. But make no mistake…. They will know my discontent and pure disgust at their selfish inhumane actions… And it will NOT be cozy for them….I have this fantasy where the 49 percent goes off and forms its own base…… Because frankly, that is the only way the 51% are going to be able to escape what is coming.”

Victor Dunson wrote, “this is war… If you f**k with my friends you f**k with me and I don’t like being f**ked with: (.”

Judge Robreno also contended in his ruling that “Datzer used coarse sexual language” but that it “does not amount to severe or pervasive sexual harassment.” a picture of a “bedazzled vagina,” repeatedly used the word “c**t,” called a coworker a “sow,” referred to coworkers as “harpies and shrews,” and wrote “have any of them LOOKED in a mirror? Tuck your shirt in fat ass… Fix your hair… How bout a tie? A little lipstick?”

AMERICAN DID NOT LIFT A FINGER

Ana Burke-Leon, AA Human Resources

Despite the legal ruling, according to its policies, US Airways / American Airlines failed to follow its own rules and did not investigate multiple complaints brought to Human Resources by many women. Ana Burke-Leon, AA Human Resource Specialist, tasked with examining Chinery and Medlin’s claims states in her deposition, “Discrimination, unlawful harassment and retaliation in the workplace will not be tolerated.”  She stated the policy included derogatory posts, jokes, letters, e-mail or graffiti that denigrate or show hostility toward an individual or group based on but not limited to race, color, religion, gender, or gender identity.

FROM THE DEPOSITION OF AMERICAN’S HUMAN RESOURCE SPECIALIST, ANA BURKE-LEON

If ever there was an instance to back up employee mistrust in human resource departments, the responses given by American’s HR representative to questions from the plaintiff’s attorney would justify their suspicions.

In her deposition, Burke-Leon repeatedly evades the questions brought forth by Chinery and Medlin’s counsel about whether or not the “c-word,” when used by a male employee to refer to a female employee, would be tolerated:

 Q. Do you consider the word, the use of the C-U-N-T to be an epithet, derogatory comment or slur?

A. Yes.

Q. What’s your understanding as to what that word means?

A. It’s a derogatory word used to describe a female.

Q. So if a male employee refers to a female employee as —

A. You can say it. I understand.

Q. I will say the “C” word. If a male employee refers to a female employee as the “C” word, does that fall within these bullet points list of the type of conduct that will not be tolerated?

A. It will depend on the context. It would depend on if it’s directly related or specific name, a person is involved. It will depend on the context.

Q. If a male employee refers to a female employee as the “C” word, do you consider that to be a derogatory comment?

A. It depends on the way it’s stated. It depends on the content. It depends on the content.

Q. Do you consider a male employee referring to a female employee as the “C” word to be a slur?

A. A slur? I don’t know.

Ana Burke-Leon was tasked with interviewing one of the men named in the lawsuit but in her deposition says she did not because on the scheduled day of her flight to meet him, she “went to the wrong gate” and missed the flight. The matter was later looked into by another member of HR. Burke-Leon went on to say, “Daniel stated that his Facebook page was compromised and that he does not believe he made those comments.”

Another senior Human Resource investigator, Dan Cleverly, admitted under oath that he did not-at-all investigate Medlin’s harassment complaints and concerns. She repeatedly emailed him requesting assistance but was ignored.  When questioned, Cleverly’s response in his deposition was “Because it got lost in my shuffle.” That was towards the end of October. I went on vacation, Thanksgiving, Christmas crazy.”  The evidence provided by American Airlines revealed Cleverly’s apparent bias from personal notes to Burke-Leon where he referred to Chinery as “exhibiting a whole new side of crazy” when she attempted to follow up with him about her concerns. His response, when asked why he said that was “Because this was an overwhelming time.”

The harassment claims brought forth against Jim Brown, to this day, have not been investigated by American Airlines. In his testimony, Brown states he has not had any interviews regarding the complaints made against him. At least four women complained to HR about Brown’s harassment. The outcomes of such investigations would determine whether or not there would be disciplinary action, and, according to AA’s policies, if an employee were in violation, it “would not be tolerated.” How is it possible that American Airlines, for years, has ignored women who came forward to complain along with those who provided affidavits testifying that they witnessed harassment by Brown?

The complaints against Brown, Datzer, Allen, and others, date back to 2012 and continue through 2016.  Despite the claims, since that time, three of the men have been promoted to various positions that include lucrative “special projects” committee work and training positions. Flight attendants are required to requalify annually in training to ensure he or she meets the FAA and company requirements to maintain continued employment. Both women have feared retaliation and for their jobs as the men they have accused of harassment have been placed in positions of authority where they potentially can pass or fail them.

AN APPEAL MAY BE FORTHCOMING

“American offered me a monetary settlement, but this has never been about money. It’s about employees suffering when policies created to protect them are ignored or selectively enforced by the company. These colleagues should be held to the same accountability that everyone else is held to. People should never be rewarded for engaging in workplace bullying and harassment” says Chinery.
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The Democrats Abandon Catholics

If you value religious education or life’s sanctity, you’re not welcome in the party.

Last Saturday’s feast of St. Patrick, the patron saint of our cathedral and archdiocese, reminded me of Archbishop John Hughes. As the first archbishop of New York (1842-64), “Dagger John” displayed dramatic reverence for the dignity of Irish immigrants. Thousands arrived daily in New York—penniless, starving and sometimes ill—only to be met with hostility, bigotry and injustice.

An immigrant himself, Hughes prophetically and vigorously defended their dignity. Because the schools at the time were hostile to these immigrants, he initiated Catholic schools to provide children with a good education sensitive to their religion and to prepare them as responsible, patriotic citizens. The schools worked. Many remain open to this day, their mission unchanged.

The second event was the recent funeral of a great African-American woman, Dolores Grier. A convert to Catholicism, she was named vice chancellor of the archdiocese three decades ago by Cardinal John O’Connor; she was the first layperson and first woman to hold the prestigious position. Grier was passionate about civil rights, especially the right to life of babies in the womb. She never missed an opportunity to defend, lovingly but forcefully, their right to life.

Grier attributed her pro-life sensitivity to the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who preached that abortion was an act of genocide against minorities. No wonder, she often observed, abortuaries were clustered in poor black and brown neighborhoods. The statistics today confirm her observation: In 2013 there were more black babies aborted in New York City (29,007) than were born here (24,758), according to a report from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.

The values Archbishop Hughes and Dolores Grier cherished—the dignity and sanctity of human life, the importance of Catholic schools, the defense of a baby’s civil rights—were, and still are, widely embraced by Catholics. This often led Catholics to become loyal Democrats. I remember my own grandmother whispering to me, “We Catholics don’t trust those Republicans.”

Such is no longer the case, a cause of sadness to many Catholics, me included. The two causes so vigorously promoted by Hughes and Grier—the needs of poor and middle-class children in Catholic schools, and the right to life of the baby in the womb—largely have been rejected by the party of our youth. An esteemed pro-life Democrat in Illinois, Rep. Dan Lipinski, effectively was blacklisted by his own party. Last year, Democratic National Committee Chairman Tom Perez insisted that pro-life candidates have no place in the modern Democratic Party.

It is particularly chilly for us here in the state Hughes and Grier proudly called their earthly home. In recent years, some Democrats in the New York state Assembly repeatedly blocked education tax credit legislation, which would have helped middle-class and low-income families make the choice to select Catholic or other nonpublic schools for their children. Opposing the bill reduces the ability of fine Catholic schools across the state to continue their mission of serving the poor, many of them immigrants.

More sobering, what is already the most radical abortion license in the country may soon be even more morbidly expanded. For instance, under the proposed Reproductive Health Act, doctors would not be required to care for a baby who survives an abortion. The newborn simply would be allowed to die without any legal implications. And abortions would be legal up to the moment of birth.

I’m a pastor, not a politician, and I’ve certainly had spats and disappointments with politicians from both of America’s leading parties. But it saddens me, and weakens the democracy millions of Americans cherish, when the party that once embraced Catholics now slams the door on us.

To Archbishop Hughes, Dolores Grier, and Grandma Dolan, I’m sorry to have to write this. But not as sad as you are to know it is true.

Cardinal Dolan is archbishop of New York.

Appeared in the March 22, 2018, print edition of The Wall Street Journal and can be found here.

American Airlines Flight Attendants Will Appeal Ruling On Facebook Sexual Harassment

The Melissa Chinery and Laura Medlin cases against American Airlines, cases currently being litigated by my firm, the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen, P.C., have been featured in an article entitled “American Airlines Flight Attendants Will Appeal Ruling On Facebook Sexual Harassment,” in Forbes b published on September 12, 2018, which can be found here.

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Two flight attendants who sued American Airlines, alleging that they were sexually harassed by male co-workers in Facebook postings, say they will appeal after a Philadelphia judge dismissed their cases.

Faye Riva Cohen, the Philadelphia attorney who represents flight attendants Melissa Chinery and Laura Medlin, said Tuesday that she will file in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in about a week.

“American Airlines is [generally] proactive in disciplining employees who do things that negatively impact the airline, but is dragging its heels in trying to enforce social media [policy] for their employees,” Cohen said.

“I feel [American] has no interest in social media policy,” Cohen said. “They just hang it out there.”

Cohen said the court did not adequately consider the new norms of the modern-day workplace, where social media has replaced lunchrooms and water coolers as sites where workers congregate, but bullying cannot be addressed face-to-face. “People are being bullied [and] there should be repercussions when that occurs,” she said, noting that flight attendants, who work with varying sets of co-workers, are particularly vulnerable.

The two flight attendants filed their case in March 2017 in U.S. District Court in Philadelphia.  At the time, Chinery was based in Philadelphia while Laura Medlin was based in Charlotte. Chinery has since transferred to the Phoenix base. Their cases were consolidated.

The insults were posted within a Facebook group, whose membership is limited to American flight attendants, by a group of four to five Philadelphia-based male flight attendants.

Medlin said she was harassed with insulting terms including “sow,” while Chinery said she was referred to as “flipper,” a synonym for prostitute. Both women said the harassment was related to union activities in support of leaders whom their harassers opposed.

U.S. District Court Judge Eduardo Robreno dismissed the cases on August 27, when he granted American’s motions for summary judgement.

In Chinery’s case, Robreno ruled, “Looking at all of the complained of behavior objectively, even that which does not appear connected to gender and instead appears to be related to Chinery’s stance on union issues, the behavior does not amount to severe or pervasive sexual harassment.”

He cited behavior by the four men including posting a photograph of a broken record; referring to Chinery as “flipper,” saying the defendant “did not present a good appearance to passengers [and] allegedly posting a picture of a bedazzled vagina.”

“The court concludes that the complained-of conduct was not so objectively severe or pervasive that it would unreasonably interfere with an employee’s work performance,” wrote Robreno. He was nominated for his post in 1991 by President George H.W. Bush.

Regarding Medlin’s case, Robreno wrote that she alleged sexual harassment on Facebook, between 2012 and 2015, including calling her a “sow” and a “mean girl.”

“While there are a number of serious questions that are raised by Medlin’s claims, including whether the alleged harassment over Facebook was due to her sex rather than her opinions regarding labor unions and whether it actually occurred in a work environment, it is clear that the alleged instances of harassment were not adequately severe or pervasive to establish American’s liability,” Robreno ruled.

American spokesman Matt Miller said the carrier, “is proud to foster a work environment in which all team members are respected.

“When American receives reports of alleged harassment in the workplace, those complaints are investigated and appropriate action is taken,” Miller said.

Superior Court Ruling Gives Hope to Custody-Seeking Grandparents

Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Section 5324, grandparents and great-grandparents, if they meet the statutory criteria, may be awarded legal and physical custody of their grandchild(ren) (or great-grandchildren). Typically, grandparents assert their potential custodial rights in opposition to the rights of the parents of the children. In some situations, however, more than one set of grandparents may seek to exercise their custodial rights at the same time. How is that conflict resolved? The recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case of G.A.P. v. J.M.W. v. S.J. and R.J., 2018 Pa.Super. 229 sheds some light on how such a matter could be handled.

In G.A.P., the father of the child has a history of substance abuse and also a criminal history, and was alleged to have committed sexual abuse against the child. Similarly, the mother of the child also has a history of substance abuse. The child has lived, from time to time, with the maternal great-grandparents over the course of his entire life, and has lived continuously with them since 2015.

In the summer of 2016 the great-grandparents filed for custody of the child on the basis that he had been living with them continuously since October 2015 and asserted that he was unsafe when in the custody of the father. The trial court, on an emergency basis, awarded the great-grandparents sole physical custody of the child and suspended the father’s partial physical custody, and an agreement was reached with the mother awarding her supervised physical custody of the child. At the end of 2016 the trial court awarded the great-grandparents and the father shared legal custody, the great-grandparents primary physical custody, and the father supervised physical custody. The mother was not awarded anything as she failed to appear for the hearing.

In the spring of 2017 the great-grandparents filed a petition for special relief requesting the father be drug tested and have his custody modified to supervised visits only, on the basis that he allegedly had relapsed into drug use. As a result, the trial court suspended the father’s unsupervised partial physical custody and replaced it with supervised physical custody.

Not long after the father’s custody was reduced, the paternal grandparents filed a petition to Intervene and requested physical custody of the child. The grandparents asserted that their petition was filed pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5324(3)(iii)(B) which permits grandparents to file for custody of their grandchildren if “the child is substantially at risk due to parental abuse, neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity.”

In response, the great-grandparents filed preliminary objections against the grandparents’ petition to Intervene, asserting that the grandparents did not have standing as, allegedly, the child was not “currently” at substantial risk. The trial court agreed and dismissed the grandparents’ petition to Intervene for lack of standing, leading them to file an appeal to Pennsylvania Superior Court.

During the litigation of the petition to Intervene, the great-grandparents conceded that the grandparents had a relationship with the child that began with the consent of a parent, and were willing to assume parental responsibility over the child. In other words, the great-grandparents admitted that the grandparents essentially met the other requirements of Section 5324 except, in their view, the requirement that the child be currently substantially at risk.

The grandparents argued that the risk to the child, by the plain language of the statute cited above, is due to “parental abuse” specifically and, therefore, the claim that the great-grandparents are not a source of risk is irrelevant. Furthermore, the “grandparents also argued that the purpose of the statute is to grant grandparents standing in custody matters, not ‘to create a situation where grandparents are essentially in a race to file to receive standing’ because the grandparent who files first is the only one able to obtain standing in a custody matter.”

The Superior Court agreed that Section 5324 confers standing upon grandparents when the child is substantially at risk “due to parental abuse, neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity.” In its view, these words are clear and unambiguous and make no exception for a child’s potential custodial situation at a given time. In the court’s words “the plain language of the statute confers standing to grandparents when a child is substantially at risk due to ongoing parental behaviors.”

Upon review of the trial court record, Superior Court noted that the conditions required by Section 5325—including the risk factors—were present to grant the great-grandparents standing. Superior Court determined that there was nothing to suggest that the risk created by the parents had changed or somehow subsided. Significantly, the court observed, as the parental rights of father and mother have not been terminated or relinquished, either or both father and mother could seek (additional) custody of the child at any time. As a result, the ongoing risk from the parents is still ongoing.

Finally, it is in Superior Court’s opinion that the General Assembly did not intend, by its adoption of the specific language in the statute, to create a so-called race-to-the-courthouse standard by which the (great) grandparent who files first gets awarded custody at the expense of the others. Instead, the Superior Court reasoned, the court should have the opportunity to consider all possible or viable options in order to decide how to allot custodial rights according to the best interests of the child at issue. As a result, Superior Court reversed the trial court’s sustaining of the great-grandparents’ preliminary objections and remanded the case back to the trial court.

This case should provide practitioners the justification, and potential custodial grandparents hope, that they can pursue potential custodial rights over their grandchildren even if others who are in a similar state of life or situation (e.g., another set of grandparents) seemingly have done so already.

Originally published in The Legal Intelligencer on October 2, 2018 and can be found here.

NBI Seminar: The Rights of Grandparents and Other Relatives

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “The Rights of Grandparents and Other Relatives.”

Thanks!

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Grandparents’ (and other relatives) rights to have custody of children is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5324 which states as follows:

The following individuals may file an action under this chapter for any form of physical custody or legal custody:

(1) A parent of the child.

(2) A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.

(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to the child:

(i) whose relationship with the child began either with the consent of a parent of

the child or under a court order;

(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for the child; and

(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

(A) the child has been determined to be a dependent child under 42 Pa.C.

S.Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile matters);

(B) the child is substantially at risk due to parental abuse, neglect, drug or

alcohol abuse or incapacity; or

(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive months, resided

with the grandparent, excluding brief temporary absences of the child from

the home, and is removed from the home by the parents, in which case the

action must be filed within six months after the removal of the child from

the home.

 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §5325 supplements §5324 and states the following:

In addition to situations set forth in §5324 (relating to standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action under this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised physical custody in the following situations:

(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent or grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action under this section;

(2) [Unconstitutional]

(3) when the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive months, resided with the grandparent or great-grandparent, excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the home, and is removed from the home by the parents, an action must be filed within six months after he removal of the child from the home.

Failure to secure standing serves to bar grandparents from pursing the custody of the child-at-issue.  If they do have standing, grandparents may file for custody like a parent can, however, when litigating against a parent, the scales are always tipped heavily toward the biological parent and away from the grandparent.  Of course, the best interests of the child are always paramount.  When two parents are litigating against one another, the burden of proof is shared equally, however when the case is between a biological parent and a third party (e.g.: a grandparent), the burden of proof is not equally balanced.  In this case, the biological parent has a prima facie right to custody which can only be forfeited only if “convincing reasons” appear that the best interests of the child are better met by the third party.

Resources:

  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5324
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5325
  • Jordan v. Jackson, 876 A.2d 443 (Pa.Super.2005)
  • K.B. v. C.B.F., 833 A.2d 767 (Pa.Super.2003)

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Termination of Parental Rights

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Termination of Parental Rights.”

Thanks!

__________

The termination of a parent’s rights over his children nearly always occurs in one of two circumstances: voluntary adoption and dependency.

When termination is an issue, the court must appoint an attorney to represent the child when one or both parents contest the termination.  Of course, the court is always free to appoint counsel and/or guardian ad litem for the child.  A lawyer may not represent both the child and one of the parents.  As far as the parents facing possible parental termination are concerned, the court may, upon petition, also appoint an attorney for one or both of them in the event he or she is unable to pay for an attorney.

There are times when parents are willing to voluntarily terminate their rights to their children, typically called relinquishment, say in the context of adoption.  Another option, besides relinquishment, is signing a consent. A parent can sign a consent for their child to be adopted and not have to appear at future hearings.  23 Pa.C.S. § 2504.  Upon receipt of a petition to relinquish parental rights, as mentioned above, a hearing will be scheduled, at least ten days from the filing of the petition, in order for the court to review and rule upon the petition.  Relinquishment is under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2501-2502 and requires a hearing wherein a judge should make sure the parent understands the consequences of relinquishment and is fully aware of his right to trial.  Usually there is a colloquy by the judge or by the parent’s attorney to establish their understanding.

It should be noted that if there is a putative father, which is to say a man who has not been formally legally established to be a child’s father, he may have his rights terminated if he had not filed an acknowledgment of paternity or a claim for paternity and fails to appear at the termination hearing.

Perhaps one of the most compassionate sections of the applicable law toward the parents subject termination is the fact that the court has the obligation to inquire into whether those parents have received counseling.  If not, the court can refer him or her to a qualified counselor.  In the alternative, a parent subject to termination may apply for a referral to counseling as well.  To help facilitate counseling, the state has established a counseling fund pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2505(e) to help those who are not in a financial position to afford counseling on their own.

Of course, termination of parental rights is a critical element of adoption and dependency.  Termination in the context of adoption is pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511.  In order to petition to terminate in this context, the parent must (1) evidence a “settled purpose of relinquishing [a] parental claim” over a child or fail to perform parental duties for a period of six (6) months immediately prior to filing to terminate; or, (2) demonstrate repeated abuse or neglect or continued incapacity; or, (3) the parent is the presumptive but not natural father of the child; or, (4) the child is in the custody of an agency and the parent is unknown (and does not claim the child within three months after being found); or, (5) the child has been removed from the care of the parent by court or voluntary agreement for a period of at least six months and the circumstances which led to the removal still persist with no reasonable expectation to improve; or, (6) a newborn child where the parent knows (or should know) of the child but takes no action to be a parent (e.g.: reside with the child or marry the other parent) for a four month period; or, (7) the parent is a father of a child conceived through rape; or, (8) the parent has been convicted of a serious crime (as listed in the statute); or, (9) the parent has committed sexual abuse or is a registered sex offender,

If a parent exhibits no sign of interest in the child over an extended period – typically about six months – he will be at risk of termination.  The Court has made it clear that a child is not an “unwanted toy” for a parent to pick up and play with at his whim and set it down again when tired of it.  Relatedly, being the fun and occasional playmate is not the same as being an involved parent.  Additionally, parental involvement is more than merely paying support or paying for various expenses.  A parent is more than a benefactor.  Interestingly, absence due to incarceration does not necessarily provide sufficient grounds for termination.  Of course, the six month interval is not mechanically applied.  The Court is to fully analyze the underlying matter to determine why there has been such extended absence, and to view the totality of circumstances before ordering termination.

Those who may petition to terminate another person’s parental rights are limited to (1) either parent; (2) an agency; (3) the person who has custody and standing as in loco parentis and has filed a report of intention to adopt; and/or (4) a guardian ad litem of a dependent child.

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the grounds listed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511.  If the aforesaid evidentiary standard is met, then the court may consider whether the termination is for the best interests of the child.  As with virtually any other issue regarding the custody or placement of children, the best interests of the child are paramount.  The court is to give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and/or emotional needs and welfare of the child.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)  The statute is clear that issues surrounding environmental factors will not be the sole basis of termination.  Environmental factors include housing, furnishings, income, clothing, medical care, and the like if they are beyond the control of the parent.  Finally, if a parent attempts to remedy the issues and conditions provoking the termination petition after the petition is filed, the court will likely not consider them.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)

After the filing of a petition for termination, a hearing is held with at least ten days’ notice to the parents, putative father, and parent of a minor parent who has not been terminated.  Following termination, the terminated parent may not object to any adoption proceeding for the child.  Terminated parents nearly always have the right to file updates of his or her personal medical history information after termination.

Resources:

  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2313
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2501
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2502
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2503
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2505
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2512
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2521
  • In Re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007)
  • Baby Boy A. v. Catholic Social Services, 517 A.2d 1244 (Pa.1986)
  • v. Arnold, 665 A.2d 836 (Pa.Super.1995)
  • In re Burns, 474 P. 615 (1977)
  • In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa.Super.2000)
  • In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738 (Pa.Super.2004)
  • In re K.K.R.-S., K.M.R. & K.A.R., 958 A.2d 529 (Pa.Super.2008)

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Questions of Paternity

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Questions of Paternity.”

Thanks!

__________

III.       CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

C.     Questions of Paternity

Historically the law regarding children born out-of-wedlock (i.e.: so-called “bastards”) was different than that regarding a child born into a family, which disadvantaged and stigmatized them.  Now, however, by contrast, parents, no matter the circumstances of the birth of their children, all have equal rights under the law.  The establishment of paternity entitles the person who is awarded it to custodial rights over the child-at-issue.

There are six ways in which paternity can be established: (1) voluntary acknowledgment; (2) stipulation to be bound to the results of a genetic test; (3) estoppel; (4) presumption; (5) hearing/trial; and, (6) failing to appear for testing, trial, and/or hearing for paternity.  An action to determine paternity for a child born out of wedlock may be commenced at any time until the child turns eighteen years old.

A child born into a marriage is presumed to be the child of the father in that marriage and this presumption is typically only rebutted through showing impotence or the impossibility of sexual access.  23 Pa.C.S.A. §5104(g).  In situations when a child is born out-of-wedlock, paternity may be determined by (1) the parents eventually marrying and/or (2) through clear and convincing evidence that the purported father has provided financial support and/or received the child into his home and has held the child out as his, and/or (3) clear and convincing evidence of actual paternity (e.g. positive paternity testing which is prima facia evidence of paternity).  The presumption of paternity in the context of marriage is for the purpose of preserving stable family units for the children within them.

Of course, a putative father may also acknowledge paternity in a verified writing.  This is often done at a child support conference/hearing where a man submits to a support order for a child he acknowledges as his own.  If a man appears at a support hearing but refuses to acknowledge paternity, the court is to enter an order directing the parties to appear for genetic testing.  Perhaps obviously, the mother is, by statute (23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513(c)) considered to be a competent witness to paternity.  The putative father may contest the results of the genetic testing, but, to do so, he must marshal clear and convincing evidence that the test is somehow not reliable.  If the test itself is not conclusive (i.e.: results in less than 99% probability), the court will schedule the matter for trial.

Estoppel occurs when a man holds a child out as his own regardless of biological relationship.  It could also occur when a woman holds him out as the father despite biological relationship.  Estoppel, basically, is the prohibition of denying paternity after holding a child out as one’s own, regardless of his relation to the child.  Estoppel, at its essence, is designed to prevent putative fathers from denying parentage at some point in the future.  “Hold out as his own” is typically evidenced by spending time with the child, living with the child, the child bearing the man’s name, the child calling him “dad,” the man representing to others he is the father, and so on.  In situations such as this, this man will be estopped from denying paternity and genetic testing may not be admitted to contradict paternity.  Relatedly, if a man other than the apparent father denies paternity, a mother may not pursue genetic testing on the alleged father due to the presence of the apparent father.  Again, similar to the presumption from a marriage, it is believed permanency is in the best interests of the child.  Furthermore, estoppel is most often applied in situations where a man has held himself out as a child’s father only to try and deny paternity when/if child support is ordered at some point in the future.  As estoppel often relies upon timing (e.g.: failing to move immediately for genetic testing upon learning of a claim of paternity) the Pennsylvania Superior Court observed that the law is starting to soften on its application and stated “paternity by estoppel continues to pertain in Pennsylvania, but it will apply only where it can be shown, on a developed record, that it is in the best interests of the involved child.”  T.E.D. v. C.A.B. v. P.D.K., Jr., 74 A.3d 170 (Pa.Super.2013).

There are times, of course, when more than one man claims to be the father of a child.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled on who may request a paternity test and/or challenge paternity and/or be denied the right to seek paternity.  In the matter of Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241 (1997) the Supreme Court, through a plurality opinion, laid out the required analysis to determine the paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage.  First, one must determine whether the marriage presumption of paternity applies and, if so, whether it has been rebutted.  Second, if the presumption has been rebutted, one must then determine if estoppel applies to bar either a plaintiff from making a claim or a defendant from denying paternity.

The underlying principle of the presumption is the preservation of marriage, in other words, the protection of an intact family.  If the presumption does not apply one must then determine whether the man seeking paternity is estopped from attempting to strip another man’s claim to paternity of a child born during marriage and/or held out as his own.  It should be noted that one’s delay or inactivity in seeking paternity may bar him from doing so.  Again, best interests – in this instance the stability of a child’s life – is paramount.

Of course, there are times when fraud is claimed regarding paternity and, if demonstrated, the argument of estoppel could be precluded.  In order to successfully argue fraud, a party must demonstrate: (1) a misrepresentation; (2) a fraudulent utterance; (3) intention to induce action by the recipient; (4) justifiable reliance on the utterance; and, (5) damages.

Resources:

  • R.C.P. 1910.15
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2313
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2502
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2513
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4343
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5102
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5103
  • 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5104
  • Rosado v. Diaz, 425 Pa.Super. 155 (1993)
  • Liebner v. Simcox, 834 A.2d 606 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • Karner v. McMahon, 640 A.2d 926 (1994)
  • John M. v. Paul T., 524 Pa. 306 (1990)
  • Freeman v. McCandless, 539 Pa. 584 (1995)
  • Buccieri v. Campagna, 889 A.2d 1220 (Pa.Super.2005)
  • Conroy v. Rosenwald, 940 A.2d 409 (Pa.Super.2007)
  • Warfield v. Warfield, 815 A.2d 1073 (Pa.Super.2003)
  • Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403 (Pa.Super.2002)
  • Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.2006)
  • O. v. C.O., 404 Pa.Super. 127 (1991)

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation.”

Thanks!

__________

III.       CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

B.   Motion for a Change of Custody or Visitation

A party to a custody order has a right to seek its modification.  Contrary to popular belief, one does not need to allege that there has been a change in circumstances in order to seek, or have, a modification of a custody order.  The form and process of drafting and filing a petition to modify custody is substantially the same as a complaint for custody and the series of hearings which follow are also the same.

            There are instances where an attorney files something entitled a complaint (or petition) to “Confirm Custody.”  It does not appear that such a filing is derived from an actual procedural category or practice.  Instead, it merely appears to be a standard complaint or petition for custody given a different title for, apparently, the sole purpose of giving the filer some sort of rhetorical capital or high ground, as “confirming custody” implies that person is already entitled to custody and is merely filing to “confirm” it.  Alternatively, it is sometimes used in situations where there is already an existing “informal” custody arrangement (i.e.: without a court order), and the person filing merely wishes to “confirm” that custody arrangement in a court order.  This merely appears to be a stylistic preference, and not based on any law or procedure, and, therefore, has no practical effect on a custody matter.

 

 

NBI Seminar: Child Custody and Visitation Rights: A Petition for Visitation and/or Custody

As I have posted recently (see here), I  had the great opportunity to lead (perhaps “teach”) a continuing legal education seminar hosted by the National Business Institute (a.k.a. NBI, see here).  The subject was “Family Law From A to Z” and I had opportunity to speak on two main topics in particular: Custody and Ethics.  I was joined by four other capable attorneys who each had their own topics to present.

Although NBI published the materials, I retain the ownership of the portions I wrote, which I will post here in this blog.

Copied below are the materials I wrote for the section entitled “Child Custody and Visitation Rights: A Petition for Visitation and/or Custody.”

Thanks!

__________

CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS

  1. A. Petition for Visitation and/or Custody

Like nearly any other court case, all custody actions – regardless of how much custody is being sought (e.g.: primary, partial, or visitation, etc) – begin with the filing a complaint.  The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a standard form for a complaint, which can be found in Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1915.15 and 1915.16.

The various county courts in the Philadelphia area offer forms for custody complaints, and they can be found at the following websites:

 

  • Elements of a Complaint

As one can see from reviewing the forms mentioned above, a standard complaint for custody is to include, more or less, the following information:

Unlike a civil complaint, very little additional information or advocacy needs to be included in the complaint for custody.  The opportunity to advance additional information and/or advocacy is when interacting with the opposing party or attorney and/or at a hearing scheduled pursuant to the filing of the Complaint.  The purpose of the custody complaint is merely to get the most basic information before the court: who the case involves, what the Plaintiff wants, and an assertion that no other court has jurisdiction.

When requesting relief in the complaint, it is important to use the proper language which best describes why the Plaintiff is seeking.  23 Pa.C.S.A. §5322 lays out the terms and their definitions.  Pursuant 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5322, the relevant terms are as follows (as quoted directly from the statute):

  • legal custody: the right to make major decisions on behalf of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational decisions.
  • sole legal custody: the right of one individual to exclusive legal custody of the child.
  • shared legal custody: the right of more than one individual to legal custody of the child.
  • physical custody: the actual physical possession and control of a child.
  • sole physical custody: the right of one individual to exclusive physical custody of the child.
  • primary physical custody: the right to assume physical custody of the child for the majority of time.
  • shared physical custody: the right of more than one individual to assume physical custody of the child, each having significant periods of physical custodial time with the child.
  • partial physical custody: the right to assume physical custody of the child for less than a majority of the time.
  • supervised physical custody: custodial time during which an agency or an adult designated by the court or agreed upon by the parties monitors the interaction between the child and the individual with those rights.
  • In a statutory provision other than in this chapter, when the term “visitation” is often used in reference to child custody, and may be construed to mean:

(1) partial physical custody;

(2) shared physical custody; or

(3) supervised physical custody.

In the vast majority of case, the only issue in dispute is physical custody as, unless there is unusual and/or extenuating custody (e.g.: incarceration, absence, abuse), the parents of a child are both presumed to have a right to shared legal custody.  As defined above, physical custody is when a parent actually has a child personally with him.  By contrast, legal custody is the right of a parent to have access to, and make decisions regarding, important parenting and lifestyle issues.

It is also important to observe the fact that the specific definitions of/for the terms above do not always coincide with popular or colloquial usage.  It is very common for a client, when consulting with his attorney, to use one or more of the terms above without reference to its technical, legal, definition; therefore, it is important to discern precisely what a client is seeking instead of assuming even a vague familiarity, much less a fluency, with the terms mentioned above.  For example, many clients, when consulting with their attorney or filing a custody petition on a pro se basis, frequently indicate they are seeking “full custody” of their children, despite the fact that no such designation exists; similarly, they often refer to “sole custody” in the same way.  In addition, it is not uncommon for someone to use the term “visitation” when he really means “partial custody.”  So, it is important to discern what the client actually means sometimes despite the precise words being used.

Following the ‘Wiseman’ Standard in Pa. Custody Battles Is Unwise

Although the so-called Wiseman standard, the standard by which shared custody arrangements were determined, stood for many years, the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case of P.J.P. v. M.M., 2018 Pa. Super. 100, has officially declared the Wiseman standard obsolete and no longer applicable to Pennsylvania child custody matters.

In the matter of P.J.P., a custody case, the father appealed a decision in the trial court regarding his petition to modify a custody order that he believed was not sufficiently favorable for his custody goals.

The father and the mother are a divorced couple who obtained a child custody order in April 2016. This order granted the mother primary physical custody of the child. In January 2017, the father sought more custody, specifically shared physical custody, and filed a petition to modify.

At the trial, in August 2017, the court made many findings of facts that are directly relevant to its ultimate decision to deny granting shared custody to the father. For example, when the mother has custody she sends the father many photographs and videos and encourages the child to call the father. By contrast, the father does not want to call the mother during his custody times and sends no photographs and videos to the mother. The mother further claimed, and the father admitted, that he has insulted the mother in the presence of the child. He also admitted to telling the child to be sure to look up the instant case on Google Scholar when he is older to know what happened during the case. The mother is also conscientious in ensuring that the father has nice gifts from the child for holidays and such, while the father makes only modest efforts to reciprocate. The parties also had disagreements over the procedure and process for dropping the child off at preschool in the morning. The mother claimed the father refused to get the child ready and just dropped him off at her house, while the father claimed the mother “unilaterally” changed the procedure. Co-parenting counseling was also attempted by the parties. Unfortunately, while the mother was trying to fully invest herself in said counseling, The father refused to meaningfully participate, and the counselor believed the counseling was “not going anywhere.” Of course, the father has a different interpretation of much of the above, but the court made its findings, which favored the mother, after a complete review of the facts, testimony and evidence.

On appeal, the father challenged the denial of shared custody, arguing it was contrary to the best interests of the child. The Superior Court first noted that the trial court made certain credibility determinations that were within its discretion. The court then mentioned that child custody is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5328, which lays out 16  factors for the court to consider when making a custody determination. Superior Court observed that the trial court analyzed each factor and noted that most were either inapplicable or weighed equally for both; however, there were four factors (namely the likelihood to encourage and permit contact with the other party, availability of extended family, attempts to turn the child against the other parent, and the level of conflict and willingness to cooperate with the other party) which weighed heavily on the mother’s side. No factor weighed heavily on the father’s side.

The father argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the Weisman standard. In Weisman v. Wall, 718 A.2d 844 (Pa. Super.1998), the court ruled that courts must make four findings when ruling on shared custody “both parents must be fit, capable of making reasonable child rearing decisions and willing and able to provide love and care for their children; both parents must evidence a continuing desire for active involvement in the child’s life; both parents must be recognized by the child as a source of security and love; a minimal degree of cooperation between the parents must be possible.” The father further argued that since he and the mother, in his view, meet the above four factors, shared custody should be awarded.

Superior Court ruled that the father’s reliance on Weisman is misplaced. As noted above, Weisman was decided in 1998 while Section 5328 became law in 2011. The court does not believe the difference between Weisman and Section 5328 is trivial. Specifically Weisman “required the court, before awarding shared custody, ‘to make at least a minimal finding that the parties were able to cooperate before awarding shared custody” while, under Section 5328, the court “must determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to, ‘the level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another.”’

Superior Court noted that the plain language of Section 5328 contradicts Weisman. Unlike Weisman, the court is not obliged to make any specific findings before awarding shared custody. Instead, the court must consider all 16 of the relevant factors, and poor cooperation need not be dispositive. In sum, therefore, Superior Court specifically described Weisman as obsolete.

Finally, the court explained that its citing to Weisman in the recent case of R.S. v. T.T., 1133 A.3d 1254 (Pa.Super.2015) does not belie the above analysis. In R.S., the court used the Weisman factors to supplement its own analysis where it seemed Section 5328 did not appear to lead to a reasonable conclusion in light of the available evidence. Moreover, the court in R.S. never once said trial courts “must” make Weisman findings. Instead, Weismanmerely holds persuasive value as the its factors have been assimilated into Section 5328.

Upon full review of the decision, it appears that P.J.P. has hammered the final nail into the casket of the Weisman analysis. Weisman, for all intents and purposes, no longer appears to be the law for Pennsylvania child custody.

Originally published in The Legal Intelligencer on July 5, 2018 and can be seen here and reprinted in the Pennsylvania Family Lawyer in September 2018 and can be seen here.

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